KOSOVO: KOSOVAR ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP ACCEPTS DELAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000952

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW
SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: KOSOVAR ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP ACCEPTS DELAY
IN STATUS PROCESS QUIETLY, FACES DOWN PRESS CRITICISM


Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: Though apprehensive about the political
repercussions of a delay in the status process, Kosovar
Albanian leaders represented in the Unity Team (the
negotiating team participating in Vienna negotiations)
uniformly accepted the announcement by UN Special Envoy
Ahtisaari that his presentation of the status package would
be held until after Serbian parliamentary elections January

21. Unity Team officials met together in emergency session
the afternoon of November 10 and, in consultation with COM,
drafted a statement that regretted the delay and evinced
concern that the Serbian electoral timetable had influenced
the decision, but noted Kosovo's continuing trust in the
Vienna process. Though it does not preclude further problems
down the road, the measured reaction by the Kosovar
leadership, and the specific acceptance by the opposition of
this temperate position, was key to maintaining stability in
Kosovo as the status process moves forward. End summary.


2. (C) President Ahtisaari, after meeting with Contact Group
representatives the morning of November 10, informed the
Kosovo "Unity Team" of his decision to postpone presentation
of his Kosovo status recommendation until after Serbian
parliamentary elections in late January. Ahtisaari also
provided the team with the text of a short press statement
issued by the UNOSEK office to that same effect.


3. (C) The Unity Team came together in emergency session
with two members absent (ORA opposition leader Veton Surroi,
now in the U.S., and Prime Minister Ceku, away in Croatia) to
discuss reaction to the Ahtisaari statement. Careful
preparation by COM and earlier visits by Special Envoy Wisner
and EUR Assistant Secretary Fried had laid the foundation for
a considered and moderate response by the Kosovar team to a
possible delay, but government and opposition officials in
the Team were nonetheless concerned that their response to
the delay must convey their determination to conclude the
status process quickly, and thereby discourage extreme Kosovo
voices from demanding counter-productive unilateral action in
support of independence.


4. (C) Unity Team members consulted COM on elements of a
public statement, understanding correctly the importance of
how they phrased their response for an international, as well
as a domestic, audience. The statement as issued expressed
"deep regret" over the delay and concern that the
postponement had been tied to the Serbian parliamentary
elections, but noted that the Kosovar leadership continues to
believe that a resolution of status through the Ahtisaari
process will contribute to regional stability and is in the
best interests of all the people of Kosovo. The Team
reaffirmed its intention to seek the independence of Kosovo,
pledging to use the remaining period before the status
decision to work closely with UNMIK, the new International
Civilian Office planning team, the U.S. and the EU on
transition arrangements for the post-status period.


5. (C) Immediately following issuance of the statement, the
Unity Team members appeared jointly in front of the press
(their second appearance of the week -- two days prior to the
postponement decision, they had come together for a two-hour
television interview on the main TV channel speaking about
the Vienna negotiations) to convey a united front and combat
press charges that the international community had gone back
on its "promise" to decide status by the end of 2006. Unity
Team members firmly rejected the notion of international
"perfidy," with PDK opposition leader Hashim Thaci -- goaded
persistently by reporters trying to induce him to take a
stand at odds with the government -- particularly impressive
in his resolve: Thaci proclaimed to the media crowd that
"Kosovo had never been betrayed by the West, and therefore
Kosovo, its politicians and its people must never allow
themselves to deviate from their commitment to the
partnership with the United States and European Union."
(Note: Thaci departed the following day for a visit to the
United States, where, among others, he will see Special Envoy

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Wisner and Department officials.)


6. (C) Comment: While they were prepared for the likelihood
of a delay in the status decision by quiet intercession from
U.S. officials and others, Kosovo leaders deserve credit for
the mature and sober approach they demonstrated to the
Ahtisaari announcement. This is particularly the case given
the immediate and predictable onslaught of media commentary
criticizing the Unity Team for its "failure" to attain status
by the end of 2006. Cognizant both of the international and
domestic repercussions of their response to the postponement,
Unity Team members hit the right note in their collective and
individual statements. There will be, without question, more
political fallout in Kosovo from the delay, with intensified
disaffection and anger if the presentation of the Ahtisaari
package is pushed even further into 2007. Nevertheless, this
was an encouraging demonstration of flexibility and
understanding, one that sets the stage for a relatively quiet
political season into the first part of the new year. End
Comment.


7. (U) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable for release to
U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari.
YAZDGERDI