WESTERN SAHARA: PREPARING THE GOM FOR AUTONOMY

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000389

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, IO; GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009
TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: PREPARING THE GOM FOR AUTONOMY
AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE POLISARIO

REF: RABAT 333

Classified By: DCm Wayne Bush for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In meetings with the MOI and MFA on February
17 in Rabat, and reiterated during the embassy's February 22
meeting with MFA SecGen Omar Hilale, visiting NEA/MAG Office
Director William Jordan urged GOM officials to be expansive
in their thinking on autonomy to make it real and credible to
the Sahrawi people. He emphasized Morocco should be prepared
to negotiate with the Polisario. Jordan assured the GOM that
the US shared the view held by many countries that an
independent state in the Western Sahara was likely unviable
and that a more realistic settlement was one that accorded
the Sahrawis a significant measure of autonomy under Moroccan
sovereignty. In light of increased international attention
focused on the response by Moroccan security services to
demonstrations and arrests of Sahrawi activists, he urged the
GOM to allow greater access to the territory to counter the
impression that the GOM "has something to hide." Jordan told
his contacts that he would be traveling to Tindouf the
following week and would use any meetings with the Polisario
to press for serious contacts with the Moroccans and
agreement to negotiate with Morocco without preconditions.
MOI Governor Rachid Rguibi said there was already
considerable Sahrawi involvement in local affairs in the
territory. He stressed that Morocco had a vision for the
territory and was ready and eager for a negotiated solution
to the conflict -- but was Algeria? End Summary.


2. (C) On February 17, NEA/MAG Office Director William
Jordan had separate meetings with Governor Rachid Rguibi, a
member of the MOI's brain trust on the Western Sahara; MFA
Bilateral Affairs Director Youssef Amrani; and MFA Director
of American Affairs Salahuddin Tazi. While the meetings with
the MFA covered other issues in the US-Morocco bilateral
relationship (reftel),the 75-minute meeting with Rguibi
focused exclusively on the Western Sahara. Polcouns
accompanied Jordan to the Rguibi meeting, and DCM, Polcouns,
and Poloff joined Jordan for the two MFA meetings.

Western Sahara: Autonomy, Image, and the Polisario
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Rguibi told Jordan by way of context that efforts to
decentralize nationally were well underway in Morocco -- not
just in the Western Sahara. Autonomy for the Western Sahara
was now an accepted idea, even though "there are those in
Morocco who fear it." Spain provided the "closest" model to
what Morocco was considering, though there were "some
tendencies" in Catalonia that "cause concern" for Morocco.
Rguibi noted that in 2000 Morocco committed to James Baker to
accept autonomy, and at that point autonomy in the Western
Sahara became part of a national plan for decentralization.


4. (C) Rguibi said Moroccan academics and political parties,
among others, had taken up the King's December 2005 call for
consultations and sharing of ideas on the Western Sahara.
"The King wants the search for the right solution to be
appropriated by the people," he said. Rguibi argued that
there was "nothing" in the south when the Spanish left the
territory; there were just some army barracks and nomads, and
over the years the GOM had made huge strikes in developing
the territory.


5. (C) Rguibi said Morocco's thinking on autonomy was no
secret to the US, as then-MOI Sahel had brought Morocco's

SIPDIS
autonomy plan to the US in late 2003. Morocco saw the
process toward a solution as a negotiation, based on
"courageous principles," essentially between two parties:
Morocco and Algeria. Rguibi wondered whether Algeria was
really ready to engage in a serious way with Morocco to find
a solution.


6. (C) Rguibi stressed that independence was an
"unthinkable" option for Morocco. US pressure on Algeria to
drive home that point was essential. Independence was
ethnically and politically impossible for the Sahrawi people,
"even for me as a Sahrawi." Rguibi said he was glad that the
US was interested in and knowledgeable about the Western

Sahara issue. Morocco, moreover, deeply appreciated the US
role in facilitating the release of the remaining Moroccan
POWs in August 2005.


7. (C) Rguibi identified a census of the Tindouf camps as
another priority for the GOM and expressed appreciation for
previous US support for this initiative in Geneva. More
pressure on UNHCR to follow through was necessary, he said; a
census would allow the international community to know the
real population of the camps. But Algeria defies the
international community and refuses a census, he charged, and
there was no real cooperation between Algeria and UNHCR.


8. (C) Morocco's other concern with the Western Sahara,
Rguibi said, was to ward off potential terrorism emanating
from the Sahel region. As the US and western Europe well
knew, much of the Sahel was a no-man's land, and what
happened there in terms of security could have an effect on
the west. Afghan Arabs could re-group in the ungoverned
spaces; there had already been kidnappings of westerners in
Algeria; there was clandestine migration of nationals from
west Africa and all the way from South Asia. Every time the
GOM intercepted migrants, others followed. Migrants transit
the Sahel and the Western Sahara to get to Europe. This
works against western interests.


9. (C) Rguibi summed up by saying the situation boiled down
to this: was Algeria ready for a definitive political
solution to the conflict? Stability in the Maghreb was
important. A militarized Polisario was a threat to Morocco;
this was the subject of FM Benaissa's recent letter to the
UNSYG Annan (concerning Polisario activity in Tifariti). The
Polisario was asserting itself along the Mauritanian border
in areas MINURSO could not reach, where there few inhabitants
and no government control. Moreover, to celebrate SADR
independence later this month, the Polisario would bring in
supporters from Mauritania, violating the ceasefire and the
military agreements.


10. (C) Jordan responded that an independent state in the
Western Sahara was not conceivable to the US and much of the
international community, primarily because such a state was
not likely to be viable. A mutually agreed solution offering
real autonomy, in which Sahrawis can realize
self-determination in the context of Moroccan sovreignty, was
the preferred solution. The US believed this was attainable.
Presentation by Morocco of an autonomy plan to the Secretary
Council was the next step. With the definitive end of the
Baker process, diplomacy on the Western Sahara had entered a
new phase. UN Envoy Van Walsum would soon issue a report on
the situation. A new formula was necessary for moving
forward, with the support of the international community and
the Friends of the Western Sahara. The US looked forward
with eagerness to Morocco's autonomy plan so the focus could
shift to negotiations. Morocco's autonomy plan should
consider all the aspects of autonomy, encompassing the
support of the Sahrawi people.


11. (C) Jordan said a concern for the US was that the
demonstrations in the territory -- whether supported or
motivated by the Polisario, or whether a reflection of the
conditions in the territory -- gave the impression that the
Sahrawis were being marginalized. Jordan said it was not for
him to pronounce on the underlying factors, but the
international community was interested in the question. The
US reviewed reports from NGOs, its embassies, and others to
develop an accurate picture of the situation in the Sahara.
For a durable end to the conflict, a solution needed to pass
through the inhabitants of the territory.


12. (C) Jordan agreed that Algeria had to be fully involved
in the search for a solution. Without Algeria, there would
be no lasting solution, and no pressure on the Polisario to
engage. The US encouraged Morocco to have direct contact
with the Polisario or the real representatives of the Sahrawi
people. The US could not envisage a tangible solution
without that. The Maghreb region needed real integration and
cooperation to realize the objectives of the Arab Magreb
Union. But integration had little chance without a solution
to the Maghreb's central problem. The US was concerned about

provocative Polisario activities in what it called the
"liberated zone" east of the berm, although there was not an
abundance of information available about what was actually
going on and whether it violated the 1991 cease-fire
agreement.


13. (C) Jordan told Rguibi he would be visiting the camps in
Tindouf the following week and would probably have contact
with the Polisario. He would stress US concern about
activities that destabilize the region and note the only way
forward is through diplomacy. The Polisario needed to
consider very seriously, despite its public rejection, the
Moroccan proposal on autonomy. The US was prepared to assist
negotiations provided the Polisario agreed to reach a
solution peacefully. Similarily, in meetings with the GOA,
Jordan told Rguibi he would tell the Algerians frankly they
could not opt out. A durable solution required the full
participation of Algeria.


14. (C) Rguibi said the US vision was encouraging to
Morocco, and he hoped the US would help the parties find a
solution as quickly as possible. He wanted to be clear about
several points concerning the situation in the "south,"
however. Morocco had spent the last twenty-five years
developing the Western Sahara. The territory enjoyed the
lowest unemployment in the country. There were ports,
airports, and good roads. There was massive immigration from
the north to the south. The Western Sahara enjoyed the most
ambitious development projects in Morocco, and the GOM was
very satisfied with the progress achieved so far. There was
greater freedom of expression in the Sahara now.
"Separatists" meet with US officials without repercussions or
arrests. Yet, some Sahrawis burn the Moroccan flag.
Moroccans are not used to that. It's a provocation. Some
people in the territory act on instruction from the
Polisario. The Polisario is against national development
plans in Morocco. When people engage in violence and swear
allegiance to the Polisario, then the GOM must be concerned.
When that happens, the Polisario becomes a militant movement.
Our people cannot accept that, Rguibi insisted. Fourteen
Sahrawi activists had been sentenced recently for their role
in demonstrations. The process was transparent. The brother
of Polisario leader Abdulaziz lives in Morocco -- he is left
alone. Delegations travel to the Western Sahara all the
time, but when they arrive waving the Polisario flag, that's
a provocation. It's not the central government that takes
action, Rguibi said, but rather the mayor of Laayoune who
decides how to handle the situation.


15. (C) The Moroccan government, Rguibi said, has gone very
far in expanding liberties in the Western Sahara and
elsewhere in Morocco. The King was going as far as possible.
It was unacceptable that people should provoke those
Sahrawis who have made the choice to be Moroccan. Thirty-one
Sahrawis were members of the Moroccan parliament -- more than
eleven percent of the seats. Most of the mayors in the
Sahara are Sahrawis. Sahrawis are integrated into political
and economic life throughout Morocco -- in Settat, in
Larache, in the banks, in the regional investment centers. I
myself, Rguibi said, am a Sahrawi who was a counselor to the
two prime ministers before coming to the Ministry of Interior.


16. (C) Rguibi closed with an anecdote. He had been in
Laayoune for the funeral of a Sahrawi man last November. As
the funeral cortege wound through Laayoune, there was an
accident and three pedestrians were killed. The next day the
Algerian press and the Polisario were proclaiming this a
politically motivated killing. Such exploitation was
dangerous for an accurate understanding of the Western
Sahara. Yes, the period May through July 2005, with numerous
demonstrations, had been difficult, Rguibi admitted. A
Sahrawi man had been killed in October during demonstrations.
This was a mistake, and the offending officers had been
arrested. Security officials are under strict orders to
avoid confrontations with demonstrators.

Meetings with the MFA
--------------


17. (C) During a brief meeting, Jordan reiterated key points

to Youssef Amrani, MFA Director of Bilateral Affairs, noting
that the Department is "waiting with impatience" for
Morocco,s autonomy proposal. He stressed that the Western
Sahara is at the forefront of how Morocco,s image is
perceived by the international community, and it is
imperative that Morocco allow access to the Western Sahara.
Jordan said it is inevitable the Polisario will have a seat
at the negotiating table and Morocco will have to engage the
Polisario. Amrani replied that Morocco is no stranger to the
Polisario because the GOM has negotiated with the Polisario
in the past. Amrani said the problem is Algeria does not
allow the Polisario to act independently. In this regard,
dealing with Algeria is "unavoidable," according to Amrani.


18. (C) Amrani asked that the USG also encourage Algeria to
have an open dialogue with Morocco on the Western Sahara,
because without this there will be no movement towards a
solution. Jordan ensured Amrani that he would pass a similar
message to the Algerian government. The GOM will propose a
"more concrete autonomy plan" in April, according to Amrani.


19. (C) MFA Americas Director Tazi noted that the stability
of Morocco depends on the rapid solution of the Western
Sahara question. Morocco, as he said, can not continue to
expend resources, money, and energy on this conflict. Jordan
agreed that the conflict has gone on too long, and suggested
that Morocco, in addition to focusing on the need to get
Algeria involved, must also ensure that a solution is
accepted by the Saharawi people. Jordan noted that although
there are those who will try to exploit the situation,
Morocco must allow as much information as possible to come
out of the territory. Not doing so risks the possibility of
outsiders concluding that Morocco has something to hide.


20. (C) During a February 22 meeting with MFA SecGen Hilale,
Polcouns stressed the importance of Morocco submitting an
expanded, credible autonomy plan that could serve as the
basis of negotiations with both Algeria and the Polisario.
Hilale said Morocco was not starting from scratch on
autonomy, echoing Rguibi that some Moroccans were not ready
to accept autonomy. Hilale said the Sudan experience was in
the back of Morocco's mind; negotiations on a north-south
peace arrangement there caused splintering and violence in
the west. This demonstrated that even autonomy was a risk
for Morocco. That said, Morocco was ready to move forward,
but it was high time for the Algerians to engage seriously.
Having the parties at the negotiating table would give the
Moroccan people a huge psychological boost. Was the Palace
consulting with Moroccan political parties and NGOs as the
King had asked, Polcouns inquired? Yes, Hilale said, "our
people are doing a good job."


21. (U) NEA/MAG Director Jordan cleared this message.
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Riley