SUPPORT FOR KOSOVO'S SOUTHERN SERBS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000881

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR
DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR KOSOVO'S SOUTHERN SERBS


Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ensuring that the Serb community can remain
and prosper in Kosovo is a key Mission goal and a vital test
of Kosovo's commitment to multi-ethnic democracy. The
Serb minority in Kosovo is not monolithic; those who live in
the northern municipalities of Leposavic, Zubin Potok and
Zvecan, plus north Mitrovica, have agendas that are distinct
and often at odds with those who live in minority enclaves
south of the Ibar River. Serbs in the south are at once the
most vulnerable and the most willing to engage in productive
discussion with the international community and Kosovar
authorities. That attitude must be nourished, in part
through active engagement via USAID and other USG resources,
and in part through political support for southern Serb
moderates who show any inclination to work with the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. End summary.

Enclave Serbs: Expanding Support for the Most Vulnerable


2. (C) Kosovo Serbs who live in ethnic enclaves south of
the Ibar river, some 55 percent of the Serb population here,
face unique challenges. Surrounded by the Albanian majority,
these Serbs are reliant on Belgrade for a part of their
livelihood but totally dependent on Kosovo instititions and
the international community for their security. A number of
southern Serbs have openly told us they view the U.S. as
their key protector; Slobodan Petrovic, founder of a new
ethnic-Serb party based in southern Kosovo, made this
explicit in a conversation with COM October 20 when he noted
that the enclave Serbs had nowhere else to turn and were
deeply grateful that the U.S. continued to keep the Serb
cause front and center with Kosovar Albanian institutions.


3. (C) Recognizing this, USOP has consistently reached out
to the southern Serbs in order to demonstrate our commitment
to their well-being and encourage them to remain as part of a
multi-ethnic Kosovo. (Note: The fact that the bulk of
southern Serbs live in the U.S. KFOR area of operations, and
that the current Texas National Guard-led contingent has
worked diligently to expand outreach to the local Serb
communities, has aided us tremendously in this effort.) Our
approach has been along three primary lines: infrastructure,
business, NGO and media assistance via USAID and public
diplomacy resources; political advocacy and support; and an
increased information flow on issues related to the Vienna
process and its benefits to the Serb community.

Visible Projects in Enclave Serb Communities


4. (SBU) U.S. support for Serb communities in the southern
part of Kosovo is visible and widespread. Three and a half
million dollars has been earmarked for Kosovo Serb
infrastructure projects in the southern enclaves, building
roads, schools, community centers, health clinics, and
improving water supplies. Projects are currently active in
Ferizaj/Urosevac, Vushtri/Vucitrn, Fushe Kosove/Kosovo Polje,
Obliq/Obilic, Kline/Klina, Shtrpce/Strpce, and Peja/Pec,
among other areas. (Note: An additional $1 million has been
devoted to projects solely in Kosovo's north, in support of
Serb communities in north Mitrovica and the three
Serb-majority municipalities.) Hundreds of Serb families
have benefited from this infrastructure improvement, as well
as from business development programs designed in part to
help Serb farmers market and export their produce, including
to Serbia.


5. (SBU) USG projects are designed to serve several
purposes: they are tangible proof of U.S. commitment to Serb
welfare in Kosovo; they have the potential to significantly
enhance the self-sufficiency of Serb communities through
business and economic links with their Albanian neighbors;
and they encourage daily interaction between ethnic
communities. In one business-related project, 54 ethnic Serb
accountants were trained in harmonizing record-keeping
practices with Kosovo regulations; in another, ethnic-Serb
construction companies were helped to obtain licenses to bid
on PISG and international donor tenders. Similar programs

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exist in agricultural and other fields. Infrastructure
assistance, as well, has been specifically targeted at
improving practical links between municipal authorities and
their Serb citizenry.


6. (SBU) NGO and media assistance to enclave Serbs is
similarly oriented. Training in reporting, production skills
and management has been provided to Kosovo Serb print and
broadcast media -- which, though rudimentary, now that the
power to reach most enclaves with news and information. USOP
has also made incentive grants available to Serb production
houses to develop topical content, for example documentaries
on minority issues, and has linked Albanian and Serb TV
stations to jointly produce and broadcast such material. On
the civil society front, USAID recently launched a project
with Freedom House International to provide grants to pairs
of Kosovo Serb/Kosovo Albanian NGOs for cooperation on common
initiatives. Other NGO grants, made through USAID and our
Democracy Commission, have focused on Serb NGO activities in
the enclaves, ranging from women's associations to youth
groups. Public diplomacy resources have enabled us to
support Serb libraries in the southern enclaves (as well as
in the north),teach English to students, and bring Serbs and
Albanians together for a variety of cultural events and
educational programs.

Political Advocacy and Support


7. (C) Moderate Serb political leaders, even in the southern
enclaves, are few and far between; pressure from Belgrade and
from the hardline northern Serb leadership to conform to an
adversarial vision of daily politics has made Serbs in
Kosovo's south wary of asserting their own prerogatives. Nor
have Kosovar Albanian governing authorities in many cases
done what they should to demonstrate a positive commitment to
Serbs' future in Kosovo. Caught between a rock and a hard
place, moderate Serb leaders consistently appeal to the U.S.
government to intercede on their behalf with both Belgrade
and Kosovar authorities. USOP maintains a regular weekly
(sometimes more frequent) exchange with Serb Orthodox Bishop
Teodosije and Father Sava Janjic, who reside in the enclave
of Decani monastery; as a result of their keen advocacy and
our responsiveness, we have together raised the pressure on
the Kosovo government to stop development near the Serb
monument to the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, fund repairs to
vandalized Serbian churches in Urosevac/Ferizaj and
elsewhere, and focus on small infrastructure needs in Serb
areas. Agreeing to a USOP initiative, Bishop Teodosije will
accompany Ambassador Wisner to Klina during his October 24-26
visit to Kosovo to raise attention to the needs of the Serb
community there, and COM has offered to accompany the Bishop
on other enclave visits in the future.


8. (C) Consistent public and private admonitions to the
Kosovar authorities has also resulted in fulfillment of eight
of the 13 Contact Group priority standards for Kosovo, many
of which are directly related to minority issues. Other
items are underway but have yet to be fully implemented,
including those related to property return and creation of a
rental scheme for Serb-owned (and Albanian occupied)
apartments; we will be intensifying our work with the PISG
and UNMIK in the next few weeks to see that these standards
are successfully completed. We can do even more to advocate
on behalf of the Serb community; as one example, there are
linkages yet to be established between Serb media in the
enclaves and KTV, the Kosovo public broadcaster, where USOP
can be helpful in facilitating contacts and expanding ties.
Other ideas may be brought forward by Slobodan Petrovic and
other Serb moderate leaders, including SLKM officials Oliver
Ivanovic and Randjel Nojkic, something COM has encouraged in
recent contacts.

Media Exposure/Access to Information


9. (C) Despite the assistance provided to Kosovo Serb media
outlets, Serbs in Kosovo remain heavily reliant on Belgrade
for their information flow. Knowledge about the Vienna final
status negotiations, especially the decentralization

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provisions and its potential benefits to the Serb community,
is scant. Internet use is practically non-existent among
Serbs in a heavily rural environment where even phone lines
are sometimes lacking. Our public diplomacy strategy has
therefore taken two tacks. One, alluded to earlier, focuses
on broadening receptivity to the U.S. role in Kosovo and our
emphasis on multi-ethnicity, through the tools of English
instruction, donations of library materials, and cultural and
educational programs.


10. (C) The other half of the strategy is targeted more
directly at getting the word out on decentralization, making
clear the USG commitment to the decentralization provisions
of the Vienna settlement and explaining those aspects of the
deal that will protect and enhance Serb rights in Kosovo.
COM has gone out to Gjilan/Gnilane within the past few weeks
to underscore that the USG expects Kosovar Albanian municipal
authorities to comply fully with the Ahtisaari plan once it
is publicly articulated; her message received wide resonance
in Kosovo media, as did EUR Assistant Secretary Fried's
comments on the same subject (as well as his condemnation of
violence against minorities) during his October visit to
Kosovo. Ambassador Wisner's visit next week will offer
another opportunity to make these points both to the Albanian
and Serb audiences in Kosovo; Radio KIM, a station based in
Serb-majority Caglavica but with network reach into all the
main Serb enclaves, will interview Ambassador Wisner in
Klina, and other media will cover his joint visit with Bishop
Teodosije to the Serb villages in Klina municipality.


11. (C) We can and will find many more opportunities to
deliver these messages, through the venue of high-level
visits, through coordination with our Contact Group
colleagues on the ground, and through statements and
interviews made in Washington aimed at listeners in Kosovo.
The latter will be particularly important as the outlines of
the Ahtisaari plan are made public and both Serbs and
Albanians respond with intense interest and, at least in some
instances, real apprehension. Managing expectations
regarding the status process (and outreach to the Serb
community) is not solely the job of the U.S. government -- we
continue to urge an often reluctant Kosovo government to take
up its reponsibilities in this regard -- but we have an
outsized voice in Kosovo and our message of reassurance will
be critical on both sides.


12. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable in its
entirety for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW