Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RABAT1974
2006-10-20 15:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:
POLISARIO COMMANDER READY TO BEND BUT NOT BREAK
how-toVZCZCXRO5943 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK DE RUEHRB #1974/01 2931513 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 201513Z OCT 06 ZFR FM AMEMBASSY RABAT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5003 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2271 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0615
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 001974
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS KPKO MA WI
SUBJECT: POLISARIO COMMANDER READY TO BEND BUT NOT BREAK
RABAT 00001974 001.2 OF 003
************************ZFR ZFR ZFR**********************
THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CANCELLED BY THE ORIGINATOR AND WILL
BE SENT OUT WITH NEW MRN AND MCN'S.
************************ZFR ZFR ZFR**********************
REF: RABAT 1963
Classified by Political Counselor Craig Karp for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 001974
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS KPKO MA WI
SUBJECT: POLISARIO COMMANDER READY TO BEND BUT NOT BREAK
RABAT 00001974 001.2 OF 003
************************ZFR ZFR ZFR**********************
THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CANCELLED BY THE ORIGINATOR AND WILL
BE SENT OUT WITH NEW MRN AND MCN'S.
************************ZFR ZFR ZFR**********************
REF: RABAT 1963
Classified by Political Counselor Craig Karp for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) At a Polisario "base" east of the berm separating
Moroccan and Polisario forces, a Polisario Political/Military
commander told an Embassy team and MINURSO commander October
12 that he and his comrades were flexible and prepared to
talk, but could not compromise the Sahrawis' right to
self-determination. Polcouns cautioned Commandante Ibrahim
Biyadillah that MINURSO's presence should not be taken for
granted indefinitely and urged the Polisario to consider
direct talks with the GOM. For his part, Ibrahim asserted
that the Polisario bore "no ill will toward Morocco," but
warned that a MINURSO withdrawal could lead to a resumption
of hostilities. End summary.
--------------
"Nothing Left but our Trousers"
--------------
2. (C) On October 12, polcouns, poloff, and army attache were
brought by MINURSO Commander Maj. Gen. Kurt Mosgaard
(Denmark),and his team, to visit a Polisario base in Western
Sahara, in the remote and desolate area outside the Berm.
3. (C) In a meeting following a brief tour (below),
Commandante Mohammed Ibrahim Biyadullah told us that the
Polisario remained committed to a "democratic solution" to
the conflict. "We have made many concessions... we have
nothing left but our trousers... but we cannot concede the
right of our people to determine their own future," he
stated. Noting that the international community had
successfully intervened against the will of the occupying
power to resolve territorial disputes in Kuwait and East
Timor, Ibrahim lamented that the UN,s Baker Plan had never
been implemented, despite considerable international effort
and support. There had been no pressure exerted on Morocco
to accept Baker's compromise, which the Polisario had
endorsed.
4. (C) Ibrahim affirmed that the Polisario "still have the
patience to wait for a solution" but conceded that it was
"difficult to convince my soldiers they have to wait
forever." "The ceasefire is helping the Moroccans continue
their violations," he stated, repeating that a "democratic
and transparent referendum" could resolve the conflict once
and for all. Ibrahim regretted Morocco's continued
resistance to a referendum "even under terms favorable to
Morocco." He described tentative talk of a Moroccan autonomy
plan as "a grave mistake," and a regression to proposals
aired 30 years ago. "Morocco can not just turn back the
clock," he stated.
--------------
Facing the Facts
--------------
5. (C) Thanking Ibrahim for his hospitality, Polcouns noted
that the USG appreciated the Polisario's willingness to make
compromises, and its patience and superb discipline in
strictly adhering to the ceasefire. For better or worse,
Polcouns continued, the fact was that the Baker Plan has not
been implemented. He urged the Polisario look forward to
find a solution rather than fixate on the past. It was time
to contemplate new solutions to end the stalemate that had
kept his men and their families in camps and on the front
line for a generation.
6. (C) At the same time, the international environment has
continued to evolve, Polcouns cautioned. Given the urgency
of crises elsewhere in the world, such as Lebanon, MINURSO
should not be taken for granted as having an open-ended
mandate. At present, Western Sahara was again an item of
growing importance on the international agenda. Polcouns
urged that the Polisario leadership think hard about a
formula in which it might be willing to sit face to face with
the GOM to work out a permanent solution. The USG has been
pressing the GOM hard to come up with a credible, meaningful
and detailed autonomy plan -- a plan which could be an
important stepping stone to a final resolution. Direct
dialogue between the GOM and the Polisario offers the best
hope for a lasting solution, Polcouns affirmed, and noted
that when the parties are ready, the USG was prepared to
RABAT 00001974 002.2 OF 003
facilitate such talks.
--------------
"No Ill Will"
--------------
7. (C) In response, Ibrahim repeatedly pointed to indications
of Moroccan bad faith. He asserted that Morocco had
consistently gone back on compromises and agreements it made
with the UN. It has blocked the humanitarian exchanges of
families, an agreed confidence building measure. (Note: Since
the meeting Morocco has agreed to re-start the flights.) He
also expressed concern that the continuing Moroccan
occupation has only led to oppression of the Sahrawis under
their control. Why can the international community not
succeed in doing anything about this? He pointed to the
recently proposed trip to Layoune by a European Palriament
delegation that had been blocked by the Moroccans.
8. (C) Ibrahim said "from the bottom of our hearts, we have
no ill will toward the Moroccan people or the Moroccan
throne... Our duty is to live together in mutual respect...
but history shows that Western Sahara is not part of
Morocco," adding that the Moroccan presence in Sahara "lacks
legal legitimacy." Turning to MINURSO Commander Gen.
Mosgaard, Ibrahim lamented that the mission had never
fulfilled its mandate to conduct a referendum but added that
MINURSO "has at least provided protection to the Sahrawi
people." Asked by Army Attache what would happen if MINURSO
departed the area, Ibrahim replied with a grave expression
and without hesitation: "We would go back to war. We know
how to defend ourselves. This is our fate." Polcouns briefly
countered that no one knew better than the Commandante the
impossibility of a favorable military solution. Reverting to
arms, even symbolically, would only worsen his people,s
prospects.
-------------- --------------
In the Desert: The Polisario's Second Military District
-------------- --------------
9. (C) The base, headquarters of the Polisario's "Second
Military District" is located in Tifariti, approximately
300km east of Layounne and about 15 km north of the
Mauritanian border. The base is approximately 3km from a
MINURSO "team site," or forward observer base, manned by 14
multinational personnel. The MINURSO personnel at the site
enjoy good relations with their Polisario neighbors. A
Polisario "liaison officer" is assigned to and often present
at the UN team site.
10. (C) The Polisario district headquarters is composed of a
handful of small, spartan one story buildings on ascorched
rocky rise in the midst of the desolate Saharan desert.
After the formal welcome Commandante Mohammed Ibrahim
Biyadillah (Note: Polisario fighters do not assume military
ranks. End note.) led visitors on a tour of the site. An
honor guard of roughly 50 mostly middle-aged Polisario
fighters, carrying well-tended AK-47 rifles and wearing
fairly new, clean and pressed battle fatigues, greeted the
USG and UN visitors. Aside from the honor guard, and several
vehicles with Polisario insignias, no other military
personnel or equipment were in evidence.
11. (C) Prior to 1991, there was a small village and remnants
of a Spanish district office at the site, which apparently
has a source of water. The Moroccans destroyed the village
in a 1991 ground-air assault, in retaliation for a Polisario
attack, one of the last hostile acts before the cease fire.
The Sahrawis pointed out the Spanish dispensary, noting they
had left it in its half rubble state as a memorial. A short
distance away lies the hulk of a destroyed Moroccan T-54 tank
from 1991, another memorial.
