Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RABAT1087
2006-06-06 10:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:
WESTERN SAHARA: CORCAS SEEKS US MEDIATION WITH
how-toVZCZCXYZ0003 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRB #1087/01 1571057 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 061057Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY RABAT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3935 INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 4017 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2964 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5519 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3192 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4228 RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 8905 RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 1760 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0985 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0540
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 001087
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, IO; GENEVA FOR RMA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009
TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: CORCAS SEEKS US MEDIATION WITH
POLISARIO
REF: RABAT 537
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 001087
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, IO; GENEVA FOR RMA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009
TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: CORCAS SEEKS US MEDIATION WITH
POLISARIO
REF: RABAT 537
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: During a 90-minute meeting with Ambassador
Riley on May 31, President of the Royal Council for Saharan
Affairs (CORCAS) Khalihenna Ould Er Rachid requested US help
in starting a dialogue between CORCAS and the Polisario.
Khalihenna said he had made informal contacts with the
Polisario, and they were promising, but he had received
nothing official from the Polisario, and Abdelaziz was
silent. He needed outside help to go further and
specifically requested US assistance in deepening contact
with the Polisario. He stressed that CORCAS was ready to
talk to the Polisario without conditions, though
"independence" is off the table, he said. He stressed there
were only two choices for the Western Sahara: the status
quo, which was potentially destabilizing, and autonomy.
Khalihenna described his organization's primary function as
promoting reconciliation between the Moroccan state and the
Sahrawi people. He affirmed the GOM would present an
autonomy plan to the UN prior to the October 31 rollover.
The meeting was widely covered by the Moroccan media. End
Summary.
2. (C) Ambassador Riley met with CORCAS President Khalihenna
Ould Er Rachid on May 31 at CORCAS headquarters in Rabat, the
first call by an ambassador on CORCAS. Ambassador was
accompanied by DCM, Polcouns, and POLFSN, while Khalihenna
was flanked by a dozen members of the council, including
Secretary General Moulainine. The Ambassador congratulated
SIPDIS
Khalihenna on his appointment as president, noted the US was
following the activities of CORCAS with interest, but said it
was somewhat unclear what CORCAS's primary objectives were:
to develop an autonomy plan? to promote development in the
Western Sahara? to stimulate public debate on the Western
Sahara among Moroccans?
We're Different
--------------
3. (C) Khalihenna responded that the CORCAS of 2006,
revitalized by the King's March 27 speech in Laayoune (Ref
A),had nothing to do with its earlier incarnation, created
by Hassan II in 1981. The older version was headed by the
Ministry of Interior and did not have a writ to promote
autonomy. It was a council that belonged to former Interior
Minister Basri and lacked direction. The council did not
include Sahrawis and achieved no notable successes. The
current council is different, Khalihenna insisted. The
primary goal of the new CORCAS is to foster reconciliation
between the Moroccan state and the Sahrawi people, whether
they reside in the Western Sahara or elsewhere. The way to
do that was to promote autonomy in the territory. King
Mohammed -- not "the palace" -- is personally invested in
this. That is new. King Mohammed decided that the Western
Sahara conflict could not be solved without reconciliation
between the state and the Sahrawi people. The challenge is
to preserve the Sahrawi people and the territorial integrity
of Morocco at the same time.
It's All in the Family
--------------
4. (C) Gesturing to his deputy, Khalihenna said SecGen
Moulainine studied medicine with (Polisario "president")
Abdelaziz in Rabat. Abdelaziz was part of the first
generation of post-independence Sahrawis that created the
Polisario in 1973. At that time Morocco was unstable,
wracked by political violence. There were coup attempts
against Hassan II, and the region suffered from inter-Arab
conflicts. The Polisario demanded rights for the Sahrawi
people. The Western Sahara conflict was created amidst this
context. The Sahrawis are an ensemble of tribes living in a
vast territory that far exceeds the territory of the Western
Sahara. Unlike many of us, Khalihenna said, Abdelaziz did
not grow up under Spanish administration. He grew up in
Morocco. (Khalihenna noted that he had not only Spanish
citizenship but a Spanish identity card. He said Franco had
at one point considered appointing him president of the
Spanish Western Sahara). Those of us who grew up under
Spanish administration in the former Spanish Western Sahara
had no gripe with the Moroccan state. We did not suffer from
Moroccan administration. The people who created the
Polisario did not represent all of the Sahrawi tribes, he
said.
5. (C) Khalihenna said an independent state in the Western
Sahara was not an option, nor was a referendum. A state
based on tribal lines cannot succeed in Africa, he said. A
referendum was not humanly or politically feasible, as
Sahrawis are scattered over a number of countries in the
region. Why then does Algeria focus solely on Sahrawis
living in the Western Sahara? Why is Algeria not concerned
with Sahrawis living in Mali and Algeria? Khalihenna said
perhaps extending autonomy to the Sahrawis would lead
Sahrawis in neighboring states to pursue autonomy as well.
CORCAS composition and objectives
--------------
6. (C) Ambassador asked Khalihenna what the main objectives
of CORCAS are. Khalihenna acknowledged CORCAS was "named,
not elected." Members were carefully selected, not voted in.
Nevertheless, it represents all 34 tribes of the Sahrawis,
in proportion to their size. Khalihenna explained that
CORCAS is made up of members of parliament, municipal
counselors, women leaders, sheikhs, and youth -- a mix of
generations and the sexes. The King selected the members
based on the best representatives of each tribe -- the most
respected, the best known, the most honest. Many were
elected officials, but not all elected Sahrawis were members
of CORCAS. No Sahrawi could say he was not represented by
CORCAS, or that he was badly represented, Khalihenna
contended. Ambassador Riley interjected that CORCAS does not
include members of the Polisario. Khalihenna said CORCAS was
indeed open to members of the Polisario. We want them to be
part of CORCAS, he said. The Polisario is made up of
Sahrawis. Even though they are an armed movement and not
just a political organization, they are not excluded. On the
contrary, CORCAS is open to dialogue and conversation with
the Polisario. They are our brothers, our family, he said.
7. (C) The problem with the Polisario, Khalihenna continued,
is that they reject the concept of autonomy. The Polisario
has not criticized CORCAS, since they cannot because we are
all Sahrawis. But there are only two choices for the Western
Sahara: the status quo, which is potentially unstable given
the illegal migration, smuggling, and trafficking in persons
that goes on in the territory. The status quo could lead to
another Somalia, where there is neither order nor security.
Autonomy, backed by the King, gives most Sahrawis what they
want, in Khalihenna's view.
8. (C) The Ambassador posed a hypothetical situation, saying
if CORCAS were selling camels, but the buyer not only
believed the price was too high but also would not even enter
the market to negotiate, as seemed to be the case with the
Polisario, then what? Then I go to you, the buyer,
Khalihenna said. I seek you out. CORCAS sought to do that
with the Polisario. But the Polisario needed to understand
there was no workable option other than autonomy.
9. (C) Khalihenna said CORCAS had started drafting an
autonomy plan. CORCAS members discussed the issue of
autonomy during their May 25-27 meeting in Rabat. Morocco
would present the autonomy plan before October 31, he
confirmed. "We will give water to the camels," Khalihenna
said. Debating the price of the camels was the easy part, he
said. The hard part was breaking down the psychological wall
that exists between Morocco and the Polisario.
Mediation
--------------
10. (C) Khalihenna said he had had some informal contact
with the Polisario about the possibility of dialogue, and the
response informally was encouraging. Members of the
Polisario were saying they were ready. But there was no
official response. CORCAS sought a mediator and a quiet
place to talk. CORCAS had asked for Spanish and French help
during Khalihenna's visit to Madrid and Paris in May.
Contact with the Polisario needed to be private and discreet,
at least at the outset. We do not know how to reach
Abdelaziz or the Algerians, though, he said, and he asked for
US assistance in helping bring this about. The Ambassador
made no promises but said the US would discuss the idea
internally.
11. (C) As for reaching out to dissident Sahrawis in the
Western Sahara, Khalihenna said, "We talk to them on a
regular basis." He insisted the dissidents were a tiny
minority in the Western Sahara, who criticized Morocco
wherever they went, including abroad. He said it was
unfortunate one could not know more about the views of the
Sahrawis living in Tindouf.
12. (C) DCM pressed Khalihenna for his reading of the
Polisario. What were their goals? Khalihenna said the
Polisario seeks to help Algeria enlarge its territory and its
sphere of influence. Beyond that, he did not know what the
Polisario wanted. But Morocco was prepared to offer the
Sahrawi people all the rights they sought, even
"quasi-independence." The DCM asked how self-determination
would be achieved. "Through autonomy," Khalihenna responded.
The Sahara would be very decentralized. There could be no
democracy there without decentralization. CORCAS needed US
help to get there. DCM stressed that that the use of terms
such as "reconciliation," "self-determination," and
"decentralization" were important for people to hear, and
were a way of demonstrating Morocco's seriousness about
resolving the conflict. Khalihenna responded he had offered
the Algerians "gifts." He had taken the Algerian insistence
on not being a party to the Western Sahara conflict at face
value, and he was not pushing at present for engagement with
Algeria.
13. (C) The Ambassador commented that US Ambassador to
Algeria Erdman had joined him at a meeting recently with
Moroccan Deputy FM Fassi Fihri, at which the US had stressed
the importance of words and rhetoric in the Western Sahara
context. The GOA was very sensitive to Moroccan rhetoric.
Claiming that the Baker Plan is dead, for example, only adds
fuel to the fire. "Win-lose" rhetoric is provocative and
should be avoided by both sides, especially in the coming
months, the Ambassador stressed. Khalihenna agreed, noting
he was attacked by the Moroccan press for saying Algeria was
not involved in the Western Sahara conflict. He acknowledged
that both Algeria and the Polisario needed their honor and
dignity to remain in tact. He joked that perhaps he should
describe the Baker Plan as "sick" rather than as "dead."
14. (C) The DCM asked whether there was debate within CORCAS
about the way forward, given the "diversity" of CORCAS as
characterized by Khalihenna. Khalihenna said the recent
three-day meeting in Rabat had been very lively, even in
CORCAS meetings were closed to the outside (Comment: senior
MFA and MOI officials have attended at least parts of both
meetings. End Comment). He gave everyone a chance to speak,
with opportunities to talk about the constitution of CORCAS,
relations between Sahrawis and the state, the disposition of
resources in the Western Sahara. Many ideas were presented,
which were being developed into a non-paper. With its second
meeting, CORCAS moved from generalities into details. People
were reticent the first day, Khalihenna said, but on the
second day the gloves came off. It was a democratic
discussion, he said, and very passionate.
15. (C) Polcouns asked how the autonomy process that CORCAS
was spearheading related to the discussions political parties
had held in March, and to the autonomy ideas the political
parties had developed and submitted to the palace.
Khalihenna said CORCAS had nothing to do with the political
parties. These were separate tracks coordinated by the
Palace.
16. (U) The meeting between the Ambassador and CORCAS was
widely covered by the Moroccan media. A two-minute segment
appeared on the evening news May 31 in both French and
Arabic. Reporters were on hand to photograph the
Ambassador's arrival at CORCAS, capture the opening
courtesies on film, and to interview both the Ambassador and
Khalihenna at the conclusion of the meeting.
Comment
--------------
17. (C) By creating CORCAS, Morocco has effectively
established an entity that allows the palace to play
(publicly) a more back-seat role in the promotion of an
autonomy plan. CORCAS is now empowered to meet with the
Polisario, and to take the lead on the autonomy plan, though
it is clear the King and select advisors (will Khalihenna be
among them?) will be calling the major shots. While we have
no illusions about the transparency of CORCAS, it is now the
Palace's front in moving forward on the Western Sahara.
