WESTERN SAHARA: SENIOR MOROCCAN OFFICIAL UPBEAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 002016

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: SENIOR MOROCCAN OFFICIAL UPBEAT
FOLLOWING WASHINGTON VISIT

REF: RABAT 1979

Classified by Ambassador Thomas Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: In an October 27 telephone conversation,
Minister Delegate Fassi Fihri told the Ambassador the GOM was
upbeat on the status of the Western Sahara process following
the visit of a senior Moroccan delegation to Washington
earlier this month. Fihri seemed resigned to continuing
Algerian and Polisario "intransigence" on the principle of
autonomy as a way forward in the dispute but asserted
confidently that support for the Polisario among Sahrawis was
as little as 25 percent. We do not know where this statistic
came from, but the GOM's citation of it begs the question as
to why the Moroccans are so adamantly opposed to the
referendum recommended in the 2004 Baker Plan. End summary.


2. (C) During an October 27 telephone conversation with the
Ambassador, Taieb Fassi Fihri, Minister-Delegate for Foreign
Affairs, was upbeat following the recent visit he and a
high-level Moroccan delegation had made to Washington (and
other capitals - reftel) to discuss Western Sahara. Fihri
told the Ambassador that he took from consultations with
senior U.S. officials that "if we convince you" of the GOM's
sincerity in presenting a meaningful autonomy plan, the U.S.
would respond in kind by embracing autonomy as the "plan of
record" and would work to convince other international actors
that this approach was the best way forward. The Ambassador
noted to Fihri that during his recent visit to the U.S. he,
Ambassador Ford, and A/S Welch had discussed the Western
Sahara problem and all were resolved to work closely with the
parties to advance a negotiated solution.


3. (C) Fihri implied resignation that Algeria would remain
intransigent in its insistence on a referendum, but asserted
that Morocco "would not remain hostage to the (Algerian)
domestic political calendar," an apparent reference to
President Bouteflika's health and the view that Algerian
support for the Polisario will continue as long as he remains
in office. Continuing on this theme, Fihri asked the
Ambassador rhetorically what would happen if the Polisario
(and Algeria) rejected autonomy. "This is why we have to go
the local population first," he stated, referring to
consultations on autonomy the Royal Commission on Sahrawi
Affairs (CORCAS) is conducting with the public in Western
Sahara. (Note: Influential members of the Sahrawi public
have told us they are not impressed with this consultation
process and question the legitimacy of CORCAS. See Rabat

1983. End note.)


4. (C) Fihri asserted that the Polisario draw support from
"less than 25 percent" of the population in Western Sahara
and made an oblique reference to growing support for autonomy
from "Sahrawi refugees currently outside the debate."
Pressed for clarification, Fihri told the Ambassador he was
referring to Sahrawis living in Spain who were disillusioned
with the Polisario leadership.


5. (C) Comment: The origin of Fihri's "25 percent" statistic
is unclear but the GOM should be circumspect about deploying
it, since it begs the question of why Morocco is so adamantly
opposed to a referendum on the Western Sahara's future that
includes any mention or possibility of independence. If the
Polisario's support among Sahrawis is as shallow as Fihri
asserts (and we doubt that it is),the GOM would have nothing
to fear from the plan proposed by James Baker in 2004. End
comment.


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Riley