Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRISTINA576
2006-07-07 16:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: NEGOTIATION TEAM RECEPTIVE TO POST-UNMIK

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2192
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0576/01 1881627
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071627Z JUL 06
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6283
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0756
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000576 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/SSA, NSC FOR BRAUN,
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: NEGOTIATION TEAM RECEPTIVE TO POST-UNMIK
INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN MISSION PLANNING


Classified By: COM PHILIP S. GOLDBERG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000576

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/SSA, NSC FOR BRAUN,
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: NEGOTIATION TEAM RECEPTIVE TO POST-UNMIK
INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN MISSION PLANNING


Classified By: COM PHILIP S. GOLDBERG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In response to an invitation from President
Fatmir Sejdiu, COM and Torbjorn Sohlstrom, the head of the EU
mission in Kosovo, briefed the Kosovo negotiating team July 5
on initial thinking on a post-status, post-UNMIK
international civilian mission. They stressed that any
future international presence would be a "clean break from
UNMIK" and have a "different mission." COM added that the
more the Kosovo government demonstrates capacity and
performance on standards in the current period, the stronger
our case for a light follow-on mission. Sohlstrom told the
negotiating team that while any future international presence
in Kosovo will be based on a UNSC resolution, the EU believed
it should also be shaped by discussions with the Kosovo
government. President Fatmir Sejdiu stated that he has
always been in favor of a continued, but smaller,
international civilian presence in Kosovo after UNMIK
departs. Prime Minister Agim Ceku responded that he hoped
that when UNMIK leaves, most of its current competencies
would be given to the Kosovo government. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) COM and the head of the EU Liaison Office Torbjorn
Sohlstrom briefed the six-member Kosovo final status
negotiating team July 5 on initial thinking on the follow-on
international civilian mission after a decision on Kosovo's
status. (NOTE: The Kosovo negotiating team, or "Unity
Team," consists of President Sejdiu, Prime Minister Agim
Ceku, Kosovo Assembly president Kole Berisha, opposition
leaders Hashim Thaci and Veton Surroi, and coordinator Blerim
Shala. Also at the meeting were Sejdiu's advisors Skender
Hyseni and Muhamet Hamiti, Minister for Environmental and
Spatial Planning Ardian Gjini, EU Liaison Mission advisor Ben
Crampton and PolOff. END NOTE). According to Sohlstrom,
Veton Surroi had insisted the heads of the EU and USOP

liaison office brief the entire negotiating team rather than
the political sub-working group due to the importance of this
subject.


3. (C) COM started by assuring the Unity Team that the U.S.
would play a strong role in implementing any agreement, as
well as continuing with assistance programs to develop
capacity in the judicial and other areas. At the same time,
COM stressed EU and USG agreement that the future
international presence be a clean break from UNMIK and that
it will be different in size and scope from UNMIK. COM
recognized that this was an important political optic for the
Kosovo side in selling the international community presence
to its population. COM noted that there are countries that
will be asked to support the final status agreement that
question the capacity of the Kosovo government to fulfill its
obligations thereunder. Therefore, he continued, the more
the government can do to implement the Standards for Kosovo
prior to final status, the more we will be able to sell a
light follow-on mission.


4. (C) President Sejdiu stated that he has always been in
favor of a continued, but smaller, international presence in
Kosovo after UNMIK departs. Sejdiu noted that an experts
group led by Minister for Environmental and Spatial Planning
Ardian Gjini is currently drafting a letter from the entire
negotiating team inviting a follow-on international presence
after UNMIK's mandate expires. Gjini told those present that
his strategy group is working on a draft letter (forwarded to
EUR/SCE) from the negotiating team to the Contact Group, the
OSCE and NATO describing the achievements of the Kosovo
government, its vision of an independent Kosovo and its ideas
about a future international presence here. The Kosovo
government envisions a smaller number of international
personnel -- mainly from EU countries and the United States
-- but Gjini quickly added that Pristina does not wish to get
into a bargaining session concerning this. He added the
Kosovo government hoped this letter will help in the final
status negotiating process. COM stated that the government's
proposal for such a letter would show the Kosovo government's
commitment to implementing the final status agreement and
that Kosovo buy-in would be essential in making the

PRISTINA 00000576 002 OF 002


arrangement work. He emphasized again that the USG was
committed -- with its allies in the EU, the OSCE and NATO --
to be very much a part of the implementation effort.


5. (C) Torbjorn Sohlstrom, the head of the EU liaison mission
in Kosovo, told the negotiating team that the EU has begun to
intensify its post-status planning and that this intensified
effort will become more visible and its discussions with the
Kosovo government more concrete. He added that although the
future international presence will be based on a UNSC
resolution, the EU also wants it to be based on prior
discussions with the Kosovo government. He enumerated five
components the EU sees will comprise the future international
presence in Kosovo: joint capacity building through
assistance programs, including a proposed donor's conference
shortly after status; a continuing NATO military presence;
the OSCE mission; the EU-led police and justice mission; and
an international office mandated to ensure implementation of
the status agreement. Sohlstrom said this international
office will differ crucially from the current UNMIK mission
because it will be much more limited in size, scope and power
and it will be developed by the international community
together with the Kosovo government.


6. (C) Prime Minister Agim Ceku then asked several questions.
Who, he wondered, would be in charge during any interim
period between the determination of final status and the
setting up of this new international office. He also asked
who is planning the follow-on NATO presence and asked that
the Kosovo government be involved in this planning too.
(NOTE: He specifically asked that the name of follow-on
international civilian presence not/not contain the word
"mission" so as to make a cleaner break with UNMIK and
similarly that the follow-on NATO presence be renamed along
the lines of NATO's "Headquarters" in Macedonia and Albania.
END NOTE.). He said there should be a sixth component to the
future international presence in Kosovo, the proposed
international administrator for Mitrovica. He concluded with
a request that when UNMIK departs, most of its current
competencies be transferred to the Kosovo government, and not
the follow-on international civilian presence.


7. (C) In response, COM reminded Ceku that NATO planning,
although linked to the current effort, is on a separate
planning and decision track. On competencies, COM remarked
that the prime minister might want to keep in mind the adage
to "be careful for what one wishes for because it might come
true." The international community fully expects Kosovars to
take responsibility for the bulk of running their own affairs.


8. (C) COMMENT: This meeting showed that the Kosovo
government too has given some thought to the UNMIK follow-on
mission and is anxious to contribute to its success. Sejdiu,
Ceku and others in the government understand that selling a
continued international presence to a population yearning for
independence will be politically sensitive. Conspicuously
absent during the meeting was any response from the two
opposition members of the negotiating team present for the
briefing. They, especially Hashim Thaci from the Democratic
Party of Kosovo, have the ability to make the planning for
any post-UNMIK international civilian presence more difficult
by making it a domestic political issue.


9. (U) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable for release in
its entirety to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti
Ahtisaari.
GOLDBERG