Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06QUITO1394
2006-06-07 20:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

CANDIDATE CORREA OPEN TO DIALOGUE

Tags:  PGOV PREL EC 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4528
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 5666
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1772
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN 9856
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 0637
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 0593
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 001394 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EC
SUBJECT: CANDIDATE CORREA OPEN TO DIALOGUE

Classified By: PolChief Erik Hall for reasons 1.4 (b&d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 001394

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EC
SUBJECT: CANDIDATE CORREA OPEN TO DIALOGUE

Classified By: PolChief Erik Hall for reasons 1.4 (b&d)


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met on June 6 with Rafael
Correa, the controversial former finance minister and leftist
presidential candidate. While noting disagreement in several
areas of USG interest, the meeting was cordial, with the
candidate generally perceived as Chavez' likely favorite
emphasizing his willingness to maintain a dialogue with us.
Though registering relatively low in early polls, Correa
remains a candidate to watch, and could appeal to undecided
voters, who remain the majority. End Summary.


2. (SBU) The meeting came at our request, and was held at
the Ambassador's residence. Correa was accompanied by Carlos
Vallejo, a senior advisor and four-term congressman.
Vallejo, a former President of Congress ('93-94) for the
Popular Democracy Party (DP) and minister of agriculture in
Ecuador's first government after the return to democracy in
1979, left the DP in 1996. Returning to congress in 2002
with PRIAN support, Vallejo resigned in April 2005 after
differences with party chief Alvaro Noboa.


3. (SBU) Correa resigned as President Palacio's first
Economy and Finance Minister in August after courting Chavez'
financial support, and launched his bid for the presidency
earlier this year at the head of the Sovereign and Proud
Nation Movement ("Patria Altiva y Soberana"). Brash and
charismatic, Correa is currently in fourth place in the
polls, with 7-8% support. Most voters (approximately 70% by
one poll) are still undecided, however, and the charismatic
Correa could attract much of the anti-system vote of the
disaffected majority.


4. (C) On June 4, Correa won the backing of the Socialist
party, which currently holds five seats in the 100-member
Congress. Correa has recently been emphasizing his strong
Catholicism, perhaps in an attempt to reposition himself as a
Christian Democratic Socialist. Correa has also been seeking
support from the main indigenous movement (CONAIE),but they
have chosen to support their own president, Luis Macas, as
their candidate. But on June 5, Macas invited Correa to
compete with him for the support of a unified leftist
grouping with the candidate to be determined by a primary,

re-opening the possibility of indigenous support for Correa.


5. (C) Vallejo told the press Macas' offer had come too
late; to the Ambassador Correa joked that he would
participate in a primary if it could be organized in three
days. Vallejo confided before the meeting to PolChief that
he disagreed with Correa's intent on forming an alliance and
naming an indigenous running-mate, which could cost votes
from the coast. The far-left Popular Democracy Movement
(MPD),meanwhile, rejected any alliance with Correa, who they
do not consider to be a "true leftist."

Setting the Tone
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador opened by emphasizing mutual
interests. We want to help Ecuador improve living and
working conditions for its most important resource, the
Ecuadorian people. We are open to dialogue with all serious
presidential candidates, including Correa.


7. (C) Correa told the Ambassador that he flew in to Quito
especially for this meeting. He seemed eager to set the
Ambassador at ease by refuting his provocative anti-American
reputation, blaming the media for distortion of his beliefs.
"My beliefs and policies are not anti-American, or
anti-anything, only pro-Ecuador." Detractors in the
elite-controlled media had distorted those beliefs by linking
him to Chavez. Repeatedly referring to his advanced studies
in the U.S. (at the University of Illinois for his Masters
and Ph.D. degrees in economics),Correa said he came to
respect and appreciate American society, particularly its
social equality and informality, which he contrasted
favorably with European society. (Correa met his Belgian
wife, whom he shields from the spotlight along with his three
children, while studying at Lovaina University.)


8. (C) His goals in Ecuador are shaped by his experiences
abroad, he said, asserting that "if you Anglo-Saxons were
faced with living with the reality of Ecuador, I'd bet you
would be more radical than I in demanding change." At
several points in the meeting he used his English (somewhat
tentatively for a PhD) and said that despite policy
disagreements, he wished to maintain an open and cordial
dialogue with us.

Economic Differences: Agree to Disagree
--------------


9. (C) Correa clearly felt obliged to acknowledge
differences stemming from his performance as finance
minister. He and Vallejo did so by blaming Ecuador's corrupt
bankers. While minister, he said, Correa perceived USG
pressure and resistance to his efforts to solicit alternate
sources of financing, especially from the Government of
Venezuela. The need arose, he claimed, after Ecuador's
creditors, many of them Ecuadorian bankers, refused to
discuss renegotiating GOE debt, and IFIs refused to extend
scheduled credits. Far from seeking an exclusive
relationship with Chavez, he pursued others--the governments
of China and other South American nations among them.


10. (C) In the most confrontational part of the meeting,
Correa and Vallejo disagreed with the USG view by bluntly
asserting that Occidental Petroleum had violated Ecuadorian
law, and the dispute was not a bilateral issue but between a
state and a private company. ATPDEA benefits should not be
affected by this dispute, Correa said, since those benefits
are derived from GOE support to Plan Colombia and the fight
against narco-trafficking, as symbolized by the Manta FOL
agreement. Correa let Vallejo take the lead on the issue of
an FTA with the U.S.; Vallejo claimed he was not opposed in
principle, once Ecuador had time to prepare for international
competition. Correa noted Democratic Party opposition to the
FTA in the U.S. Congress, and claimed the FTA would cause job
losses in Ecuador.


11. (C) True to his reputation for arrogance, Correa
repeatedly mentioned his academic credentials when discussing
economic themes, insisting "I know what I'm talking about."
Recognizing that Ecuador needed more funds for social
investments, he had eliminated a mandatory debt repayment
fund. But he opposed Congress' populist raid on social
security funds, led by PSC leader Leon Febres Cordero.

Politics/Elections/Governance Strategy
--------------


12. (C) Asked what reforms he considers necessary to address
entrenched inequities in Ecuador, and how he would govern
Ecuador's highly fractured political system, Correa laid out
a strategy he characterized as democratic. "First, we must
win power (through the voting booths). Then we need to
convoke a constituent assembly to change how Congress is
selected. What is needed is to elect representatives by
district, as you do in the United States." Congress should
act to de-politicize the electoral commission and the courts,
using more transparent processes to select better qualified
judges. He cited the passage of the debt fund law (FEIREP),
which he achieved as minister despite Palacio's lack of
support in Congress, as evidence of his personal leadership.
With such superior leadership, he would convince the next
Congress to act on these reforms.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) This initial encounter was useful in opening a
channel of communication with a dark horse presidential
contender who, if elected, could dramatically affect USG
interests. To ensure that the channel remains open, we
purposely let Correa vent freely and muted our reaction to
preserve the positive atmosphere. We also saw signs of
reciprocation from Correa. When airing his views on Oxy and
ATPDEA, Correa seemed dutiful, apparently not wishing to
sacrifice dialogue to debate. We will seek to maintain the
dialogue throughout the campaign period, to maximize USG
influence, with increasing frankness as we develop trust.
JEWELL