Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06QUITO2138
2006-08-25 12:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

A THOUSAND CHARIOTS IN THE FIELDS: CHINESE PLAYERS

Tags:  ECON EPET PINR PREL ETRD EC CN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 002138 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR SGOOCH, NSC FOR DTOMLINSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016
TAGS: ECON EPET PINR PREL ETRD EC CN
SUBJECT: A THOUSAND CHARIOTS IN THE FIELDS: CHINESE PLAYERS
IN ECUADOR'S OIL INDUSTRY

REF: A. A) 05 QUITO 2152


B. B) QUITO 1231

C. C) INR REPORT 06/10/2005

Classified By: EconOff Josh M. Cartin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 002138

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR SGOOCH, NSC FOR DTOMLINSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016
TAGS: ECON EPET PINR PREL ETRD EC CN
SUBJECT: A THOUSAND CHARIOTS IN THE FIELDS: CHINESE PLAYERS
IN ECUADOR'S OIL INDUSTRY

REF: A. A) 05 QUITO 2152


B. B) QUITO 1231

C. C) INR REPORT 06/10/2005

Classified By: EconOff Josh M. Cartin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: With their $1.4 billion acquisition of
Canadian EnCana, China's state oil companies announced their
entrance as major players in Ecuador's and the region's
petroleum industry. Now with active participation in at
least five of Ecuador's petroleum blocks, and with further
investments in the offing, Quito is playing host to a steady
inflow of managerial, financial and technical representatives
of China's major and minor oil companies. Their efforts and
activities in Ecuador are both less coordinated and less
harmonious than they may appear. End summary.

"The Heavy and the Swift..."
--------------


2. (C) The overseas arms of three major Chinese oil
conglomerates, the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC),
the China Petroleum Company (Sinopec) and Sinochem all are
present and have ongoing operations in Ecuador. (Note: the
fourth major Chinese oil conglomerate, the China National
Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC),has concentrated its efforts on
offshore drilling and does not operate in Ecuador). These
companies own, invest in or operate individual assets in
Ecuador, and in some cases work together through consortia.
CNPC, for example, through its international arm, the China
National Overseas Development Corporation (CNODC),operates
CNPC International (Amazon),which solely possesses the
concession to drill in Ecuador's Block 11. CNPC and Sinopec
also are the 60-40 joint-investors in Andes Petroleum, the
Ecuadorian operating entity that purchased the Ecuadorian
assets of Canadian EnCana earlier this year (reftel a) and
which is now the majority concessionaire for Blocks 14, 17,
Tarapoa and Shiripuno. As part of the EnCana acquisitions,
Andes purchased the former's 36% stake in the Oleoducto de

Crudos Pesados (OCP) pipeline consortium and its 40% stake in
the disputed Block 15, formerly run by Occidental Petroleum
(Oxy). Andes' $1.4 billion purchase agreement with EnCana
contained an indemnity clause specifying a refund of up to
20% of the total purchase price if the Oxy asset was seized
by the Ecuadorian government. EnCana's ex-General Manager in
Ecuador told EconOff that the companies currently "are
working toward that".


3. (C) Sinochem, as its name implies, has its historical
roots in chemical production, trading and sales, and,
according to its local manager in Ecuador, is known in China
as a fertilizer monopoly. Its integrated petroleum arm was
established in 2002, In Ecuador Sinochem is a 15% joint
investor-operator, together with Taiwan's Offshore Petroleum
Investment Corp. (OPIC),of Block 16, of which Spanish Repsol
is the majority shareholder. Sinochem's senior
representative in Ecuador XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect) told EconOff
that in Ecuador most of Sinochem's activities are in
petroleum trading.


4. (C) Sinopec Services, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Sinopec, has a relatively large operation in Ecuador and
contracts technical services such as equipment leasing,
seismic studies and oilfield construction to the petroleum
exploration companies in Ecuador. Sinopec Services has
performed work for American companies such as Oxy. Several
Ecuadorian engineers from state-owned Petroproduccion have
traveled to China recently to participate in the analysis of
seismic studies performed by Sinopec Services.


5. (C) EconOff has also met representatives from at least
three other Chinese petroleum companies: Changqing Petroleum
Exploration Bureau (CPEB),nominally under the control of
CNPC, and Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau (ZPEB) and
Jiangsu Oil Exploration Corporation (JOECO),both nominally

under the control of Sinopec. These companies are legacy
upstream companies apparently still directed by Chinese
provincial and local governments. As China's domestic oil
exploration opportunities have dried up, these bureaus have
attempted to sell their expertise overseas.

"Subdued Tones Point To Disaffection..."
--------------


6. (C) EconOff spoke with Sinochem's XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX, a
senior manager from Sinopec Services (protect),about the
structure of Chinese petroleum companies in Ecuador.
Regarding the structure of the Andes consortium, XXXXXXXXXXXX said
that the 60-40 CNPC-Sinopec ownership structure leads to
management tension and "long, fractious board meetings."
Andes is by far China's most productive and lucrative
operator with an output, at EnCana's previous production
level, of approximately 200,000 barrels per day. Andes'
senior executive in Ecuador, Dr. Zhang Xing (reftel b),is a
CNPC man; the Sinopec counterpart at his level, Dr. Duan
Zhibin, lives in China and visits Ecuador only occasionally.
His deputy, Ding Jingjun, is thus the highest-level Sinopec
officer resident in Ecuador but not an equal partner to
XXXXXXXXXXXX. Sinochem's XXXXXXXXXXXX said that "the worst thing is for
Chinese companies to work together. Chinese and foreign
companies can work together without problems, but Chinese
companies together are not good." XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Sinochem
originally had planned to participate in the Andes consortium
but pulled out. He said that "Sinochem actually cares about
making money", while CNPC and Sinopec do not. This apparent
disregard for profits by China's two majors echoes the
sentiments of other industry contacts. Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX
confirmed that CNPC Amazon's work on Block 11 has been
unproductive: "they keep drilling, but there's no oil coming
out."


7. (C) According to Sinopec Service's XXXXXXXXXXXX, his company
subcontracts with the old provincial service bureaus to
perform technical services: "we receive money from our
clients, and then we pay the subcontractors." Sinopec
Service's office in Quito thus appears mainly to be engaged
in sales, business development and finance, with little
in-house technical expertise permanently resident in Ecuador.
EconOff asked how Sinopec Services chose which provincial
service bureaus to employ, and XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that "the
decisions are made back in China, depending on which service
bureaus have relationships with Sinopec executives."
According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the service bureaus are not supposed to
contract their services without passing through Sinopec or
CNPC, but because of "poor management control in CNPC", CPEB
managed to contract a perforation deal directly with American
company City Oriente, its first foray into the private
sector. City Oriente's local manager told us that CPEB
drilled nine wells in its Block 27, and City Oriente had
plans to expand the cooperation to twenty-one wells before it
had to scale back plans due to the passage of the
Hydrocarbons Law. The City Oriente manager said that
although CPEB first started the work with shoddy equipment
and low standards, they were "very compliant" in working with
City Oriente to upgrade their rigs and safety standards.

"Cooking Pots Over The Campfires..."
--------------


8. (C) The profile of Chinese oil company staff in Ecuador is
overwhelmingly male, on average between the ages of thirty
and fifty years old. Most of these workers seem to be
married but leave their families back in China. According to
XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect),a XXXXXXXXXXXX manager of Sinopec
Services, staff leave their families in China because Chinese
educational options for their children in Ecuador are
nonexistent. Many of the staff live communally in
apartments. The companies bring their own Chinese chefs to
Ecuador, and the staff often eat their meals together in the
communal apartments. In addition to raising the mean quality
of Chinese food available in Ecuador, the influx of single,
Chinese men into Quito has been a boon to Ecuador's nascent
casino industry. We are aware of one ex-finance manager from
CPEB who embezzled several thousand dollars from the company
to finance his gambling habit.

Comment - Ecuador's "Entangling Ground"
--------------


9. (C) The entrance en masse of Chinese oil companies into
Ecuador is a potent manifestation of China's national
strategy of securing direct oil contracts around the world to
reduce China's reliance on oil shipped from and through
hotspots such as the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Malacca.
Sinochem's XXXXXXXXXXXX, echoing many industry analysts, questioned
this strategy, recommending a greater emphasis on maximizing
profits from sales to the world oil markets. Nonetheless
Chinese oil exploration activities are increasing in the
region. Sinopec's XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff that Chinese oil
companies will soon announce a new consortium with India's
ONGC-Videsh in Colombia.


10. (C) Global contracts for the Chinese majors' service arms
also offers valuable opportunities to increase their
technical and managerial expertise, and we assume that the
dozens of Chinese petroleum engineers coming through Quito on
temporary projects will take these lessons home, furthering
China's effort to create an integrated oil services company
to rival Western companies like Schlumberger and Halliburton
(reftel c).


11. (C) Acquisitions of efficiently-managed and productive
operations such as EnCana's therefore serve both strategic
objectives at once, but Ecuador has proven a difficult and
expensive training ground for China. With the GOE's
combination-punch of the Hydrocarbons Law and the Oxy
contract caducity, the Chinese saw the value of their $1.4
billion EnCana acquisition shaved by about seventy percent
(reftel b). Meanwhile CNPC reportedly faces periodic
indigenous unrest around its heretofore unproductive Block

11. Chinese petroleum managers and diplomats, who appear to
consult closely on all major issues, openly complain about
the corruption and difficulty of doing business in Ecuador,
but we see no sign of a tactical retreat. Indeed, if XXXXXXXXXXXX's
pronouncement of a China-India joint-exploration venture in
Colombia materializes, then that will be more evidence that,
profits or losses, Chinese petroleros in South America are
here to stay. End comment.
JEWELL