12. (C) The adjacent Polisarion HQ "compound" has a
"museum," a pupil-less school building and an adjacent small
hospital building that had just been built with funds and
technical assistance from Spanish Provincial governments and
NGOs. The museum's exhibit featured the remains of a
Moroccan Air Force jet downed by the Polisario in the 1970s,
a display of other modern and traditional weaponry,
inspirational artwork by Polisario fighters and family
members, and some testimonials of alleged human rights abuses
of Sahrawis in Moroccan custody. There was no habitation
visible. We were told that the only civilians in the
district were nomads, who rotated family members in from the
Tindouf camps. A few Polisario fighters" apparently stay the
site and in outposts between the village and the berm.
13. (C) After our meeting, following a break at the team
site, we were brought back to the very same compound, this
RABAT 00001974 003.2 OF 003
time to meet an international Humanitarian Demining NGO, who
were the real occupants of the "school" buildings, an in-kind
contribution to their effort from the Polisario. They were
in the initial stages of a mine survey, and eventual
clearance project for areas on the "Polisario" side of the
berm.
--------------
Leadership Note
--------------
14. (C) Ibrahim told polcouns that he would report the
content of our discussions directly to Mohammed Abdel Aziz,
President of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (RASD).
Responding to questions about the Polisario's leadership
structure, Ibrahim told us that in addition to President
Abdel Aziz (who is also Secretary-General of the Polisario,
the overall liberation movement, a position he has held since
1976),the Polisario is guided by a 36 member National
Secretariat, the supreme decision-making body elected by a
SIPDIS
larger General Popular Congress, which is convened every four
years. Ibrahim said he was a member of this Secretariat, but
not part of the 4-5 person inner cabinet around Abdel Aziz.
--------------
Comment
--------------
15. (C) A field commander and a political figure in the
Polisario Movement, Ibrahim appeared somewhat flexible,
perhaps born of a visible weariness of the prospect of an
entire lifetime in camp or in the desert. MINURSO considers
him a moderate, at least compared to his &hot head8
colleagues in the southern districts. Although he repeatedly
spoke about a referendum, Ibrahim insisted only on
self-determination. He did not appear to condition his own
readiness for talks with the Moroccans. He made clear
however his lack of confidence in the Kingdom, this will
likely have to rise if talks were to go forward. As a
result, there is no reason to believe that he would accept a
take-it-or leave it fait accompli. ((Ian do you think I am
going to far in this))
16. (C) Clearly a politician, Ibrahim did not appear to be
looking at present to go back to war, and neither did his
troops. Their sharp dress but unthreatening overall mien
suggests to our relatively untrained eyes that they may be
being sustained (by Algeria) to keep up appearances, but not
much more. (See reftel on MINURSO for additional military
assessment.)
******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************
Riley
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS KPKO MA WI
SUBJECT: POLISARIO COMMANDER READY TO BEND BUT NOT BREAK
RABAT 00001974 001.2 OF 003
************************ZFR ZFR ZFR**********************
THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CANCELLED BY THE ORIGINATOR AND WILL
BE SENT OUT WITH NEW MRN AND MCN'S.
************************ZFR ZFR ZFR**********************
REF: RABAT 1963
Classified by Political Counselor Craig Karp for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) At a Polisario "base" east of the berm separating
Moroccan and Polisario forces, a Polisario Political/Military
commander told an Embassy team and MINURSO commander October
12 that he and his comrades were flexible and prepared to
talk, but could not compromise the Sahrawis' right to
self-determination. Polcouns cautioned Commandante Ibrahim
Biyadillah that MINURSO's presence should not be taken for
granted indefinitely and urged the Polisario to consider
direct talks with the GOM. For his part, Ibrahim asserted
that the Polisario bore "no ill will toward Morocco," but
warned that a MINURSO withdrawal could lead to a resumption
of hostilities. End summary.
--------------
"Nothing Left but our Trousers"
--------------
2. (C) On October 12, polcouns, poloff, and army attache were
brought by MINURSO Commander Maj. Gen. Kurt Mosgaard
(Denmark),and his team, to visit a Polisario base in Western
Sahara, in the remote and desolate area outside the Berm.
3. (C) In a meeting following a brief tour (below),
Commandante Mohammed Ibrahim Biyadullah told us that the
Polisario remained committed to a "democratic solution" to
the conflict. "We have made many concessions... we have
nothing left but our trousers... but we cannot concede the
right of our people to determine their own future," he
stated. Noting that the international community had
successfully intervened against the will of the occupying
power to resolve territorial disputes in Kuwait and East
Timor, Ibrahim lamented that the UN,s Baker Plan had never
been implemented, despite considerable international effort
and support. There had been no pressure exerted on Morocco
to accept Baker's compromise, which the Polisario had
endorsed.
4. (C) Ibrahim affirmed that the Polisario "still have the
patience to wait for a solution" but conceded that it was
"difficult to convince my soldiers they have to wait
forever." "The ceasefire is helping the Moroccans continue
their violations," he stated, repeating that a "democratic
and transparent referendum" could resolve the conflict once
and for all. Ibrahim regretted Morocco's continued
resistance to a referendum "even under terms favorable to
Morocco." He described tentative talk of a Moroccan autonomy
plan as "a grave mistake," and a regression to proposals
aired 30 years ago. "Morocco can not just turn back the
clock," he stated.
--------------
Facing the Facts
--------------
5. (C) Thanking Ibrahim for his hospitality, Polcouns noted
that the USG appreciated the Polisario's willingness to make
compromises, and its patience and superb discipline in
strictly adhering to the ceasefire. For better or worse,
Polcouns continued, the fact was that the Baker Plan has not
been implemented. He urged the Polisario look forward to
find a solution rather than fixate on the past. It was time
to contemplate new solutions to end the stalemate that had
kept his men and their families in camps and on the front
line for a generation.
6. (C) At the same time, the international environment has
continued to evolve, Polcouns cautioned. Given the urgency
of crises elsewhere in the world, such as Lebanon, MINURSO
should not be taken for granted as having an open-ended
mandate. At present, Western Sahara was again an item of
growing importance on the international agenda. Polcouns
urged that the Polisario leadership think hard about a
formula in which it might be willing to sit face to face with
the GOM to work out a permanent solution. The USG has been
pressing the GOM hard to come up with a credible, meaningful
and detailed autonomy plan -- a plan which could be an
important stepping stone to a final resolution. Direct
dialogue between the GOM and the Polisario offers the best
hope for a lasting solution, Polcouns affirmed, and noted
that when the parties are ready, the USG was prepared to
RABAT 00001974 002.2 OF 003
facilitate such talks.
--------------
"No Ill Will"
--------------
7. (C) In response, Ibrahim repeatedly pointed to indications
of Moroccan bad faith. He asserted that Morocco had
consistently gone back on compromises and agreements it made
with the UN. It has blocked the humanitarian exchanges of
families, an agreed confidence building measure. (Note: Since
the meeting Morocco has agreed to re-start the flights.) He
also expressed concern that the continuing Moroccan
occupation has only led to oppression of the Sahrawis under
their control. Why can the international community not
succeed in doing anything about this? He pointed to the
recently proposed trip to Layoune by a European Palriament
delegation that had been blocked by the Moroccans.
8. (C) Ibrahim said "from the bottom of our hearts, we have
no ill will toward the Moroccan people or the Moroccan
throne... Our duty is to live together in mutual respect...
but history shows that Western Sahara is not part of
Morocco," adding that the Moroccan presence in Sahara "lacks
legal legitimacy." Turning to MINURSO Commander Gen.
Mosgaard, Ibrahim lamented that the mission had never
fulfilled its mandate to conduct a referendum but added that
MINURSO "has at least provided protection to the Sahrawi
people." Asked by Army Attache what would happen if MINURSO
departed the area, Ibrahim replied with a grave expression
and without hesitation: "We would go back to war. We know
how to defend ourselves. This is our fate." Polcouns briefly
countered that no one knew better than the Commandante the
impossibility of a favorable military solution. Reverting to
arms, even symbolically, would only worsen his people,s
prospects.
-------------- --------------
In the Desert: The Polisario's Second Military District
-------------- --------------
9. (C) The base, headquarters of the Polisario's "Second
Military District" is located in Tifariti, approximately
300km east of Layounne and about 15 km north of the
Mauritanian border. The base is approximately 3km from a
MINURSO "team site," or forward observer base, manned by 14
multinational personnel. The MINURSO personnel at the site
enjoy good relations with their Polisario neighbors. A
Polisario "liaison officer" is assigned to and often present
at the UN team site.
10. (C) The Polisario district headquarters is composed of a
handful of small, spartan one story buildings on ascorched
rocky rise in the midst of the desolate Saharan desert.
After the formal welcome Commandante Mohammed Ibrahim
Biyadillah (Note: Polisario fighters do not assume military
ranks. End note.) led visitors on a tour of the site. An
honor guard of roughly 50 mostly middle-aged Polisario
fighters, carrying well-tended AK-47 rifles and wearing
fairly new, clean and pressed battle fatigues, greeted the
USG and UN visitors. Aside from the honor guard, and several
vehicles with Polisario insignias, no other military
personnel or equipment were in evidence.
11. (C) Prior to 1991, there was a small village and remnants
of a Spanish district office at the site, which apparently
has a source of water. The Moroccans destroyed the village
in a 1991 ground-air assault, in retaliation for a Polisario
attack, one of the last hostile acts before the cease fire.
The Sahrawis pointed out the Spanish dispensary, noting they
had left it in its half rubble state as a memorial. A short
distance away lies the hulk of a destroyed Moroccan T-54 tank
from 1991, another memorial.
12. (C) The adjacent Polisarion HQ "compound" has a
"museum," a pupil-less school building and an adjacent small
hospital building that had just been built with funds and
technical assistance from Spanish Provincial governments and
NGOs. The museum's exhibit featured the remains of a
Moroccan Air Force jet downed by the Polisario in the 1970s,
a display of other modern and traditional weaponry,
inspirational artwork by Polisario fighters and family
members, and some testimonials of alleged human rights abuses
of Sahrawis in Moroccan custody. There was no habitation
visible. We were told that the only civilians in the
district were nomads, who rotated family members in from the
Tindouf camps. A few Polisario fighters" apparently stay the
site and in outposts between the village and the berm.
13. (C) After our meeting, following a break at the team
site, we were brought back to the very same compound, this
RABAT 00001974 003.2 OF 003
time to meet an international Humanitarian Demining NGO, who
were the real occupants of the "school" buildings, an in-kind
contribution to their effort from the Polisario. They were
in the initial stages of a mine survey, and eventual
clearance project for areas on the "Polisario" side of the
berm.
--------------
Leadership Note
--------------
14. (C) Ibrahim told polcouns that he would report the
content of our discussions directly to Mohammed Abdel Aziz,
President of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (RASD).
Responding to questions about the Polisario's leadership
structure, Ibrahim told us that in addition to President
Abdel Aziz (who is also Secretary-General of the Polisario,
the overall liberation movement, a position he has held since
1976),the Polisario is guided by a 36 member National
Secretariat, the supreme decision-making body elected by a
SIPDIS
larger General Popular Congress, which is convened every four
years. Ibrahim said he was a member of this Secretariat, but
not part of the 4-5 person inner cabinet around Abdel Aziz.
--------------
Comment
--------------
15. (C) A field commander and a political figure in the
Polisario Movement, Ibrahim appeared somewhat flexible,
perhaps born of a visible weariness of the prospect of an
entire lifetime in camp or in the desert. MINURSO considers
him a moderate, at least compared to his &hot head8
colleagues in the southern districts. Although he repeatedly
spoke about a referendum, Ibrahim insisted only on
self-determination. He did not appear to condition his own
readiness for talks with the Moroccans. He made clear
however his lack of confidence in the Kingdom, this will
likely have to rise if talks were to go forward. As a
result, there is no reason to believe that he would accept a
take-it-or leave it fait accompli. ((Ian do you think I am
going to far in this))
16. (C) Clearly a politician, Ibrahim did not appear to be
looking at present to go back to war, and neither did his
troops. Their sharp dress but unthreatening overall mien
suggests to our relatively untrained eyes that they may be
being sustained (by Algeria) to keep up appearances, but not
much more. (See reftel on MINURSO for additional military
assessment.)
******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************
Riley