WESTERN SAHARA: AUTONOMY IDEAS EMERGE DESPITE

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 002254

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016
TAGS: PBTS PGOV PHUM MO
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: AUTONOMY IDEAS EMERGE DESPITE
CORCAS SHAM

REF: RABAT 1775

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The so-called "CORCAS" autonomy plan that
its president announced he would submit to the King was not
broadly approved by Sahrawis, even among CORCAS itself. In
the event CORCAS had legitimately approved, it still would
have meant little, as CORCAS itself is not a representative
institution. The news is not all bad, however. Enough
details of autonomy plan discussions have leaked to suggest
that some potentially interesting ideas are in play; these
may see the light of day in another CORCAS meeting scheduled
December 21. We should not forget, however, that at this
point we do not feel that this plan necessarily reflects any
broad consensus of the Sahrawis. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The Royal Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs,
known as CORCAS, held a two-day "Extraordinary meeting"
December 4-5. At the meeting's end, the Council's Chairman,
long-time Sahrawi politician Kalihenna Ould Er Rachid,
announced that "CORCAS" had approved an autonomy plan and he
would submit it to King Mohammed VI. He said autonomy would
guarantee the political, social, economic and cultural rights
of the Sahrawi people under the sovereignty of the Moroccan
monarchy. He maintained it would be in harmony with
international law. A referendum would be impossible, he
thundered, partly because the Sahrawi people lived also in
Mauritania, Algeria, other parts of Morocco and elsewhere.


3. (C) Kalihenna's announcement was covered by press from
Morocco and Spain. The only detail Kalihenna announced at
the conference was that Spanish would be the second language
of the independent territory, after Arabic and before French.
Kalihenna allegedly told Spanish reporters afterwards that
the CORCAS had unanimously approved the plan.


4. (C) Some CORCAS members, including CORCAS Human Rights
Committee chairman Baida El Hocine (protect) have told us and
the press they were very unhappy. Not only had the meeting
not approved such a plan, but the rank and file had not even
seen a draft, nor were they aware of details. Participants
also told us the session had gotten off to a bad start.
Mobile phones were confiscated by security personnel,
sometimes forcibly, citing direct orders from His Majesty the
King.


5. (C) El Hocine and other CORCAS members disillusioned with
the leadership have told the press they would be submitting
their own plan and comments to the King. They railed at
Kalihenna, decrying his dictatorial stage management of the
meeting and of the CORCAS in general. At the same time they
stressed their own support for Moroccan sovereignty. Our
interlocutors acknowledged that some of the issues within the
CORCAS were tribal. The CORCAS dissidents told us that 80
percent of their fellow members were on Kalihenna's payroll,
but even those did not get to see a "plan". These Sahrawis
had agreed to become CORCAS members in the first place
because they support Moroccan sovereignty, and alienating
them further jeopardizes the limited credibility of the
CORCAS and the GOM in the Sahara. Nevertheless, they are not
planning to quit and expect to attend the "ordinary" or
regularly scheduled meeting due to begin on December 21.


6. (C) Some Sahrawi in Layoune who are not supportive of
Morocco told us they were not bothered by the deception at
CORCAS. CORCAS had no credibility for them anyway. It was,
as billed, only a consultative council, with selected, not
elected membership. They remain fixed on self determination
by a referendum. Separately, the CORCAS dissidents told us
they believed King Hassan's old CORCAS was fairly chosen and
relatively representative, with members chosen by elections
held within the tribes.


7. (C) Despite the disputes, some substance subsequently
emerged on what the so-called CORCAS proposal, or perhaps
more accurately, on what GOM thinking, may contain. The
CORCAS extraordinary session did discuss the natural resource
question, having spent most of the first day on it. There
was agreement that some division of income from resources was
needed, though it was unclear whether the GOM should have
part ownership or simply the authority to tax revenues. In

discussions with members and others and from press leaks we
have heard the following additional details of a potential
plan:

--The King would be sovereign;

--A bicameral legislature, with a popularly elected lower
house and an upper house of the tribal shaykhs. The
Parliament itself would have political parties and some
sources intimated possible future participation of the
Polisario could not be ruled out;

--Justice would be delivered in the King's name and using the
Moroccan system, but the justices would be Sahrawi;

--Security (i.e. police) would be Sahrawanized;

--International borders would remain a Moroccan
responsibility, and protected by the Moroccan Army, which
would remain stationed on the territory; and

--The borders of Saharan autonomy would be the borders of
formerly Spanish Sahara: the special regime would not apply
to traditionally Sahrawi areas of Morocco proper, south of
Agadir.


8. (C) Because of the unattributed sourcing, we cannot
confirm these elements would be included in any eventual
plan. Some press has suggested that the plan was elaborated
not in CORCAS, but in the palace, a view shared by the CORCAS
dissidents.


9. (C) We also understand the King was to hold meetings with
Walis and other officials this week in Agadir to discuss
decentralization, a prerequisite domestically to a viable
autonomy plan.


10. (C) COMMENT: For our part, we believe the USG should
make clear to the Moroccan officials that when they are
ready, they should present their ideas transparently to the
Sahrawis, and directly, if quietly, to the Polisario. But
they should not pretend to the USG or the rest of the
international community that they have the imprimatur of a
constituency that has not been consulted. This will hardly
win them votes at the UN. In addition, they should focus
more on hearts and minds on the ground (see septel on the
recent suppression of a non-violent demonstration). We would
welcome instructions to share these views with the GOM. END
COMMENT.
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Riley