Since we are keen to bring Morocco and the Polisario
together, and see that as a logical next step, Embassy Rabat
believes we should considering responding positively to
Khalihenna's request for help in bringing the two sides
together. Before responding to the GOM, we might consider a
quiet approach to the Polisario to encourage a meeting with
CORCAS. It would be a breakthrough to get the two together,
even if little concrete was accomplished in the meeting.
******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************
Riley
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, IO; GENEVA FOR RMA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009
TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: CORCAS SEEKS US MEDIATION WITH
POLISARIO
REF: RABAT 537
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: During a 90-minute meeting with Ambassador
Riley on May 31, President of the Royal Council for Saharan
Affairs (CORCAS) Khalihenna Ould Er Rachid requested US help
in starting a dialogue between CORCAS and the Polisario.
Khalihenna said he had made informal contacts with the
Polisario, and they were promising, but he had received
nothing official from the Polisario, and Abdelaziz was
silent. He needed outside help to go further and
specifically requested US assistance in deepening contact
with the Polisario. He stressed that CORCAS was ready to
talk to the Polisario without conditions, though
"independence" is off the table, he said. He stressed there
were only two choices for the Western Sahara: the status
quo, which was potentially destabilizing, and autonomy.
Khalihenna described his organization's primary function as
promoting reconciliation between the Moroccan state and the
Sahrawi people. He affirmed the GOM would present an
autonomy plan to the UN prior to the October 31 rollover.
The meeting was widely covered by the Moroccan media. End
Summary.
2. (C) Ambassador Riley met with CORCAS President Khalihenna
Ould Er Rachid on May 31 at CORCAS headquarters in Rabat, the
first call by an ambassador on CORCAS. Ambassador was
accompanied by DCM, Polcouns, and POLFSN, while Khalihenna
was flanked by a dozen members of the council, including
Secretary General Moulainine. The Ambassador congratulated
SIPDIS
Khalihenna on his appointment as president, noted the US was
following the activities of CORCAS with interest, but said it
was somewhat unclear what CORCAS's primary objectives were:
to develop an autonomy plan? to promote development in the
Western Sahara? to stimulate public debate on the Western
Sahara among Moroccans?
We're Different
--------------
3. (C) Khalihenna responded that the CORCAS of 2006,
revitalized by the King's March 27 speech in Laayoune (Ref
A),had nothing to do with its earlier incarnation, created
by Hassan II in 1981. The older version was headed by the
Ministry of Interior and did not have a writ to promote
autonomy. It was a council that belonged to former Interior
Minister Basri and lacked direction. The council did not
include Sahrawis and achieved no notable successes. The
current council is different, Khalihenna insisted. The
primary goal of the new CORCAS is to foster reconciliation
between the Moroccan state and the Sahrawi people, whether
they reside in the Western Sahara or elsewhere. The way to
do that was to promote autonomy in the territory. King
Mohammed -- not "the palace" -- is personally invested in
this. That is new. King Mohammed decided that the Western
Sahara conflict could not be solved without reconciliation
between the state and the Sahrawi people. The challenge is
to preserve the Sahrawi people and the territorial integrity
of Morocco at the same time.
It's All in the Family
--------------
4. (C) Gesturing to his deputy, Khalihenna said SecGen
Moulainine studied medicine with (Polisario "president")
Abdelaziz in Rabat. Abdelaziz was part of the first
generation of post-independence Sahrawis that created the
Polisario in 1973. At that time Morocco was unstable,
wracked by political violence. There were coup attempts
against Hassan II, and the region suffered from inter-Arab
conflicts. The Polisario demanded rights for the Sahrawi
people. The Western Sahara conflict was created amidst this
context. The Sahrawis are an ensemble of tribes living in a
vast territory that far exceeds the territory of the Western
Sahara. Unlike many of us, Khalihenna said, Abdelaziz did
not grow up under Spanish administration. He grew up in
Morocco. (Khalihenna noted that he had not only Spanish
citizenship but a Spanish identity card. He said Franco had
at one point considered appointing him president of the
Spanish Western Sahara). Those of us who grew up under
Spanish administration in the former Spanish Western Sahara
had no gripe with the Moroccan state. We did not suffer from
Moroccan administration. The people who created the
Polisario did not represent all of the Sahrawi tribes, he
said.
5. (C) Khalihenna said an independent state in the Western
Sahara was not an option, nor was a referendum. A state
based on tribal lines cannot succeed in Africa, he said. A
referendum was not humanly or politically feasible, as
Sahrawis are scattered over a number of countries in the
region. Why then does Algeria focus solely on Sahrawis
living in the Western Sahara? Why is Algeria not concerned
with Sahrawis living in Mali and Algeria? Khalihenna said
perhaps extending autonomy to the Sahrawis would lead
Sahrawis in neighboring states to pursue autonomy as well.
CORCAS composition and objectives
--------------
6. (C) Ambassador asked Khalihenna what the main objectives
of CORCAS are. Khalihenna acknowledged CORCAS was "named,
not elected." Members were carefully selected, not voted in.
Nevertheless, it represents all 34 tribes of the Sahrawis,
in proportion to their size. Khalihenna explained that
CORCAS is made up of members of parliament, municipal
counselors, women leaders, sheikhs, and youth -- a mix of
generations and the sexes. The King selected the members
based on the best representatives of each tribe -- the most
respected, the best known, the most honest. Many were
elected officials, but not all elected Sahrawis were members
of CORCAS. No Sahrawi could say he was not represented by
CORCAS, or that he was badly represented, Khalihenna
contended. Ambassador Riley interjected that CORCAS does not
include members of the Polisario. Khalihenna said CORCAS was
indeed open to members of the Polisario. We want them to be
part of CORCAS, he said. The Polisario is made up of
Sahrawis. Even though they are an armed movement and not
just a political organization, they are not excluded. On the
contrary, CORCAS is open to dialogue and conversation with
the Polisario. They are our brothers, our family, he said.
7. (C) The problem with the Polisario, Khalihenna continued,
is that they reject the concept of autonomy. The Polisario
has not criticized CORCAS, since they cannot because we are
all Sahrawis. But there are only two choices for the Western
Sahara: the status quo, which is potentially unstable given
the illegal migration, smuggling, and trafficking in persons
that goes on in the territory. The status quo could lead to
another Somalia, where there is neither order nor security.
Autonomy, backed by the King, gives most Sahrawis what they
want, in Khalihenna's view.
8. (C) The Ambassador posed a hypothetical situation, saying
if CORCAS were selling camels, but the buyer not only
believed the price was too high but also would not even enter
the market to negotiate, as seemed to be the case with the
Polisario, then what? Then I go to you, the buyer,
Khalihenna said. I seek you out. CORCAS sought to do that
with the Polisario. But the Polisario needed to understand
there was no workable option other than autonomy.
9. (C) Khalihenna said CORCAS had started drafting an
autonomy plan. CORCAS members discussed the issue of
autonomy during their May 25-27 meeting in Rabat. Morocco
would present the autonomy plan before October 31, he
confirmed. "We will give water to the camels," Khalihenna
said. Debating the price of the camels was the easy part, he
said. The hard part was breaking down the psychological wall
that exists between Morocco and the Polisario.
Mediation
--------------
10. (C) Khalihenna said he had had some informal contact
with the Polisario about the possibility of dialogue, and the
response informally was encouraging. Members of the
Polisario were saying they were ready. But there was no
official response. CORCAS sought a mediator and a quiet
place to talk. CORCAS had asked for Spanish and French help
during Khalihenna's visit to Madrid and Paris in May.
Contact with the Polisario needed to be private and discreet,
at least at the outset. We do not know how to reach
Abdelaziz or the Algerians, though, he said, and he asked for
US assistance in helping bring this about. The Ambassador
made no promises but said the US would discuss the idea
internally.
11. (C) As for reaching out to dissident Sahrawis in the
Western Sahara, Khalihenna said, "We talk to them on a
regular basis." He insisted the dissidents were a tiny
minority in the Western Sahara, who criticized Morocco
wherever they went, including abroad. He said it was
unfortunate one could not know more about the views of the
Sahrawis living in Tindouf.
12. (C) DCM pressed Khalihenna for his reading of the
Polisario. What were their goals? Khalihenna said the
Polisario seeks to help Algeria enlarge its territory and its
sphere of influence. Beyond that, he did not know what the
Polisario wanted. But Morocco was prepared to offer the
Sahrawi people all the rights they sought, even
"quasi-independence." The DCM asked how self-determination
would be achieved. "Through autonomy," Khalihenna responded.
The Sahara would be very decentralized. There could be no
democracy there without decentralization. CORCAS needed US
help to get there. DCM stressed that that the use of terms
such as "reconciliation," "self-determination," and
"decentralization" were important for people to hear, and
were a way of demonstrating Morocco's seriousness about
resolving the conflict. Khalihenna responded he had offered
the Algerians "gifts." He had taken the Algerian insistence
on not being a party to the Western Sahara conflict at face
value, and he was not pushing at present for engagement with
Algeria.
13. (C) The Ambassador commented that US Ambassador to
Algeria Erdman had joined him at a meeting recently with
Moroccan Deputy FM Fassi Fihri, at which the US had stressed
the importance of words and rhetoric in the Western Sahara
context. The GOA was very sensitive to Moroccan rhetoric.
Claiming that the Baker Plan is dead, for example, only adds
fuel to the fire. "Win-lose" rhetoric is provocative and
should be avoided by both sides, especially in the coming
months, the Ambassador stressed. Khalihenna agreed, noting
he was attacked by the Moroccan press for saying Algeria was
not involved in the Western Sahara conflict. He acknowledged
that both Algeria and the Polisario needed their honor and
dignity to remain in tact. He joked that perhaps he should
describe the Baker Plan as "sick" rather than as "dead."
14. (C) The DCM asked whether there was debate within CORCAS
about the way forward, given the "diversity" of CORCAS as
characterized by Khalihenna. Khalihenna said the recent
three-day meeting in Rabat had been very lively, even in
CORCAS meetings were closed to the outside (Comment: senior
MFA and MOI officials have attended at least parts of both
meetings. End Comment). He gave everyone a chance to speak,
with opportunities to talk about the constitution of CORCAS,
relations between Sahrawis and the state, the disposition of
resources in the Western Sahara. Many ideas were presented,
which were being developed into a non-paper. With its second
meeting, CORCAS moved from generalities into details. People
were reticent the first day, Khalihenna said, but on the
second day the gloves came off. It was a democratic
discussion, he said, and very passionate.
15. (C) Polcouns asked how the autonomy process that CORCAS
was spearheading related to the discussions political parties
had held in March, and to the autonomy ideas the political
parties had developed and submitted to the palace.
Khalihenna said CORCAS had nothing to do with the political
parties. These were separate tracks coordinated by the
Palace.
16. (U) The meeting between the Ambassador and CORCAS was
widely covered by the Moroccan media. A two-minute segment
appeared on the evening news May 31 in both French and
Arabic. Reporters were on hand to photograph the
Ambassador's arrival at CORCAS, capture the opening
courtesies on film, and to interview both the Ambassador and
Khalihenna at the conclusion of the meeting.
Comment
--------------
17. (C) By creating CORCAS, Morocco has effectively
established an entity that allows the palace to play
(publicly) a more back-seat role in the promotion of an
autonomy plan. CORCAS is now empowered to meet with the
Polisario, and to take the lead on the autonomy plan, though
it is clear the King and select advisors (will Khalihenna be
among them?) will be calling the major shots. While we have
no illusions about the transparency of CORCAS, it is now the
Palace's front in moving forward on the Western Sahara.
Since we are keen to bring Morocco and the Polisario
together, and see that as a logical next step, Embassy Rabat
believes we should considering responding positively to
Khalihenna's request for help in bringing the two sides
together. Before responding to the GOM, we might consider a
quiet approach to the Polisario to encourage a meeting with
CORCAS. It would be a breakthrough to get the two together,
even if little concrete was accomplished in the meeting.
******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************
Riley