Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRISTINA648
2006-08-04 16:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: CHIEF OF MISSION STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6361
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0792
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
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RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000648 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR
DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: CHIEF OF MISSION STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF
UNITY TO KOSOVO LEADERS

Classified By: COM TINA S. KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000648

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR
DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: CHIEF OF MISSION STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF
UNITY TO KOSOVO LEADERS

Classified By: COM TINA S. KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In her initial calls on Kosovo's leaders,
COM urged them to stay united and not let personal
differences interfere with their seriousness of purpose in
the Vienna status negotiations. President Fatmir Sejdiu
vented his frustration at the antics of opposition leaders on
the negotiating team. Kosovo Assembly president Kole Berisha
also said he feels that the opposition is more interested in
interfering with the work of the Assembly than in cooperating
productively. Prime Minister Ceku seemed distracted by a
letter he received from the senior coalition partner, the LDK
party, which purports to limit his authority, but was adamant
that he has the necessary support he needs to continue to
fulfill his mandate to serve the people of Kosovo. END
SUMMARY.

President Sejdiu: We Will Maintain the Unity of the
Negotiating Team


2. (C) COM met privately with Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu
on July 28, one day after she had accompanied Special
Representative Ambassador Frank Wisner to his meeting with
Sejdiu. The meeting was also one day after opposition
members of the Kosovo Assembly failed to return from a
mid-day coffee break to listen to Sejdiu's report on the July
24 meeting between high level delegations in Vienna. Sejdiu
told COM that since taking over as the head of the
negotiating team in March 2006, he has strongly maintained
the unity of the group despite challenges to his authority by
opposition leaders Hashim Thaci from the Democratic Party of
Kosovo (PDK) and Veton Surroi from the Reform Party Ora
(PRO). According to Sejdiu, both opposed negotiating team
coordinator Blerim Shala's position on the team, resulting in
Sejdiu having to call meetings without both Shala and
negotiating team spokesperson (and Sejdiu's primary advisor)
Skender Hyseni. Sejdiu also recounted how, in the hope of
developing a uniform position for the July 24 meeting in

Vienna, he had asked for team members to provide the texts of
their interventions. He said that of the four other team
members, only Thaci provided the text of his presentation,
but less than an hour before he delivered it.


3. (C) Sejdiu claimed that in Vienna, the team agreed he
would report to the Kosovo Assembly on the results of the
meeting with Serbian President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister
Vojislav Kostunica. He said he was astounded that after they
were not allowed to review his presentation, Thaci and Surroi
ordered their parliamentary delegates to boycott his address.
Sejdiu speculated on the reasons for Surroi's mischief,
claiming that Surroi was angry he did not get to go to
Washington to meet with Secretary Rice or to New York for two
recent UNSC meetings on Kosovo. Sejdiu admitted that he
should have allowed Thaci and Surroi to review his speech
before the Kosovo Assembly so as to deny them the pretext for
their boycott, and he vowed not to give in to any attempt by
them to destroy the negotiating team.


4. (C) COM reminded Sejdiu of Ambassador Wisner's message of
the previous day, in which Wisner emphasized the vital
importance of maintaining unity among the negotiating team.
She told Sejdiu that during the course of her initial calls
she would meet with all the members of the negotiating team
and underscore to them that the USG would hold each member
responsible for any breakdown in the functioning of the team.
(Note: COM's conversations with Shala, Hyseni and Surroi
will be reported septel.) In closing, the COM emphasized
that the dynamics between the current governing coalition and
the opposition cannot be allowed to get in the way of the
final status negotiations.

Assembly President Berisha Also Frets about Opposition


5. (C) In her July 27 meeting with Kosovo Assembly president
Kole Berisha, COM assured him that the smooth functioning of
the Assembly continues to be of the highest importance to the
U.S. government. The COM noted that the Assembly has the

PRISTINA 00000648 002 OF 003


great responsibility of putting into effect not only
legislation to stimulate the economy, but also laws that will
protect the rights and interests of Kosovo's minorities,
which is of special import during the final status
negotiations. She praised Berisha and his staff for creating
transparent processes in the Assembly during his tenure, and
encouraged him to continue to improve the functioning of the
institution.


6. (C) Berisha responded that, despite his efforts over the
past four months to overcome the legacy of his autocratic
predecessor (fellow LDK member Nexhat Daci) and open up the
Assembly's procedures, the opposition appeared uninterested
in working together productively with the majority coalition.
"The honeymoon is over," he observed, and he complained
particularly about the tendency of opposition delegates to
boycott in an effort to delay proceedings.


7. (C) Berisha also touched briefly on the results of the
independent audit of the Assembly, with which, he said, his
office has cooperated fully. He fretted that the delay in
publishing the report -- which the Auditor General's office
has yet to complete -- would weaken his hand in eliminating
troublesome employees in the Assembly staff aligned with the
ousted ex-Assembly President Daci. COM offered to inquire
about the audit, but noted that Berisha might have to act,
regardless of the audit report's findings or the pace of its
drafting, to remove employees who interfered with his reform
agenda. (NOTE: On August 1 Berisha provided us with a copy
of the proposed final audit report as presented to him by the
Auditor General's office, which inexplicably omits earlier
draft language critical of Daci's management and procurement
under his tenure. We are looking into why these references
have been deleted in the proposed final report. END NOTE).

Letter from LDK "Unpleasant," but Ceku Insists He Has the
Support He Needs


8. (C) COM met with Prime Minister Agim Ceku on August 2,
while Ceku was in the midst of dealing with a media maelstrom
over a letter he received from the presidency of his senior
coalition partner, the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK).
The letter purports to remind Ceku of the agreement between
then-President Ibrahim Rugova (LDK) and then-prime minister
Ramush Haradinaj (AAK) that additional ministries created
after the formation of the coalition would go to the LDK.
The letter also insisted that Deputy Prime Minister Lutfi
Haziri (LDK),rather than Ceku, be responsible for oversight
of individual LDK ministers. Ceku assured COM that although
the letter was unpleasant, he understands that the current
LDK leadership needs to strengthen its profile within the
party in the run-up to this fall's party conference. He said
that he had spoken with Sejdiu and Haziri, who both expressed
their support. He also added -- vehemently -- that despite
persistent rumors circulating around Pristina, he has no
problem with the LDK or with AAK party head Haradinaj.


9. (C) COM agreed the LDK letter was clumsy, but noted that
in all her consultations with LDK leaders -- especially
President Sejdiu -- they had indicated full backing for Ceku
and his efforts. She again emphasized the unity message, and
pointed to Ceku's special role in ensuring that the
government continues to focus on standards implementation.
Ceku and his advisor, Avni Arifi, affirmed that they were
working through August on the priority standards; Arifi said
that the language law, one of three minority-related pieces
of legislation which must be passed (the law on religion is
already through parliament and the law on cultural heritage
must go through a second reading),would make its way through
the Assembly without problem after a compromise resolution
was reached at government initiative with the head of the
Turkish minority party.

Comment


10. (C) All three of Kosovo's top leaders listened closely to
the COM's message of unity, purpose and flexibility in the

PRISTINA 00000648 003 OF 003


Vienna negotiations. They stressed the need for a continued
close relationship with the COM and the USG. Both Berisha
and Ceku have asked to meet with the COM on a weekly basis.
If the opposition continues to be difficult, these meetings
will be important to reinforce USG support for the
negotiation process. END COMMENT.


11. (U) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable for release in
its entirety to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti
Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW