WESTERN SAHARA: MINURSO'S HOPES AND FRUSTRATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000240

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, DRL, IO; GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2011
TAGS: KPKO MO PBTS PGOV PHUM
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: MINURSO'S HOPES AND FRUSTRATIONS

REF: A. 05 RABAT 2262


B. USUN 98

Classified By: Pol/C Timothy Lenderking, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: During NEA/MAG desk officer's January
23-27 visit to Morocco and the Western Sahara, Poloffs and
desk officer met over dinner with Francesco Bastagli, the
Secretary General's Special Envoy to the Western Sahara and

SIPDIS
MINURSO Chief of Staff Philippe Elghouyal on January 25 in
Laayoune. Deskoff and Poloff also attended an updated (and
vastly improved) military briefing with MINURSO military
staff on January 26 at headquarters. Bastagli, Elghouyal,
and the military briefers all expressed frustration with the
current state of affairs and limited MINURSO mandate.
Bastagli argued that three options lie before MINURSO: it
either reshapes its role to include humanitarian efforts,
and, (once an agreement between the parties gets underway)
guarantees Moroccan commitments in the territory; second,
pares down to a military presence only; or, third, is
eliminated. He appeared to favor the first option and
clearly feels that MINURSO is under pressure to demonstrate
its utility to the international community. Bastagli
speculated that the Polisario might actually be edgy about
the demonstrations in Laayoune, concerned perhaps that new
leaders could emerge west of the berm and not be under the
control of the Polisario leadership in Tindouf. End Summary.

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Whither MINURSO?
--------------


2. (C) On January 25, NEA/MAG Desk Officer, Polcouns and
Poloff met over dinner in Laayoune with Francesco Bastagli,
the Secretary General's Special Envoy to the Western Sahara
and Chief of Staff Philippe Elghouyal. Bastagali bluntly
expressed increasing frustration over the history of the
MINURSO program: fifteen years and no resolution. He stated
that there are three options available for MINURSO: expand
the program to include humanitarian relief; maintain the
military presence only; or eliminate MINURSO entirely.
Bastagli favored expanding MINURSO,s role, suggesting that
if the GOM put forward an autonomy proposal for the Western
Sahara, MINURSO could be the key international guarantor of
Moroccan commitments in the territory. Bastagli said he
could not rule out that removing MINURSO from the picture
entirely could precipitate conflict in the territory.


3. (C) Bastagli and Elghouyal characterized the GOM,s
attitude toward MINURSO as "arrogant and paranoid.8 They
said the GOM continues to obstruct MINURSO operations not
specifically outlined in the MINURSO mandate. The GOM knows
MINURSO operates under constraints and takes advantage,
Bastagli said. Despite GOM obstacles, Bastagli still hopes
to expand the confidence-building measures (CBMs) and conduct
non-political seminars in order to increase people-to-people
contact. (Note: GOM MINURSO Coordinator Hamid Chabar told
Polcouns February 8 that he was pleased with the CBMs so far
and was fully on board with expanding them, provided UNHCR
remained committed to implementing them "transparently" and
demanded strict adherence to the agreements by the Polisario.
End Note.). Bastagli wondered if there could be a role for
the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in promoting CBMs for the
Western Sahara.


4. (C) Bastagli complained that MINURSO continued to exist
in a bubble, due mainly to constraints placed on contact with
the local population. While MINURSO has little contact with
Sahrawis, Bastagli noted that the Polisaro has frequent
contact with MINURSO in and around Tindouf and the berm.
Despite such contact, Bastagli said he could not comment with
any certainty on fissures within the Polisario leadership or
reported &tensions8 in the Tindouf camps. He said he had a
feeling, though, that the Polisario leadership was not
entirely comfortable with the demonstrations in
Moroccan-controlled Sahara. He had a sense that the
Polisario was concerned about not being able to control the
popular mood west of the berm, and a new leadership could
emerge in Laayoune that was home-grown and not entirely under
the sway of the Polisario.


5. (C) Bastagli said MINURSO,s night patrols, which started
in November, were continuing but were not as effective as

they could be due to the lack of night-vision equipment.
Without such, Bastagli said the patrols cannot do much.
Bastagli said a request was being made through formal
channels for the proper equipment.

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Security Situation in Laayoune
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6. (C) When asked about the current situation in Laayoune,
Bastagli said that the atmosphere was tense, demonstrations
continue, and that security had increased in the city.
(Comment: The increase in security was evident during our
visit, more than ever before. Emboffs saw an usual number of
security vehicles on the streets, belonging to gendarme,
army, and urban security, and in one vacant lot near the
UNHCR office two truck loads of officers in riot gear. End
Comment). He added that some of the conflicts were largely
youth-based and the result of tense relations between
Moroccan and Sahrawi students. He did, however, stress that
MINURSO had little or no contact with the local population
and his observations were largely secondhand. He said the
recent series of demonstrations did not constitute an
&intifada8 as the Polisario contended, but there was
"popular support" for the demonstrations. He said the GOM
was trying to "win hearts and minds," but their crackdown on
demonstrators made their efforts seem "schizophrenic."


7. (C) Bastagli said that the area around MINURSO is now
blocked off, following an early January attempt by apparent
Sahrawi demonstrators to gain access to the compound. A GOM
security patrol is now posted outside of MINURSO headquarters.

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Military Briefing at MINURSO
--------------


8. (C) Deskoff and Poloff had an updated military briefing
at MINURSO headquarters January 26. The military briefers
indicated that they rarely see heavy Polisario military
equipment and are aware that most of the Polisario's
remaining functioning equipment is kept in Rabouni. This
equipment is of Russian origin, visibly aging, and, according
to MINURSO, very little looks functional. MINURSO is
expecting that the remaining working equipment will be used
on the Polisario side of the berm February 27, Polisario
"national day," and they are preparing for instability on
both sides of the berm during the celebrations. All at
MINURSO suspected a negative and swift reaction by the GOM to
any celebrations of Polisario &independence.8


9. (C) According to the MINURSO briefers, there are
approximately one million mines along the berm. These mines
were placed by the GOM and the Polisario, explode frequently,
and have killed and injured both people and livestock over
the years, though in small numbers in the recent past.
MINURSO has requested a "mine coordinator" from New York to
explore ways to eliminate this problem.


10. (C) As noted Ref B, on January 15, the Polisario agreed
to allow the MINURSO military freedom of movement. The GOM,
however, has not agreed to allow MINURSO freedom of travel
and continues to require permission for MINURSO movements in
the Western Sahara. MINURSO expressed frustration with other
GOM restrictions that prevent Moroccan weaponry from being
checked and limit MINURSO free discussions to only certain
military personnel. MINURSO military officials commented
that the GOM is fearful that any information learned during
discussions with the Moroccan military might be passed to the
Polisario, which, according to MINURSO, has happened in the
past. Whereas MINURSO views the officer corps in the
Moroccan military as professional, the enlisted military does
not garner the same respect.


11. (C) There are currently 232 peacekeepers in the MINURSO
force, including the force commander. The forces have never
encountered a skirmish between the Polisario and the GOM --
the situation is static. Briefers said the night patrols to
date have encountered vehicles during their patrols, but have
not investigated these vehicles. MINURSO had no information
on the region being a transit area for terrorists. According
to MINURSO, the Polisario is still housing 48 illegal
migrants, mostly sub-Saharans and South Asians. MINURSO would
not comment on alleged Polisario involvement in illegal
migration. MINURSO confirmed they had assisted illegal
migrants that were likely released in the Sahara by the GOM
and also stated the GOM had killed two illegal sub-Saharan
migrants within the recent past.

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Comment
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12. (C) Bastagli made his pitch on the relevance of MINURSO
to maintaining the cease-fire and ensuring stability as a
buffer between Morocco and the Polisario, in spite of the
constraints that MINURSO faces. While understanding the
concern of the international community and Van Walsum that
MINURSO has essentially never fulfilled its mandate, he
clearly believes MINURSO has a role to play, and if anything
needs to be armed with more political resolve and more
resources to enhance its effectiveness. MINURSO staff
emphasized frustration with the GOM while remaining more
upbeat about their dealings with the Polisario.


13. (U) This cable was cleared by Y. Robert Ewing.

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