Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRISTINA308
2006-04-07 17:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: STAKES HIGH AS LDK CHOOSES NEW LEADER

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PREL UNMIK YI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6005
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0642
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
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RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
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RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000308 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/SSA, NSC FOR BRAUN,
USUN FOR SCHUFLETWOSKI, USOSCE FOR STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: STAKES HIGH AS LDK CHOOSES NEW LEADER

REF: (A) PRISTINA 131 (B) 05 PRISTINA 1224

Classified By: COM Philip S. Goldberg for reaons 1.4 b/d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000308

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/SSA, NSC FOR BRAUN,
USUN FOR SCHUFLETWOSKI, USOSCE FOR STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: STAKES HIGH AS LDK CHOOSES NEW LEADER

REF: (A) PRISTINA 131 (B) 05 PRISTINA 1224

Classified By: COM Philip S. Goldberg for reaons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) SUMMARY. The next president of the Democratic Party
of Kosovo (LDK) could reconfigure the government, the
Assembly leadership, and a good part of the makeup of
Kosovo's final status negotiating team. With the passing of
Ibrahim Rugova, the LDK leadership has no organizational
center and the party will drift into a convention this summer
at which it will elect its new leadership. Several
pretenders have already emerged, chief among them the
embittered Nexhat Daci, recently ousted as president of the
Kosovo Assembly. The race is wide open and the stakes, for
Kosovo's democracy and the final status process, are huge.
END SUMMARY.

Why We Care Who Runs The LDK
--------------


2. (SBU) The president of the Democratic League of Kosovo
(LDK) has the ex-officio potential to become a kingmaker The
late President Ibrahim Rugova wielded unchecked power within
the party, effectively naming every LDK official from the
president of the Assembly to submunicipal officials.
Although a great deal of Rugova's power derived from his
unique personal stature as the de facto father of Kosovo, his
successor as LDK president will nevertheless carry a great
deal of clout in his own right on at least an ex officio
basis. The room to operate afforded the new party president,
on the other hand, will depend in large measure on his
ability to unify behind him (there is little chance of a
woman being elected) the 20-member party presidency, also to
be elected at the coming convention. (COMMENT. It is safe to
say Rugova never had to give a thought to the views of the
party presidency, and rarely did. END COMMENT.)


3. (SBU) Election of a new LDK president and presidency is of
particular interest to the international community in that
the LDK is easily the major partner (47 seats) in the
governing coalition (65 seats total). The LDK's dominance of

the Kosovo political scene translates to control or veto
power over three seats (president of Kosovo, Assembly
president, and prime minister) on the five-seat Kosovo
Albanian final status negotiating team (aka the "Unity Team").

The Coming Summer Of LDK's Discontent
--------------


4. (SBU) Kosovo law requires political parties to hold
internal elections at least every two years. The LDK's last
party-wide get-together was in July, 2004 and resembled much
more a coronation (of Rugova) than a convention. The
gathering included a general assembly of 275 delegates, a
meeting of the 151-member general council, and election of
the party president (Rugova) and presidency -- all of which
was concluded in two hours flat.


5. (C) The LDK's 2006 convention will be different. Control
of the party is very much up in the air with one candidate
for party president (Nexhat Daci) already announced and
several others testing the waters. Daci, recently
unceremoniously ousted as Assembly president in large measure
because of his autocratic style and disruptive influence
within the Unity Team (Ref A),is clearly bent on pay-back.
The cornerstones of his support have become apparent as he
very publicly cultivates both diaspora financier Bexhet
Pacoli and LDK Youth Forum leader Sejde Tolaj. Daci also
less publicly pursues an on again-off again courtship with
shadowy Rugova family intimate Rame Maraj (Ref B) who, in
turn, continues quiet associations of apparently mutual
convenience with Culture Minister Astrit Haracija, Public
Services Minister Melihate Termkolli, Deputy Prime Minister
Lutfi Haziri, and Tolaj.


6. (C) Fluidly allied against the Daci camp are LDK "old
guard" members including Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu,
Assembly President Kole Berisha, and Kosovo Assembly

PRISTINA 00000308 002 OF 002


presidency member Sabri Hamiti. On April 6 Berisha expressed
to E/P chief his increasing concern that the Daci camp has
taken advantage of the old guard's preoccupation with
governing and the final status process to steal the campaign
march. He suggested that several pending audits and
investigations of Daci camp members could counter that
advantage if brought to fruition before the convention.
Another possibility is that the convention could be delayed
if the general Kosovo elections set for October 2006 are
themselves postponed by SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen until
after the status decision.


7. (C) COMMENT. Major change in Unity Team composition or
negotiating positions would be most unwelcome as the final
status process reaches what otherwise would be its
culmination. The LDK's long history of back room dealing has
left the party ill-equipped to deal with the sudden onset of
real internal democracy. Much as the LDK is getting a
measure of what it deserves, therefore, summer 2006 is hardly
the best time to settle accounts.


8. (SBU) Post clears this cable for release in its entirety
to UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
GOLDBERG