Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRISTINA930
2006-11-06 12:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: LDK INTERNAL BATTLE PORTENDS CONTINUING

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNMIK YI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000930 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW
SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: LDK INTERNAL BATTLE PORTENDS CONTINUING
DIFFICULTIES IN ASSEMBLY AND KOSOVO GOVERNMENT

REF: PRISTINA 906

Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000930

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW
SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: LDK INTERNAL BATTLE PORTENDS CONTINUING
DIFFICULTIES IN ASSEMBLY AND KOSOVO GOVERNMENT

REF: PRISTINA 906

Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: The internal LDK struggle for power between
two factions continues, with the process of party elections
now in full swing. Though former Assembly speaker Nexhat
Daci appeared to take the early momentum with low-level party
victories in eastern Kosovo, the LDK "old guard" under Kosovo
President Fatmir Sejdiu has dominated the last few branch
elections in key locations including Klina, Pristina, Prizren
and Peja/Pec. While this trend is encouraging, the
factionalization of the party has had a detrimental effect on
party discipline and unity, most noticeable in the Kosovo
Assembly and the rudderless quality of the LDK assembly
caucus. The date for the LDK party convention is not yet
set; it could come as soon as the end of November or early
December, but could also be delayed for several weeks because
some of the branch elections were deemed irregular and must
be re-run. Even if Sejdiu wins the election outright, Daci
has made a strong enough showing that he will be a factor in
the party for some time. Daci is also receiving unspecified
support from Bexhet Pacolli, founder of a new party with
murky objectives, who may add to Daci's weight in Kosovo's
ever-shifting political climate. We judge it is unlikely,
though not impossible, that Daci will break with the LDK
after the elections; either way, he and his supporters will
prove disruptive to LDK cohesion, making our job more
difficult on settlement implementation. End summary.

LDK Struggle Goes On, Sejdiu Gaining Momentum


2. (C) The process of party elections for the LDK is
reaching its crescendo, with key party organizations
declaring themselves for one of the two primary candidates
for the LDK president slot and electing delegates to the LDK
convention who will be pledged to either Daci or Sejdiu.
Early elections at the lowest level of the party, known as
"actives," appeared to give a certain momentum to former

Assembly speaker and charismatic figure Nexhat Daci. Daci's
fortunes were helped by the fact that LDK municipal leaders
in eastern Kosovo (Gjilan, Ferizaj, Viti, Ljipjan),where the
first LDK elections took place, feared the outcome of
decentralization discussions in Vienna and believed that Daci
would be more forceful in opposing any change to their
municipal boundaries. On occasion, some of these local LDK
contests deteriorated into outright fights between Sejdiu and
Daci supporters, as in Fushe Kosove/Kosovo Polje and Ferizaj
(in both areas, "parallel" LDK structures have been set up by
Sejdiu backers to protest what they view as an "illicit"
takeover of the branch by Daci's people).


3. (C) However, as branch elections have taken place in "old
guard" strongholds of Pristina, Peja/Pec, Prizren, and Klina,
among others, Sejdiu's numbers have grown to the point where
it would be increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for
Daci to win the presidency. This is despite -- not because
of -- Sejdiu's campaign organization, which is weak to
non-existent. Persistent USOP efforts, in tandem with urging
from Sejdiu's AAK coalition colleagues and other observers of
the Kosovo political scene, to encourage Sejdiu to take a
more active approach to the campaign have been generally
unsuccessful; fortunately, his position as the President of
Kosovo and general dislike of Daci in the larger LDK ranks
have combined to propel Sejdiu forward in the race.

LDK Internal Divisions Impact Assembly, Government


4. (C) The LDK organization is cumbersome and only nominally
hierarchical; without its revered elder statesman, former
President Rugova, at the helm, its multi-member party
presidency has been riven with dissent along the Daci/Sejdiu
lines, and individual members with the power to sway the
party in one direction or another -- including Sejdiu,
current Assembly speaker Kole Berisha, and Prizren mayor
Eqrem Kryeziu -- have been extremely reluctant to put
themselves in the forefront. The rudderless quality of the

PRISTINA 00000930 002 OF 003


LDK has shown itself to be particularly detrimental in the
Assembly, where the lack of clear guidance from on high has
allowed individual ambition to overshadow party discipline.
The LDK caucus leader in the Assembly, Alush Gashi, has no
clear loyalties except to himself, and has used the vacuum at
the top of the party to assert his own brand of
obstructionism, even in the face of clear Contact Group and
USG preferences. Gashi fancies himself a dark horse
candidate for the LDK presidency, evidently believing that if
Daci fails, he could emerge as a more acceptable nominee for
the party in opposition to Sejdiu, with the support of Daci's
delegates (this is a scenario belied by deep dislike for
Gashi among most LDK rank and file). Gashi also harbors
lingering resentment that the international community -- in
his mind mainly the U.S. government -- did not elevate him to
the Assembly speakership or Presidency in the immediate
aftermath of Rugova's death and the resulting government
shuffle.


5. (C) Gashi's instinct to cause mischief just to show his
own power, and his flirtation with Daci, has led to open
clashes with the international community and USOP on several
occasions, most notably regarding the passage of an amendment
to the Law on Languages (part of the 13 Contact Group
priority standards) and more recently during the fierce
Assembly debate over the audit report detailing mismanagement
under Daci's Assembly reign (reftel and septel). Only
repeated USOP intercession with Speaker Berisha and President
Sejdiu prompted them to lay down the law with the LDK caucus,
instructing caucus members over Gashi's head to agree to
parliamentary debate of the audit report and thereby avoid a
prolonged opposition boycott of the Assembly's work. Even
after Berisha and Sejdiu's intercession, the motion to debate
the audit report and form an investigative commission on
mismanagement passed by 58 to 5, with 87 members present in
the Assembly; while the Assembly's electronic voting does not
record individual votes, we can assume the bulk of the LDK
caucus merely abstained rather than vote in favor. A number
of LDK caucus members are known to support Daci, and at least
a couple of these found their way into the composition of the
new commission, guaranteeing further trouble with the
opposition down the road on this issue. The LDK also remains
too preoccupied with its internal issues to be an effective
ally in the post-status transition effort, a troubling trend
at a time when full LDK governmental support for the UNMIK to
ICO and PISG handoff is absolutely necessary.

Whither the LDK?


6. (C) Speculation abounds that if Daci fails to win the LDK
president slot, as is looking increasingly likely, he will
take his supporters and break with the party, creating not
only a separate political factor but another parliamentary
caucus, as well. This is possible, but it is equally likely
that he will stay within the comfortable confines of the LDK
and seek to expand his base, relying on new connections and
an infusion of cash from wealthy expatriate Kosovar financier
Bexhet Pacolli. Pacolli, whose visage is now plastered
across Kosovo in a series of billboards extolling the virtues
of his own party, labelled the "Alliance for a New Kosovo,"
is known to be close to Daci and is very likely underwriting
his efforts. Daci can continue to cause as much trouble from
within the LDK as without, making settlement implementation
and passage by the Assembly of critical legislation much more
problematic over time. Thus far, USOP, using contacts within
the LDK, the AAK, and the opposition, has been able to
overcome the periodic crises in the Assembly, but as the
stakes grow higher in the status discussions, controlling the
LDK will be an ever more labor-intensive endeavor.


7. (C) If Sejdiu does win the LDK election, we will press
him to overcome his traditional passivity and purge the party
leadership of its most troublesome figures, including Alush
Gashi. Sejdiu's reticence aside, this is a prerequisite for
adequate functioning of the party in the post-status phase.
We should be prepared, however, for a running Daci role, most
likely unhelpful in the extreme, in urging individual party

PRISTINA 00000930 003 OF 003


members to work against the settlement provisions. USOP will
continue to monitor and report on events in the LDK, as well
as to press its existing leadership for greater investment in
the transition process and clear, uncompromising support for
the Vienna negotiations.


8. (U) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable for release to
U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW