KOSOVO: WHY A SPEEDY RESOLUTION OF STATUS MATTERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000788

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW
SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: WHY A SPEEDY RESOLUTION OF STATUS MATTERS

REF: BELGRADE 1484

Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Having read Embassy Belgrade's excellent cable
(reftel) on the compelling reasons to stick to the planned
timetable for resolution of Kosovo's status, we wanted to
offer a few thoughts from the Pristina perspective on why a
status decision this year remains critical to our objectives
of stability and progress in the region.


2. (C) We have maintained steady momentum over the past
months in directing the energies of Kosovo's fractious
political parties towards fulfillment of key standards agreed
by the international community, standards that help
demonstrate Kosovo's political will to protect ethnic
minorities and enshrine basic democratic rights for all
citizens. The multi-party "Unity Team" (UT) of Kosovar
Albanian negotiators has also put on a more than credible
showing in Vienna, responding to President Ahtissari's
repeated requests for more concessions on decentralization
and community rights with flexibility and seriousness of
purpose. For this, each member of the team has taken a
direct political hit -- President Sejdiu and his LDK
compatriots have been accused of "selling out" to the Kosovo
Serbs without any corresponding concessions from Belgrade,
while opposition UT members Surroi and Thaci have seen their
parties grow restive in an enforced and unnatural (though
necessary) alliance with the governing coalition. Further,
though the political atmosphere is highly charged in this
pre-status timeframe, inter-ethnic violence has not been part
of the landscape, with ethnically-instigated incidents both
south and north of the Ibar River at an all-time low.


3. (C) That any of this is the case is not by accident.
Progress on standards, continued unity among political
rivals, and restraint among the even the most radical
factions of Kosovar society has been predicated on the
prospect of a clear resolution this year to the status
question. Using the leverage of the status process, we have
kept this house in order and -- more to the point -- we have
empowered Kosovo's moderate leadership to seize the
initiative and propel Kosovo firmly in the direction of
inter-ethnic cooperation and democratic institution-building.
We obviously have a long way to go, but status has been and
remains the engine for positive change.


4. (C) Take away the prospect for a settlement of status by
the end of 2006, and we open the door for divisive and
dangerous forces to seize the political stage in Kosovo.
Delay will almost certainly fracture the Unity Team itself
beyond repair. What tenous control members of the Team have
over voices within their own parties arguing against
decentralization (and indeed any concessions to the Serbs)
will also diminish precipitously. Most worrying, small but
significant extremist Albanian elements -- whose activities
have thus far been kept in check -- will find fertile ground
for an expanded base of support. Even random acts of
violence, if they build in intensity during a hiatus in the
status process, could derail our carefully honed plans and
lead to a downward spiral of conflict and destruction. What
chance we have now to navigate through an admittedly
difficult patch and find a productive modus operandi with
Serbia post-status, as Embassy Belgrade so rightly points
out, could be lost for many years in a cycle of escalating
violence and mutual recrimination.


5. (C) The imperative of moving resolutely towards a status
decision is further underscored by the economic difficulties
facing Kosovo this winter and beyond. Credible reports from
the World Bank and our own assessments point to the
possibility of a far bleaker winter season -- with regular
power outages and energy infrastructure failures -- than even
those of the last few years; combined with growing
unemployment as a consequence of UNMIK's departure and any
delay in the status determination, we could see a "perfect
storm" of events leading to social unrest, inevitably
exploited by irresponsible elements of Kosovo's political

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spectrum. Nor would Kosovo's long term prospects for
stability be served by its continuing inability to attract
private investment or financial support from the IFIs under
current legal arrangements.


6. (C) The immediate period ahead of us will be difficult
all around, in Serbia and most certainly here in Kosovo,
where increasing fire is being levelled at Kosovar
negotiators and where even parliamentary members from
Kosovo's governing parties have taken potshots at their
political leaders for appearing too "generous" to the Serbs.
With our unceasing support, and armed with the clear prospect
of a status decision by year's end, Kosovo's mainstream
leadership can and will weather the storm and emerge stronger
at the other end. Under any other circumstances, however, we
cannot be sure what the future will hold here. We would urge
that the status determination timeline proceed forward as
planned, and we echo Embassy Belgrade's assurance that we
will do everything possible to bring the process to a
positive conclusion.


7. (U) U.S. Office Pristina does not/not clear this cable
for release to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW