KOSOVO: PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE SERB REFUGEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000948

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR
DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: PREF EAID PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE SERB REFUGEE
MOVEMENTS POST-STATUS SHOWS GAPS IN ABILITY TO HANDLE LARGE
MIGRATIONS


Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Since the leak to Serbian media in May 2006
of UNHCR's draft contingency planning on possible population
movements after a decision on Kosovo's final status, UNHCR
has continued to refine its thinking. Planning assumptions
vary wildly, with estimates ranging from 10,000 to 112,000
additionally displaced people (i.e., above and beyond those
already displaced after the Kosovo conflict and March 2004
riots),depending on whether the decision is accompanied by
violence as in March 2004. UNHCR has pre-positioned small
amounts of humanitarian assistance in Kosovo, but warns that
funding will be needed and additional aid providers like the
World Food Program will have to get involved depending on the
scale of population movements. Some of these gaps could
potentially be filled now if donors and outside agencies were
quietly approached in advance for support. END SUMMARY.

UNHCR Planning Assumptions


2. (C) UNHCR began contingency planning in earnest in the
spring of 2006 for possible population movements after a
decision on final status, although planning on how to handle
population displacements had begun provisionally even
earlier, after the March 2004 riots. UNHCR's Pristina latest
plan (we have been allowed only to review the document, not
carry away a copy, since UNHCR is worried it will leak to the
Serbian media as did a previous document) is dated August 13,
2006 and presents three political scenarios that could emerge
from the status decision: independence, independence with
partition, and territorial autonomy under Serbian
sovereignty. (Comment: The delineation of these scenarios
is purely UNHCR's and does not appear to be tied to any
particular UN or UNMIK analysis that might afford greater
prescriptive ability and consequently more refined planning.
The first two scenarios appear to us to differ little in
terms of numbers of southern Serbs who might potentially exit
their enclaves, though a "soft" partition could encourage
more Serbs to remain in northern Kosovo versus travelling on
to Serbia, and the third scenario is unlikely in the extreme.
End comment.)


3. (C) Within the scope of these three scenarios, UNHCR
additionally contends for planning purposes that:

-- internationals are overstating potential problems north of
the Ibar and understating them in Kosovo's southern ethnic
Serb enclaves;
-- the size and direction of population movements will depend
on whether there is violence and the kinds of assurances
given to minority populations by the Kosovo government and
the international community;
-- no matter which of the three scenarios occurs, there will
be some population movements as minority areas consolidate,
especially in any new majority Serb municipalities created by
the final status document. UNHCR also believes that whatever
the outcome, some Serbs will not leave at all and others
could delay their ultimate departure. At the present time,
UNHCR has staff monitoring all Serb enclaves to report
trigger events like property listings and school enrollment
figures to assess whether people are preparing to move.
These reports are not indicating any potential movements at
the present time.


3. (C) In the event that independence is the outcome of the
final status process, UNHCR's planning assumptions encompass
anywhere from 41,000 to 112,000 refugees or displaced
persons. Of these, UNHCR calculates 17,000 could be
displaced within Kosovo (either to enclaves in the south or
the majority Serb areas north of the Ibar River) in a low
displacement scenario and 31,000 within Kosovo in a high
displacement situation. Previously UNHCR representatives had
told us they estimated only 10,000 Kosovo Serbs would choose
to leave Kosovo after final status. The reason for the
recent rise in estimate is unclear, but it makes obvious the
gaps UNHCR could face with a large population outflow (see

PRISTINA 00000948 002 OF 003


para 6 below).

Contingency Planning Coordinated with Other Agencies, But
Still Problematic


4. (C) According to UNHCR representatives in Pristina, every
UNHCR office (Pristina, Belgrade, Skopje and Podgorica) that
could be affected by possible population movements and
displacement because of a decision on Kosovo's final status
has undertaken contingency planning in coordination with
relevant local organizations and agencies. In Kosovo, UNHCR
has used a three-tiered approach to develop its contingency
plan. In initial stages of planning, a limited number of
agencies (UNMIK, ICRC, KFOR and the Danish Relief Council,
UNHCR's long-standing logistics partner in Kosovo) formed an
operational core team. Later, UNHCR expanded this group to
include other key international NGOs (particularly UNHCR's
lead partners throughout different areas of Kosovo --
Norwegian Church Aid in Mitrovica, International Catholic
Migration Commission in Peja and Prizren, and Mercy Corps in
Gjilan and Pristina). Lastly, the UNHCR brought in the
broader community, most significantly Kosovar and Serbian
government officials, to focus on a public information
campaign and on preventing de-stabilization.


5. (C) Even with the seemingly coordinated effort, however,
the multi-agency approach has had its difficulties. UNHCR
Pristina representative Francesca Friz-Priguda (protect) told
us that the various UN agencies involved often had different
agendas; as an example, she claimed, UNDP was too focused on
the effect of population outflows on its own returns projects
and not enough on the emergency recovery aspects of a
possible UN-led crisis response.

Pre-positioned Supplies for Large-Scale Movement Inadequate,
Outside Support Will Be Needed


6. (C) Friz-Priguda said bluntly that UNHCR will be hard
pressed to deal with any massive outflow from Kosovo because
its programs in the Balkans are only 80 percent funded. She
added that collective centers UNHCR has identified in
southern Serbia could accommodate only 3,000 persons and
UNHCR would have to reopen those collective centers that have
not been privatized or otherwise currently used for other
purposes. UNHCR has stored a small amount of contingency
stocks of non-food items like blankets, stoves, hygiene kits
and mattresses in a warehouse outside of Pristina; however,
depending on the scale of displacement these stocks would not
be nearly enough. Food could also be a problem. UNHCR has
only stored emergency food rations for 5,000 people for three
days. It expects it could quickly expand its stocks to cover
one month or involve the World Food Program (WFP),despite
the fact that WFP is no longer operating in the region.

COMMENT


7. (C) UNHCR's own planning assumptions, recently raised to
include the possibility of tens of thousands of IDPs,
demonstrate that resources to deal with a large population
outflow could quickly be exhausted. Early and swift response
from donors and other international agencies might be
required to avert a humanitarian crisis. In this respect,
UNHCR appears to have done little to marshal support in
advance, and seems -- unrealistically -- to be relying on the
impetus of the moment to bring aid to the table should the
worst happen.


8. (C) Nor is it apparent that there are long-term solutions
to the very real problems posed by a population migration out
of Kosovo. We see no special provision for the possibility
that a significant number of southern Serbs might choose to
remain in northern Kosovo, where the political climate might
be more congenial to them but where the supply of housing is
already strained to capacity. Embassy Belgrade can comment
further, but upwards of 40,000 refugees or more streaming
into Serbia would likely also find an inhospitable atmosphere

PRISTINA 00000948 003 OF 003


and social welfare systems unable to cope with the additional
burden.


9. (C) In the end, of course, much depends on the
assumptions made about refugee outflow and the impact of an
independence decision on Kosovo Serb calculations. We can
hope for the best, but prudent planning demands that we deal
more effectively with the potential for large-scale
population movements, especially given the political
implications of a major humanitarian event in the immediate
post-status period. Department may wish to engage with UNHCR
at a higher level on the potential for encouraging advance
commitments by donors and other agencies, including WFP,
should a crisis build. USOP will continue to work with UNHCR
on the ground and help shape their planning assumptions in
line with the evolving political dynamic. END COMMENT.


10. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina does not clear this cable for
release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
YAZDGERDI