TENSIONS BUILDING OVER NORTHERN KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000587

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/SSA, NSC FOR BRAUN,
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: TENSIONS BUILDING OVER NORTHERN KOSOVO

REF: (A) PRISTINA 518 (B) PRISTINA 575 (C) PRISTINA 519

Classified By: COM PHILIP S. GOLDBERG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. As all concerned enter the Kosovo final
status home stretch, the north of Kosovo is increasingly
coming into focus as the area where preferred status outcomes
potentially collide. UNMIK officials say they have credible
reports that Kosovo Serbs in the north are attempting to
reinforce de facto partition. COM has urged Prime Minister
Ceku to resist the pressure he says is increasing on him to
take a government stand on the north. In recent weeks,
UNMIK, police, and KFOR have poured security resources into
the north, but the jury is still out on the utility of the
added presence. In recent days, the presence of USOP
officials provoked a reaction from illicit Serbian security
personnel. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) UNMIK police and civilian sides are convinced that
Belgrade has in recent weeks significantly upped the number
of interior ministry police (MUP) illicitly patrolling in the
north of Kosovo in plainclothes (ref A). Acting SRSG Steven
Schook recently told COM that a well-placed UNMIK source in
the north is reporting that the build-up is ongoing and is
intended as a means of reinforcing de facto partition. The
three northern municipalities, all majority-Serb, meanwhile
continue to organize volunteer "self-defense committees" as
some variety of neighborhood watch groups to assist the MUP
(ref B).


3. (C) Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Ceku recently told COM that
Kosovo Albanians are increasingly nervous about the north.
Ceku said he is becoming frustrated at having nothing to say
in response. (NOTE. COM impressed on Ceku in reply that any
unilateral PISG action in the north would surely provoke a
Kosovo Serb reaction that could only be counterproductive to
Pristina's interests, particularly in the final status
process. The best thing Ceku could do, COM added, would be
to manage the hotheads on this side of the Ibar River that
divides Mitrovica and let KFOR and CIVPOL handle the
situation on the ground. Ceku acknowledged that there is
little else the government can do. END NOTE.) One Kosovo
Albanian daily carried a communique on July 12, allegedly
authored by the radical Albanian National Army (AKSH),
calling on Kosovo Albanians to mobilize in the north "to face
difficulties in the circumstances that may be created by the
eternal Serb enemy."


4. (C) In this context of increasing tension, USAID officers
from Pristina, Belgrade, and Kosovo met with area high school
principals on June 30 in north Mitrovica to discuss possible
USG assistance. The meetings were routinely substantive, but
outside the meeting site (a vocational high school) USOP
drivers and security personnel, all ethnic Albanians, were
approached by seven Serb men, all dressed casually and
apparently unarmed, in an obviously-coordinated action. One
USOP employee recognized two of the Serbs as MUP personnel.
The encounter ended without confrontation, but its occurrence
was the first in several years involving USOP personnel in
the north.


5. (C) COMMENT. We see four threads of developments in
Kosovo's north: KFOR is re-asserting its presence (ref C);
Serb municipal leaders are reacting to a perceived up-tick in
interethnic violence (ref A); UNMIK is increasing the degree
and visibility of the CIVPOL and Kosovo Police Service
presence; and the Serbian ministry of the interior is
seemingly re-inforcing its illicit police presence. KFOR's
return was prompted by a sudden collective international
community realization that French KFOR had quietly and
inexplicably withdrawn from the north months ago, leaving
NATO with no troops north of the Ibar. KFOR does not do
policing and its return is not intended to directly address
Kosovo Serb concerns over recent violent crimes. Further,
KFOR has set up camp (ref C) in Leposavic Municipality, which
has not been the venue of the recent violence, and the troops
are not necessarily seen by area Serbs as protectors.


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6. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. The major unknown regarding these
four developments is the extent to which the reactions of
Belgrade and the three northern municipalities are
coordinated. The unusual recent reluctance of all three
involved mayors to engage USOP officials suggests outside
influence and leaves us believing that the hardening of their
rhetoric reflects more a calculated decision to also harden
the de facto soft partition of the north than an effort to
address legitimate security concerns.


7. (U) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable for release in
its entirety to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti
Ahtisaari.
GOLDBERG