KOSOVO: SCENESETTER FOR SEPTEMBER 13-14 VISIT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000748

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW
SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SCENESETTER FOR SEPTEMBER 13-14 VISIT OF
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROSEMARY DICARLO

Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: With the Unity Team still fractious and a
growing tide of public criticism against the decentralization
provisions of the UNOSEK plan, we are anticipating a rough
political season in advance of the eventual status decision.
What would normally have been a heated debate over the merits
of decentralization has been deliberately -- and successfully
-- stoked by LDK party presidential hopeful Nexhat Daci,
whose anti-international theme meshes well with the
disgruntlement of local LDK leaders over the loss of
municipal territory to new Serb carve-outs. Municipal
protests in key towns have had large-scale and cross-party
participation, egged on by Daci supporters. The Unity Team,
in typical feckless fashion, has been unable to counter
accusations of "enclavizing" Kosovo, and the field has
largely been left to voices that argue against a measured
approach to status and the negotiating process. Your visit
here will help reinforce to the Kosovar public that
decentralization is a necessary and positive step towards
status and that the entire spectrum of Kosovar leadership --
party, assembly, and municipal authorities -- will need to
take responsibility for bringing the status process to a
successful close. Unity Team members, feeling beleaguered,
will also welcome your vision for the next few months and the
message that the U.S. is committed to pushing the status
process through. And finally, a firm injunction to UNMIK and
OSCE that they must finish their planning for a rapid
post-status transition will help spur action in an otherwise
torpid work environment. End summary.

Anxiety, Anger Grows on Decentralization


2. (C) We would have expected a backlash on the concept of
decentralization and the establishment of new Serb-majority
municipalities in almost any case once the UNOSEK
negotiations reached their denouement. Tensions, however,
have been deliberately heightened on this issue by LDK
presidential challenger Daci, whose clever manipulation of
nationalist themes coincides nicely with municipal leaders'
anger over the loss of territory to new Serb areas. Local
LDK leaders in Viti, Gjilan and elsewhere in eastern and
central Kosovo have eagerly espoused the Daci cause in
opposition to Kosovo President (and Unity Team member) Fatmir
Sejdiu, who declared himself a candidate for the LDK
presidency this past week in an effort to stave off the
disastrous prospect of a Daci win. Most analysts predict an
eventual Sejdiu victory over Daci (though it will by no means
be a cakewalk, and Sejdiu's ability to campaign has been
severely restricted by UNMIK for constitutional reasons),but
the vicious quality of the campaign will make it harder for
the Unity Team to agree on further concessions in Vienna and
will widen the existing faultlines among the Albanian
negotiators. Yellow press coverage of the decentralization
debate also adds to the prospect that an already anarchic
Kosovo Assembly will vote down key provisions of the
Ahtissari plan once they are put into draft legal form.
Assembly caucus heads should hear an unequivocal message from
you that the USG will brook no dissent in passing through
both standards- and settlement-related legislation, and that
they will be held personally accountable for this.

Unity Team Feeling Beset, Adrift


3. (C) The rising drumbeat of attack against the Unity
Team's negotiating efforts has demoralized even the team's
most enthusiastic members (including Blerim Shala) in recent
days, as has a sense of drift (at least in the team's
perception) in the UNOSEK-sponsored talks. Uncertainty over
Ahtisaari's final demands, particularly on Mitrovica and
vertical links between Kosovo Serb municipalities and
Belgrade, is fueling their unease, as are rumors that the
status process could be delayed or put off indefinitely.
What reassurance you can give them on timing and forward
movement will help reenergize team members, though they
should be left under no illusion that it remains squarely on
their shoulders to close remaining gaps with UNOSEK and make

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their case on decentralization to the wider Kosovar audience.
You should also begin to prepare them for the idea that
cross-party unity will need to be maintained beyond status
day (Thaci and Surroi have repeatedly claimed that the day
after status, the Team will cease to exist); among other
things, constitution drafting and elections timing will
require inter-party consensus in order to avoid a massive
political crisis at the very outset of the post-status
period.

UNMIK, OSCE Paralyzed on Transition Planning


4. (C) Despite repeated assurances that detailed planning
documents will be forthcoming shortly, we have seen no real
sign that UNMIK is prepared to launch a full-scale transition
effort in the next weeks. UNMIK SRSG Ruecker will be in New
York with Prime Minister Ceku for a Security Council
appearance, but you and your EU colleague should set down
with PDSRSG Schook a firm deadline for the UNMIK transition
plan and counter any lingering hope at UNMIK or at the OSCE
that more than three months will be allotted for the
handover. You will also have a chance to hear from the head
of the EU Rule of Law team, who has steadily pursued his
planning mission but is hampered by an inchoate set of
demands from EU capitals to make the ROL mission "more
robust" without a corresponding pledge of enhanced resources.
Transition issues will take up an increasing amount of our
time and energy over the next months; in some instances,
Kosovo's economic stability could be imperiled if adequate
attention is not paid to the future structure and function of
key agencies now underpinned (if loosely) by UNMIK authority.

Kosovo's North


5. (C) You will have a chance to travel to north Mitrovica
and Zvecan municipality and speak with mayors and other
Serbs, including students, about U.S. hopes for northern
Kosovo. We have successfully raised our profile in the north
in recent weeks as a function of intensified political
engagement, as well as USAID-sponsored small infrastructure
projects that will get underway this month and next.
Northern Serb leaders profess to want open communication
channels with us, but they have given no ground on the
independence issue; you can continue to underscore that we
have every intention of assisting Serbs in the north and
elsewhere, but any post-status move to isolate northern
Kosovo will be to the detriment of the Serb population and
will be opposed by the international community. Press
opportunities will offer you the chance to indicate our
strong support for decentralization to the Kosovo Serb
audience.

Comment


6. (C) We look forward to your coming, not least because you
are the first USG visitor in many weeks to have a vision to
share that will help steer a fragile and underwhelming
Kosovar leadership through the tricky pre-status shoals.
Using the leverage of direct Washington interest, we will use
this visit to hammer home the unity theme with party leaders
and press them for full agreement with UNOSEK; bring
obstructionist Albanian legislators to heel; send an
inclusive but determined signal to Serb opinion makers in the
North; and leave UNMIK under no doubt that they must produce
transition plans now. These are all critical objectives in
the run-up to the status decision, ones that, if carefully
managed, will help make the outcome stable and sustainable
for the long term.


7. (U) U.S. Office Pristina does not/not clear this cable
for release to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW