KOSOVO AND MACEDONIA: THE WAY FORWARD ON BORDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 001121

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR
DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PBTS INR UNMIK YI KTIA
SUBJECT: KOSOVO AND MACEDONIA: THE WAY FORWARD ON BORDER
DEMARCATION


Classified By: CDA ALEX LASKARIS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (U) The following is a joint cable from U.S. Office
Pristina and Embassy Skopje.


2. (C) SUMMARY: When Macedonian FM Milososki visited Kosovo
on November 23, he reiterated the GoM's position calling for
inclusion of the demarcation of the Kosovo-Macedonia border
in the UNSCR on Kosovo's final status. This prompted a
negative reaction from PM Ceku's office and highlighted the
issue's sensitivity in Kosovo. Border demarcation remains a
controversial issue, but Kosovo will have to accept border
demarcation based on the 2001 agreement as part of the final
status package. However, we should do what we can to make
this bitter pill more palatable to the PISG so it does not
become a stumbling block to implementation of the status
agreement.


3. (C) U.S. Office Pristina and Embassy Skopje met recently
to discuss possible ways forward. Given the highly-charged
emotions on the issue, we propose urging PM Ceku to accept
the 2001 agreement, but softening the blow bilaterally by
encouraging the GoM to be among the first to recognize Kosovo
independence and suggesting confidence-building measures,
such as having American and perhaps other international
experts involved in the technical demarcation, to help that
process proceed more smoothly. Our underlying argument to
the Kosovars will be that good relations with Kosovo's
southern neighbor are considerably more important than the
insignificant bit of territory involved. High-level U.S.
engagement, including by Ambassador Wisner, may be required
to reorient Kosovar thinking. We would appreciate Department
guidance on this approach and possible sweeteners. END
SUMMARY.

Background


4. (SBU) When Macedonian FM Antonia Milososki visited Kosovo
on November 23, 2006, Kosovo media reported that he
reiterated the GoM's position calling for the UNSCR on
Kosovo's final status to include demarcation of the
Kosovo-Macedonia border based on the February 23, 2001 border
agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the
then-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Milososki's comments
caused a negative reaction by PM Ceku's office, bringing the
contentious border demarcation issue to the surface again.
PM Ceku immediately told reporters, "the issue of demarcation
of the border with Macedonia has not been discussed with
(United Nations Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti) Ahtisaari
and we hope that it would not be included in his package.
Kosovo will be recognized as an independent country within
its current administrative borders."


5. (SBU) According to a Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR) Office of the Geographer and Global Issues paper dated
June 10, 2002, about 26 square kilometers, or 2,620 hectares,
changed hands as a result of the 2001 border agreement.
Macedonia gained the most land, while Kosovo was the biggest
loser. Macedonia ceded 6.552 sq. km. to Serbia and 1.778 sq.
km. to Kosovo, while Serbia ceded 3.2 sq. km. to Macedonia
and Kosovo ceded 14.633 sq. km. to Macedonia. Kosovo's net
loss was 12.8 sq. km., while Serbia's net gain was 3.4 sq.
km. An INR GIS inspection revealed that the larger segments
Kosovo ceded to Macedonia generally gave the Macedonians an
elevation advantage or consolidated farmlands. According to
INR, if demarcation occurs, the agreement permits the
boundary teams to make adjustments 150 meters in either
direction of the boundary to accommodate property claims.


6. (SBU) On March 7, 2001, the President of the UN Security
Council issued a statement emphasizing that the 2001 border
agreement "must be respected by all." It was reaffirmed by
the UN Secretary General and the USG in February 2002. On
May 23, 2002, the Kosovo Assembly passed a resolution
rejecting the agreement, arguing that it had been negotiated
over the Kosovars' heads. Then-Special Representative of the
Secretary General (SRSG) Michael Steiner immediately annulled

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the resolution. That day, the Department issued a statement
endorsing the SRSG's decision and reiterating our position
that "the border agreement stands." The Department also
called on "all parties to move to the agreement's fair and
full implementation, including the accommodation of affected
persons in the border area." Since 2001, the GOM has tried
to identify the correct legal partner in Kosovo in order to
complete the technical demarcation of the border. However,
the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG)
and UNMIK have not been able to determine who has the legal
authority to complete this process.

The Kosovar Position


7. (C) Kosovo sentiment with regard to the border, despite
the relatively small area involved, remains visceral. PM
Ceku adviser Arben Qirezi told us recently that the PISG
"cannot accept" the 2001 border demarcation agreement "on top
of swallowing decentralization." He said the PISG would
prefer not to have border demarcation mentioned at all in the
status package, but "might accept" a vague reference to
border demarcation being a technical issue to be worked out
between Skopje and Pristina based on the 1974 agreement
establishing the administrative boundary line (ABL) between
the then-Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Macedonia. Qirezi
said he was "dismayed" by what he termed a change in position
by the Macedonian government, claiming that the Kosovo and
Macedonian governments agreed in May 2006 that Kosovo would
release a statement calling border demarcation a technical
issue to be worked out between Kosovo and Macedonia.
According to Qirezi, the statement was painstakingly
negotiated and the two governments understood that they would
demarcate the border based on the 1974 agreement. He also
maintained that then-Macedonian Prime Minister Vlado
Buckovski clarified as much a day after the statement was
released.

The Macedonian Position


8. (C) The GOM is seeking U.S. support to ensure that the
UNSCR setting forth Kosovo's final status includes a
reference to the validity of the 2001 border agreement, as a
matter of legal succession of international treaties of the
former Yugoslavia, and also calls for full and final
demarcation of the border. The 2001 agreement provides the
legal framework for the technical demarcation, and the GOM
believes all concerns expressed by either side can be
addressed within that framework. The Macedonians would like
the technical process of demarcation to start as soon as
possible after adoption of the UNSCR, fearing that any delay
could open the door to politicization of the issue on both
sides and have a negative affect on regional stability.

The Way Forward


9. (C) USOP and Embassy Skopje met on December 15 to discuss
the best way forward, and agreed that there must be clear
acceptance on both sides of the 2001 agreement. However,
some possible softeners for the Kosovars could help the PISG
accept the bottom line more gracefully. It might in the
first instance be possible to suggest that the reference to
the border issue in the Ahtisaari document establish that
Kosovo's border shall be defined by the Yugoslav frontiers as
they stood on December 31, 1989, except as amended by
internationally-recognized agreements. A footnote would
contain a specific reference to the March 7, 2001 statement
by the U.N. Security Council President. Other inducements to
make the issue more palatable for Kosovo include encouraging
the GoM to be among the first to recognize Kosovo's
independence, and urging the two sides to introduce
confidence-building measures (CBMs) to help the actual
demarcation go more smoothly. These CBMs might deal with
having the technical team that demarcates the border include
American experts among any internationals on the team; adding
border crossings to facilitate cross-border communications
and trade links; improving infrastructure to include paving
roads; providing mobile medical care teams to service remote

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areas; working with farmers and villagers to minimize the
impact of demarcation on property holdings.


10. (C) On our end, we propose raising the issue directly
with PM Ceku and possibly other members of the Unity Team to
prepare them for accepting the 2001 agreement in the final
package. We would stress that it is far more important for
Kosovo to maintain good relations with its neighbor to the
south than to quibble about what amounts to an insignificant
bit of territory, particularly given the strained
relationship Kosovo will almost certainly have with Serbia in
the immediate post-status period. This message may need an
additional push by Ambassador Wisner and other high-level
U.S. officials in discussions with the Kosovars.


11. (C) Comment: Border demarcation is a very emotional
issue for Kosovo, but Kosovo will have no choice but to
accept border demarcation based on the 2001 agreement as part
of the final status package. However, we should do what we
can to make this bitter pill more palatable to the PISG so it
does not becoming a stumbling block to implementation of the
status agreement. USOP would appreciate Department guidance
to help prepare the ground in Kosovo for this sensitive
issue, especially in the immediate run-up to Ahtisaari's
presentation of his package in Pristina. End comment.


12. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina does not clear this cable for
release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
LASKARIS