Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRISTINA726
2006-09-01 18:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: SERB LEADERS CLOSE THEIR EYES TO

Tags:  PREL KCRM PGOV PINR KDEM UNMIK YI 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6444
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RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000726 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE
NSC FOR BRAUN
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2015
TAGS: PREL KCRM PGOV PINR KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SERB LEADERS CLOSE THEIR EYES TO
POSSIBILITY OF INDEPENDENCE DECISION

REF: A. PRISTINA 647


B. PRISTINA 688

Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000726

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE
NSC FOR BRAUN
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2015
TAGS: PREL KCRM PGOV PINR KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SERB LEADERS CLOSE THEIR EYES TO
POSSIBILITY OF INDEPENDENCE DECISION

REF: A. PRISTINA 647


B. PRISTINA 688

Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Kosovo Serb leaders, particularly in the
north, are abundantly aware that the likeliest outcome of the
status process is independence. Nevertheless, they continue
to deny that a status decision will apply to them. Some
express hard-line views on secession and violence if
independence is declared, but more simply believe that the
status decision will either be postponed indefinitely or that
international backers -- meaning Belgrade and Moscow -- will
successfully prevent, or possibly disavow, an independence
outcome. There are some moderates who are at least
contemplating future realities, though even they find it
impossible to articulate those sentiments publicly.
International officials in Mitrovica correctly advise that
the best way to convince Serbs to stay, and to avoid
violence, is to give them concrete information that indicates
their life will not change appreciably after status. USOP
plans to continue visits to the north and to the southern
enclaves to underscore this message with Serb NGOs, civic
leaders, and others. END SUMMARY.

Kosovo Serb Leaders: See No Evil, Hear No Evil


2. (C) Kosovo Serb leaders, especially those in the north,
are cognizant that the status process could well end in an
independence decision, but they continue to close their eyes
to the reality of what such an outcome would mean. Their
individual perspectives differ somewhat, but they all share a
common view that independence is both unacceptable and, more
to the point, likely to be opposed and hopefully prevented by
Belgrade and other international players, particularly
Russia. In meetings with a selection of northern Serb
opinion makers, the vehemence of their sentiment against
independence varied, but not their refusal to contemplate the

benefits of decentralization within an integral, independent
Kosovo.


3. (C) Some Serbs warn darkly of the likelihood of a violent
reaction to an independence decision, though their claims of
an organized Serb resistance deserve ample skepticism.
President of the northern Kosovo SNC (Serb National Council)
executive board Tomica Zivkovic -- not a particularly
reliable source, but one indicative of a brand of brash
assertiveness common among northern Serb leaders --
maintained to poloff recently that Serbs have "constituent
nation" status as founders of the state of Serbia, and thus
must benefit from collective rights that go well beyond
individual rights extended to minority communities. Zivkovic
called the KFOR presence in northern Kosovo a military
occupation, and the peacekeeping mission a "punishment" for
Serbs. He claimed that if Kosovo becomes independent, Kosovo
Serbs will declare their own independence and "will need just
two days to mount their defense, with armed supporters coming
from Serbia, Bosnia and around the world."

More Thoughtful Serbs Aware of the Probabilities, But
Unwilling/Unable to Speak


4. (C) These unsubstantiated assertions about violence
aside, there are Serb leaders who have clearly given more
rational thought to the prospect of an independence outcome
and its probable consequences for the northern Serb
community. Still, such leaders remain unwilling or unable to
articulate this possibility out loud and to craft a political
program that would promote Serb interests within the
construct of an independent Kosovo. These "moderates" or
semi-moderates understand and worry about the prospect of
violence by more radical elements of the Serb minority (and
the likely response by Albanian extremists),but the
political taboo of even discussing independence means that
any effort to plan for a post-status integration process is
immediately stillborn.

PRISTINA 00000726 002 OF 003




5. (C) President of the Mitrovica municipal branch of the
hard-line Serbian National Council (SNC) Nebojsa Jovic -- a
hardliner, though one who understands the value of
cooperation with the international community -- told us
recently that he expects trouble in northern Kosovo in
October and November as a result of the impending status
decision, and counseled that the best way to avoid this was
through direct dialogue between Serbs and Albanians. He
lamented that moderates on both sides were being pushed aside
by extremists, that Kosovo Serbs who try to reach out to
their Albanian neighbors are branded as traitors, and that
Belgrade representatives continue to hint at the possibility
of partition for Kosovo, an outcome he derided as detrimental
to the Serb community overall. Tellingly, Jovic acknowledged
that it is no longer up to Kosovo Serbs to decide their
destiny -- the international community, he agreed, will play
that role. Still, he asserted that independence was
unacceptable, though any compromise short of that could be
contemplated.


6. (C) The Hamlet-like uncertainty of moderate Serb leaders
has left them caught -- unproductively -- between the
"virtual reality" of the more extremist elements in the north
and the increasingly visible outline of the status decision.
Leader of the moderate Serb List for Kosovo and Metohija
(SLKM) coalition and northern Mitrovica resident Oliver
Ivanovic, who has agonized for months over whether to rejoin
Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG),
tells us repeatedly that he understands the direction in
which things are headed. Ivanovic recently applied to
register the Kosovo branch of his Belgrade-based Social
Democratic Party (SDP)(Ref A),a move that could provide him
an opening post-status to engage in the political process.
That said, a despondent Ivanovic underscored that Kosovo
Serbs would never willingly participate in the creation of an
independent state of Kosovo; after recent meetings with Prime
Minister Agim Ceku (which, to Ivanovic's credit, he continues
to hold),the SLKM leader has consistently refused to break
step with northern Serb leaders and openly declare his
understanding of the political realities.

International Reps in the North Emphasize the Need for
Information Flow


7. (C) There is little likelihood of reversing the tide of
northern Serb feeling, but there is room to reach out to the
Serb public and press home the message that the status
decision need not dramatically affect their daily lives. The
head of OSCE's Mitrovica Region, Alastair Livingston,
emphasized this, telling us that Kosovo Serbs in the north
will be reassured when they see concrete details of the
status package. Kosovo Serbs need to know, he stressed, what
will happen with their Serbian state pensions, their
insurance, courts, health and school systems, and whether
they will hold dual passports. Similarly, UNMIK Mitrovica
regional representative Jerry Gallucci maintained that much
of the uncertainty among Serbs in the north is driven by a
lack of information about the decentralization debate going
on in Vienna. Gallucci did not rule out, however, a move
toward partition by the Serb leadership if such actions were
not firmly reined in by the international community.

Comment


8. (C) We second the notion that information is key to
enlightening Serbs on the post-status framework and changing,
if not their aversion to independence, at least their
calculations about the advisability of remaining within
Kosovo. To that end, we are embarking on an intensified
outreach effort -- with media, assistance, and other elements
-- to give Serbs in both north and south a sense that they
have a future in Kosovo no matter what the status outcome.
The launching point for this campaign was COM's August 31
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the three
northern mayors as the precursor to USG construction of roads

PRISTINA 00000726 003 OF 003


and other small-scale infrastructure in predominantly Serb
areas. Guidance provided by UNOSEK or the Department to aid
in this kind of outreach, especially containing further
specifics on decentralization provisions and the possibility
of dual citizenship/dual documentation for Serb citizens of
Kosovo, would be welcome, and will be increasingly important
as the status decision draws near. END COMMENT.


9. (U) Post clears this message in its entirety for release
to Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW