Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRISTINA802
2006-09-22 11:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: SCENESETTER FOR SEPTEMBER 26-28 VISIT OF

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNMIK YI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7046
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0802/01 2651153
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221153Z SEP 06
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6529
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000802 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (A/S FRIED, DAS DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, BLACK,
ERATH, LANG)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SCENESETTER FOR SEPTEMBER 26-28 VISIT OF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED

Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000802

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (A/S FRIED, DAS DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, BLACK,
ERATH, LANG)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SCENESETTER FOR SEPTEMBER 26-28 VISIT OF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED

Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The successful September 20 Contact Group
ministerial with Secretary Rice at the helm was viewed here
as further indication that the U.S. government will press for
a timetable that delivers a status determination by the end
of 2006. This remains the sole and almost obsessive focus of
Kosovar leaders, and your visit, like DAS DiCarlo's earlier
in September, will provide a necessary corrective to push
Kosovo officials to recognize their own responsibilities in
the status process. Standards fulfillment must stay at the
center of Kosovars' attention, and they must be convinced to
take the message of decentralization to their increasingly
skeptical -- and vocal -- Albanian public. In conversations
with the President, the Prime Minister and the Unity Team,
your unambiguous message should be to "stay out of CG
politics and concentrate instead on your own": Unity Team
leaders -- especially those in the governing LDK -- need to
bring recalcitrant Assembly delegates to heel and prepare
party members at Kosovo and municipal levels for those
aspects of the status settlement related to minority rights
that must/must be embraced and implemented. End summary.

Kosovars Fret Pointlessly Over End Game Scenarios


2. (C) With the last few months of the year approaching,
every Kosovar's fancy has turned to thoughts of independence.
Each step in the status process is endlessly analyzed and
turned over for what it might mean by way of final status
determination. Less time, unfortunately, is spent in
contemplation of what can be accomplished on the Kosovar
Albanian side to make the status outcome a positive one.


3. (C) The good news is that standards fulfillment is
proceeding; by various counts, up to nine of the 13 priority
Contact Group standards have been completed and Prime
Minister Ceku's office is intent on finishing up the rest.
You can encourage him in this, and urge him to exercise the

necessary leadership in the Kosovo Assembly to get the job
done.


4. (C) Less positive is the increasingly shrill tone of
media and political discourse in Kosovo on the prospect of
decentralization and the devolution of significant governing
authority to Serb-majority municipalities, which will be an
integral part of the settlement no matter what the ultimate
status outcome. The broadest part of the Kosovar public is
ambivalent on the issue of decentralization, but the
frightening prospect of "giving up precious bits of Kosovo"
to the Serbs has been quite cleverly manipulated by those
within the ruling LDK party who seek to unseat President
Sejdiu from his position of prominence and instead install
Nexhat Daci, an autocratic nationalist who was successfully
ousted as Assembly Speaker some months back. You should
underscore to Sejdiu in the strongest possible terms the need
to get his party house (and Assembly caucus) in order and
effectively counter his LDK enemies by using his position as
Kosovo President to build support for the Ahtisaari approach.


5. (C) The message to the combined negotiating team, which
has -- remarkably -- held together despite the almost
constant efforts of its opposition members (Hashim Thaci and
Veton Surroi) to condition continued unity on a reshuffling
of government, should be sharp and pointed: stop obsessing
about possible status scenarios (and your own political
ambitions) and get on with your work, particularly the
business of selling Ahtisaari's package to your parties and
people. We are pressing the team to agree on a media plan
that gets them out and about, but apathy and mutual mistrust
have inhibited fruitful action. You can stress again the
time urgency of joint Unity Team appearances, both on
television and in person, especially in those municipalities
where opposition to decentralization is greatest. The
international community and USOP can help in this effort, but
we cannot supplant the voice of those who have negotiated the
package and must stand by its content.

UNMIK, KFOR, Contact Group: Need for Close Coordination,
Active Planning on Transition


6. (C) You will meet with newly appointed SRSG Joachim
Ruecker, DSRSG Steve Schook, OSCE Head of Mission Werner
Wnendt, EU liaison office head Torbjorn Sohlstrom, and
COMKFOR LTG Roland Kather (the latter separately),as well as
have a chance to talk to local Contact Group representatives.
Ruecker was a good partner to us as the previous head of
UNMIK's economic pillar, but he has spent less time in Kosovo
than in New York over the few weeks since becoming SRSG. You
can congratulate him on his enhanced responsibilities while

PRISTINA 00000802 002 OF 002


emphasizing the importance of moving forward smartly on
transition planning for the post-UNMIK era. UNMIK
foot-draggers at lower levels of the bureaucracy have yet to
produce a comprehensive turnover scheme, but we do have the
advantage of close cooperation with our local EU partners in
pressing for faster UN action. You can get a sense first
hand of EU plans for the follow-on international mission to
be established post-status, including its critical Rule of
Law component.


7. (C) COMKFOR Kather, on the ground only since early
September, is far and away an improvement over his Italian
predecessor. Savvier and more respectful of political
imperatives, he understands the need to be responsive to
capitals and to the NAC, though he will guard his
prerogatives in determining the appropriate level of military
force to apply to his assigned tasks. After considerable
pressure was brought to bear on the previous commander,
KFOR's presence in northern Kosovo has grown to roughly
battalion size; the Germans occupy "Camp Nothing Hill" in the
far northern corner of Kosovo until the end of October, and
U.S. forces will rotate in next. Kather has said he will
look at ways of increasing the length of rotation from its
current (and insufficient) two weeks, and he is trying to
establish some permanence at Nothing Hill though hampered by
lack of funds. Kather is also acting swiftly to expand
KFOR's visibility in the wake of several recent bombings in
southern Kosovo, one of which was ethnically-inspired.


8. (C) The more robust KFOR presence in the north, along
with a plus-up in international civilian police, has been
registered by the Serb leadership, which is far more cautious
in its pronouncements these days. USG assistance projects
have also had the beneficial impact of promoting direct links
with Serb municipal authorities in the north. You will see
the UNMIK representative in Mitrovica (a former FSO) and meet
directly with three of the more moderate Serb leaders.
Despite their acknowledgement that independence is the
likeliest outcome of the status process, they cannot yet tear
themselves away from Belgrade's influence or contemplate
post-status arrangements that would associate their parties
with Kosovar institutions. You can encourage them to remain
engaged with the international community and stay open to the
eventual provisions of the Ahtisaari settlement, which will
heavily favor their interests. In a subsequent press
opportunity, you can make the same points to the larger Serb
audience.

Public Diplomacy: Selling the Package


9. (U) In addition to some time with the Serb press, you
will make an appearance in front of the Pristina press corps
after your meetings with the President and the Unity Team.
Expect questions on the USG view of independence and the
timing of the status announcement, as well as on the
construct of the UN Security Council resolution related to
status. The big points to get across:

-- As Secretary Rice and the Contact Group made clear on
September 20, we hope to see the status process concluded by
the end of 2006.

-- But to make that happen, Kosovo must do its part. The
Unity Team has engaged productively in negotiations in
Vienna; they must do everything possible to finalize an
agreement with President Ahtisaari and UNOSEK. Kosovo must
also fulfill the 13 Contact Group priority standards without
delay.

-- A crucial part of the settlement process will be Kosovar
acceptance and implementation of decentralization.

-- Decentralization is not about carving up Kosovo. It's
about providing meaningful guarantees to ethnic communities
in Kosovo and ensuring that they have appropriate authority
at local level to live their lives in peace and security.
Minority protections via decentralization are part of modern
European life and have been successfully implemented
throughout Europe. With acceptance of decentralization,
Kosovo will demonstrate its reponsibility and its readiness
to move forward in the status process.


10. (U) U.S. Office Pristina does not/not clear this cable
for release to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW