Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRISTINA336
2006-04-20 14:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR WISNER URGES KOSOVARS TO BEAR DOWN ON

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PREL UNMIK YI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9257
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0336/01 1101444
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201444Z APR 06
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6035
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0654
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 PRISTINA 000336 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/SSA, NSC FOR BBRAUN,
USUN FOR DSCHUFLETWOSKI, USOSCE FOR SSTEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WISNER URGES KOSOVARS TO BEAR DOWN ON
FINAL STATUS, STANDARDS; IMPRESSED BY NEW TEAM

REF: PRISTINA 310

Classified By: Chief of Mission Philip Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 PRISTINA 000336

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/SSA, NSC FOR BBRAUN,
USUN FOR DSCHUFLETWOSKI, USOSCE FOR SSTEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WISNER URGES KOSOVARS TO BEAR DOWN ON
FINAL STATUS, STANDARDS; IMPRESSED BY NEW TEAM

REF: PRISTINA 310

Classified By: Chief of Mission Philip Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. During an April 14-16 visit to Kosovo, U.S.
Special Representative Frank Wisner congratulated the
revamped Kosovo Albanian leadership team for its serious
engagement in the Vienna final status process and for its
outreach to the Kosovo Serb community. He urged the team to
build on its record by making its best offer yet on
decentralization at the next Vienna meeting and by preparing
very generous opening positions on upcoming issues, including
the protection of religious sites, returns, property rights,
and the special case of Mitrovica. The Kosovo Albanian
response was almost uniformly positive. Ambassador Wisner
told moderate and hard-line Kosovo Serb leaders alike that
their continued nonparticipation in Kosovo's Provisional
Institutions of Self Government (PISG) only made much more
difficult the task of finding a way out of what all agreed
was an unsustainable status quo. Although neither Kosovo
Serb group predicted a return to the PISG, the moderates at
least were hopeful of progress in Vienna whereas the
hard-liners seemed deluded that they would have veto rights
over any final status determination. Ambassador Wisner's
visit to two western Kosovo villages -- one Albanian and one
Serb -- subjected to brutal violence during and after the war
demonstrated the special obstacles to returns to that part of
Kosovo. Finally, the ambassador's visit to Decani Monastery
found the resident Serbian Orthodox monks anxious for
international community commitment to hold the Kosovo
Albanian public to any agreeements on preservation of
religious sites negotiated by their leaders. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Ambassador Frank Wisner, the Secretary's Special
Representative for Kosovo Final Status Talks, visited Kosovo
on April 14-16. In Pristina, Ambassador Wisner met privately

with new Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu and new Prime
Minister Agim Ceku. He met collectively with the Kosovo
Albanian negotiating team comprising Sejdiu, Ceku, Assembly
President Kole Berisha, Presidential Advisor Skender Hyseni,
opposition leaders Hashim Thaci and Veton Surroi, and team
coordinator Blerim Shala. Former Prime Minister Bajram
Rexhepi joined the ambassador and several members of the team
at dinner. The ambassador also met in Pristina with SRSG
Soren Jessen-Petersen and Kosovo Serb leaders Oliver
Ivanovic, Goran Bogdanovic, and Randjel Nojkic. In
Mitrovica, he met with hard-line Kosovo Serb leaders Marco
Jaksic and Nebojsa Jovic. In Prizren, he met with Mayor
Eqrem Kryeziu and non-Serb deputy mayors Ercan Spat (Turk)
and Cemajlj Kurtishi(Bosniak). In the Kosovo Albanian
village of Krushe e Vogel, the ambassador met with missing
persons activist Agron Limani, two survivors of ethnic
cleansing who had testified at the Slobodan Milosevic trial
in The Hague, and several surviving widows. In the Kosovo
Serb village of Belo Polje, he met with a dozen returnees.
Finally, at the Decani Monastery, he met with Bishop
Teodosije Sibalic Father Sava Janjic. Ambassador Wisner also
received a briefing from KFOR Chief of Staff, Bridagier
General Joseph Orr (US). COM participated in all meetings
and visits.

EU: Getting to Final Status in 2006
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador Wisner told Kosovo-based interlocutors that
his visit to Europe and the Balkans had three objectives --
to satisfy the USG that our EU colleagues were fully engaged
on steps to reach final status and beyond; to reach out to
Kosovo's neighbors in Tirana, Athens, and Skopje regarding
final status; and to review in Pristina and Belgrade the
progression of the final status process to date. The
ambassador told the assembled Kosovo final status negotiating
team (a.k.a. the "Unity Team") that he was happy to report
that he had found EU leaders in Brussels to be "disciplined
and focused on the issues" and fully intending to help
determine Kosovo's final status by the end of 2006.

PRISTINA 00000336 002 OF 006




4. (C) Going into a more detailed accounting with SRSG
Jessen-Peterson, Wisner said EU leaders, particularly (EU)
enlargement chief Olli Rehn, were clearly focused on wrapping
up the process in 2006 and were developing a timetable of
tasks needing completion this year to create "a Kosovar
entity that can stand on its own feet, perhaps with
supervision at the beginning. He said the EU envisions an
international "superchief with specific authorities" to lead
Kosovo through a transition phase upon determination of final
status. Wisner said he would personally like to see this
individual named early enough in 2006 events to "help write
his or her own job description." Wisner said he had also
found the EU very focused on the potential transformation of
the Kosovo Protection Corps into a combination
security/border police/civilian protection force.


5. (C) Ambassador Wisner often noted the challenge the EU
faces in bringing 25 member states to consensus on Kosovo's
final status and often suggested that to this end the strong
approval of other capitals and the United Nations Security
Council would be essential. He was happy to see that the EU
is sending a police and justice fact-finding team to Kosovo
and congratulated the SRSG on his role in bringing about that
visit. Wisner offered his own office as a point of ongoing
USG outreach and coordination.

New Team Off to Great Start But Final Status Gear Shift
Needed to Bring on End Game
--------------
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador Wisner reminded Kosovo Albanian leaders
that he had asked them for two things when he last met with
them in February -- their full engagement with the
Ahtisaari/Vienna process and a maximum effort on the ground
in Kosovo, particularly to reach out to the Kosovo Serb
community. He congratulated them for substantial efforts on
both counts, particularly praising the work of Veton Surroi
and his consultative process that had produced the most
serious Kosovar-organized gathering of Albanian and minority
leaders (in Durres, Albania) since the war. Accepting this
praise, Surroi said he had been personally astonished to
realize in Durres that none of the Kosovo Serbian leaders in
attendance (all moderates) had even been briefed by Belgrade
on developments at the Vienna talks, adding that the Kosovo
Albanians leaders would be priviledged to continue providing
these briefings.


7. (C) Surroi also had high praise for the cooperative spirit
exhibited by new Unity Team members Sejdiu, Berisha, and
Ceku, a sentiment strongly shared by SRSG Jesen-Petersen.
The SRSG said the new leaders "had brought about a change in
the political landscape of Kosovo." Drawing unmistakable
though tacit comparisons to the former president, Assembly
president, and prime minister, the SRSG said: "Sejdiu engages
and discusses. Berisha has created a new, cooperative, and
transparent Assembly, even inviting UNMIK to conduct audits.
Ceku is strongly motivated and organized; we covered eight or
nine topics in our weekly meeting today in 55 minutes."



8. (C) While praising Unity Team members for their efforts
over the last several weeks, Ambassador Wisner was also
careful to praise them for not picking public quarrels with
Belgrade, most recently over its decison to compel Kosovo
Serb public servants to refuse salaries paid by Pristina.
The ambassador and the SRSG agreed that this combination of
outreach to Kosovo Serbs and restraint in reaction to
Belgrade provocation would serve the Unity Team well in the
face of what they saw as an obvious hardening of Belgrade's
negotiating position. Jessen-Petersen believes "the primary
reason for this hardening is that Belgrade sees which way
this is going" (i.e., to independence for Kosovo),but the
SRSG also believes the arrival of Ceku as prime minster has
boxed Belgrade in to a degree in that Ceku "is getting out
there" (i.e. reaching out to Kosovo Serbs) because his war

PRISTINA 00000336 003 OF 006


record as Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) commander leaves him
fearless of accused of betraying the Kosovo Albanian cause.
Ambassador Wisner assured Unity Team members that he would
tell leaders in Belgrade that the USG has duly noted their
very unhelpful salaries initiative and their generally
uncooperative approach to the Vienna negotiations.


9. (C) Ambasador Wisner urged Kosovo Albanian leaders to
continue to build on their recent positive record by
developing generous and full negotiating positions on the
component elements of the final status process. On
decentralization, Wisner cautioned against a recent
unfortunate tendency of Kosovo Albanian negotiators "to get
hung up on legalisms." On property rights, law and order,
freedom of movement, and returns, he urged them to consider
that every step forward they make collectively supports their
negotiating goals and provides him evidence of progress he
could carry to Belgrade. He frankly told Unity Team members
that they should "keep their eye on the main game, the final
status solution, and that to my mind means independence."


10. (C) During a COM-hosted dinner with several Unity Team
members joined by former Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi (now
drafting a position paper on the ethnically divided city of
Mitrovica for the team),Ambasador Wisner continued on this
big picture theme. In urging greater generosity in the
negotiations, he said most every Kosovo Albanian concern
melts away when viewed in a broad contex -- "if you don't get
everything you want today, so what? You may prefer a united
Mitrovica in a united Kosovo, but you may not get it; you may
get it tomorrow. It will be hard to accomplish in the
negotiations everything that wasn't done in the past seven
years. Think carefully about how to secure final status. We
need to be very smart, flexible, and maybe drive around some
obstacles to deal with them later."

Ceku Gets It
--------------


11. (C) Ambassador Wisner found that new Prime Minister Agim
Ceku understands, instinctively it seems, what has to be done
on the Kosovo ground to keep the final status process on
track. When the ambassador urged Ceku privately to continue
the very public outreach on minority issues that has
characterized his first month in office, Ceku rolled out a
five-point plan to do just that. The PM said his five
priorities for the next two to three months would be:
standards implementation; interethnic confidence building;
law and order; economic development; and setting the stage
for eventual EU integration. Specific measures slated for
implementation include the creation of more police
substations and post offices in minority areas, a public
campaign of zero tolerance for interethnic violence, the
appointment of Croatian Serb leader Milorad Pupovac as
advisor for minority outreach, rolling financial audits of
ministries and public officials, and development of a
strategic plan for electrical energy development. Ambassador
Wisner suggested that a public information campaign be
launched to assist in the filing of agricultural and
commercial property claims with the new Kosovo Property
Agency, a step Ceku said would be taken.

Thaci: Letting Us Know He's Here
--------------


12. (C) In a minor discordant note, opposition leader Hashim
Thaci (president of the Democratic Party of Kosovo) resisted
Ambassador Wisner's call for Unity Team endorsement of an
unabridged right of return for all Kosovo citizens to any
part of Kosovo. Thaci insisted that some parts of Kosovo,
naming Mitrovica in particular, were not sufficiently secure
to permit returns and that other parts of Kosovo lacked
economic opportunity for returnees. The ambasador suggested
that Thaci would do better to frame Kosovo policy as
supporting an "unabridged right of return" and committing the
team to do all that is necessary to supply security and
economic opportunity for returnees.

PRISTINA 00000336 004 OF 006



Moderate and Hard-line Kosovo Serbs: Some, But Not Much, Room
for Discussion
--------------
--------------


13. (C) Ambassador Wisner urged representatives of the
moderate Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija (SLKM) to
rejoin Kosovo government institutions. SLKM leader Oliver
Ivanovic asked Wisner to ensure a peaceful status
negotiations process after which individual Kosovo Serbs
could reasonably decide whether to stay in Kosovo or leave.
Wisner's praise for the new Kosovo government brought a
strong reaction from Goran Bogdanovic, a member of Belgrade's
negotiating team, who said that the current government had
only issued "false promises" on standards implementation and
done nothing to improve safety for Serbs in Kosovo, encourage
returns or develop the economy in Serb-inhabited areas.
Wisner agreed that there are problems, but added that he is
convinced Ceku and Sejdiu are addressing them in good faith.
Bogdanovic also conceeded that the Vienna talks showed
promise. Randjel Nojkic warned against the international
community imposing a solution for Kosovo and complained that
Belgrade does not want the SLKM to participate in Kosovo
institutions because it does not want progress prior to final
status. He also said that although no one will admit to
favoring the partition of Kosovo, he believes it may be the
practical solution that Belgrade is aiming towards.


14. (C) Hard-line Kosovo Serb leaders in northern Kosovo
showed no interest in participation in Kosovo institutions or
in cooperation or reconciliation with Kosovo Albanians.
Ambassador Wisner lamented that northern Kosovo Serb leaders
seem to "persist in habits of obstruction." He offered to
act on Kosovo Serb economic and security interests in the
context of a final status solution, but said his ability to
do so would be seriously limited by their continued refusal
to engage. Marko Jaksic (EO-listed leader of the Association
of Serb Municipalities and member of Belgrade's negotiating
team) replied that Kosovo Serbs had participated in Kosovo
institutions for three years and were rewarded with the
violence of March 2004.


15. (C) Going to the status bottom line, Jaksic said Kosovo
independence and Kosovo Serb survival are mutually exclusive.
He said the United States must choose between Serbia and
Kosovo -- if the U.S. chooses Kosovo's independence, it will
never have Serbia as an ally and Serbia will turn away from
EU integration. He added that if Albanians think they can
get independence without Serbia's consent, they are "kidding
themselves." Ambassador Wisner said that he had visited
Serbs who were returning to Kosovo and who travel freely and
that he has seen churches being rebuilt. He agreed that a
multiethnic Kosovo had not been achieved but insisted that to
deny progress was "ridiculous." The ambassador said Jaksic
was ill-serving his community by presenting a false choice
between Serbia and Kosovo and that such a choice would risk
driving the U.S. away at the same time Jaksic and others are
urging that U.S. to protect Kosovo Serbs.


16. (C) Nebojsa Jovic's nuanced version of Jaksic's points
stressed that Serbs realize the status quo is not viable and
want to participate in the resolution of the current
situation. He urged that the USG work directly with the
Serbian National Council to decide Kosovo's status, saying
that "you've probably dealt with other Serbs who want to make
you like them," (i.e. the SLKM) but that agreements entered
into by such people could not be implemented in the field.
He urged that final status not "punish" Serbs for the actions
of Milosevic and look at a status solution between autonomy
and independence. Ambassador Wisner expressed appreciation
for Jovic's comments as "something to work with."

Western Kosovo Feelings Still Run High
--------------


17. (C) During an April 15 visit to Krushe e Vogel/Mala

PRISTINA 00000336 005 OF 006


Krusa, villagers told Ambassador Wisner of a March 1999
massacre in which 112 men and boys were murdered by Serbian
forces, allegedly including regular army troops, police, and
local Serbs. Relatives of the massacre victims and survivors
(two of whom testified in the Milosevic trial at
International Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague)
described the massacre and their frustration that no
prosecutions had resulted, despite their identification of 56
former Serb neighbors (who are now living in Serbia) as
perpetrators. Asked for their views on the return of
displaced Serbs, Agron Limani, who heads the 26 March 1999
Association and whose father, brother, and two nephews were
killed in the massacre, replied that "money should not be
spent to bring these criminals back here." He said that the
local population bitterly resented international community
care for Kosovo Serbs and failure to prosecute those who have
committed crimes.


18. (C) Serb returnees in Belo Polje, a village near Pec/Peje
where 65 displaced Serb families have returned since 2003,
said they had come back to Kosovo because their homes were
dear to them and because they lacked the money to buy
property elsewhere. Although appreciative of the
international assistance which rebuilt their homes, they
faced a near-total lack of employment (only one resident, a
Kosovo Police Service officer, is employed),fear of
venturing into town or working outlying fields, and alleged
attempts by local ethnic Albanians to fraudulently
appropriate their land. Freedom of movement concerns were
intensified by the unrest of March 2004, during which ethnic
Albanian rioters from Peja/Pec burned down virtually the
entire village and forced the resident Serbs to flee to the
near-by Italian KFOR base. In converstion with Ambasador
Wisner the returnees showed much more interest in the
concrete conditions of their lives than in Kosovo's future
status. They were very open to increased contact with their
Kosovo Albanian neighbors.

Church Protection: International Presence Pending Ethnic
Reconciliation
--------------
-------------- --------------


19. (C) Ambassador Wisner visited the Decani Monastery where
he asked Bishop Teodosije and Father Sava for the continued
active involvement of Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) leaders
in efforts to design protections for SOC properties. Church
protection, the ambassador noted, would necessarily involve
the cooperation of the international community and a strong
security presence, adding however that an international
presence could not substitute for ethnic reconciliation and
cooperation, especially with respect to more ordinary
churches for which protection zones like that recently
created around Decani would be less feasible. Ambassador
Wisner also suggested that the monastery invite President
Sejdiu to its Easter services, and the Bishop agreed. (NOTE:
Sejdiu accepted a subsequent invitation to the 23 April
services. END NOTE.)


20. (C) Bishop Teodosije described his own active
participation in the working group on protection of religious
and cultural heritage and spoke with approval of the previous
day's visit of Ora party leaders Veton Surroi and Ylber Hysa,
who are preparing the Unity Team's position paper on
protection of religious sites and cultural heritage. The
bishop also outlined an SOC initiative to host an
interreligious conference at the Pec Patriarchate in May and
his own initiative to invite mayors and heads of prominent
local ethnic Albanian families for discussions at the
monastery. Sava and he frequently expressed concern,
however, that Kosovo Albanian leaders would be willing to
deliver strong SOC-protection messages to their constituents
and, if such messages were delivered, to follow them up with
enforcement of agreements made in the context of a final
status determination. Sava said that the church appreciates
the efforts of the international community, especially those
of USOP, to use their influence with local Kosovo Albanian

PRISTINA 00000336 006 OF 006


leaders to protect Decani Monastery, but fearded that a
system that relies on "calling a few phone numbers" rather
than institutionally respected legal measures is inherently
fragile.


21. (SBU) Ambassador Wisner cleared on this message. USOP
clears this cable for release in its entirety to UN Special
Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
GOLDBERG