Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRISTINA1088
2006-12-20 09:01:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: 2006 ANNUAL TERRORISM UPDATE

Tags:  PTER ASEC KCRM PGOV KJUS EAID KDEM UNMIK YI 
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ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6846
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0959
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHFMIUU/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFIUU/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 001088 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/CT RHONDA SHORE AND ED SALAZAR, DEPT FOR DRL,
INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW
SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC KCRM PGOV KJUS EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: 2006 ANNUAL TERRORISM UPDATE

REF: STATE 175925

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 001088

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/CT RHONDA SHORE AND ED SALAZAR, DEPT FOR DRL,
INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW
SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC KCRM PGOV KJUS EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: 2006 ANNUAL TERRORISM UPDATE

REF: STATE 175925


1. (U) The following submission provides Post's contribution
to the Department's "Country Reports on Terrorism 2006."

BEGIN REPORT


2. (U) The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) continues to administer Kosovo pursuant to UN
Security Council Resolution 1244, and Kosovo remains a
steadfast member of the global coalition against terrorism.
There have been no significant acts of international
terrorism in Kosovo in 2006. Kosovo is not a sponsor of
terrorism and does not provide safe haven to international
terrorist organizations.


3. (U) The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG)
and UNMIK continue to monitor suspected terrorist activity.
UNMIK Police and Kosovo Police Service (KPS) monitor
individuals entering Kosovo at official points of entry; a
regulation adopted in 2005 requires persons entering Kosovo
who are not employed by an international organization or
liaison office to register with the KPS's Office of Foreign
Registration.


4. (U) Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are of concern
in Kosovo, and the PISG and UNMIK monitor NGOs suspected of
funding Islamic extremist and Albanian extremist movements
within Kosovo. Officials believe only several of the more
than 400 NGOs operating in Kosovo are involved in suspicious
activities, and they seek to prevent extremists from using
NGOs to gain a foothold in Kosovo. Consequently,
municipalities authorize NGOs' use of public facilities for
religious gatherings only if the relevant religious community
gives its consent. The Kosovo Islamic Community (KIC)
reports that it evaluated about 20 applications of mostly
foreign NGOs in 2006 and rejected four due to reservations
about their proposed programs and participants. The KIC
reports that it generally consents to religious gatherings of

a cultural character, but rejects those involving preaching.
With few exceptions, municipalities have respected KIC
positions when issuing their permits.


5. (U) UNMIK Police's Counterterrorism Task Force (CTTF) is
primarily responsible for counterterrorism efforts in Kosovo.
It has nine international police officers and reports that
its objectives have recently shifted from reactive to
preventive measures. It receives information and analysis
support from the UNMIK Central Intelligence Unit (CIU) and
the UNMIK Police Intelligence Liaison Unit (ILU). In October
2006, with UNMIK Police's support and guidance, the KPS
established its own counterterrorism unit (CTU). Six
officers are currently assigned to the KPS CTU and are
receiving training. The KPS plans to expand the CTU in four
phases to be completed by September 2007. It will eventually
have 35 officers. In January 2007, upon completion of phase
one of the expansion plan, the CTU will be incorporated into
the work of UNMIK's CTTF.


6. (U) UNMIK and the PISG are also involved in the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) Internal Security Sector
Review (ISSR) process, which is scheduled to conclude in
December 2006 with the publication of a comprehensive
analysis of short- and long-term needs for institutional
development of Kosovo's security sector. Initiated by the UK
Ministry of Defense in 2004 and later taken over by UNDP, the
ISSR proposes concrete measures to increase Kosovo's capacity
to prevent such future strategic threats as terrorism,
inter-ethnic extremism, organized crime and corruption.


7. (U) UNMIK established the Ministries of Justice (MOJ) and
Internal Affairs (MOIA) in December 2005, launching the
process of gradual transfer of police and justice
competencies to the PISG. Following a successful interim
progress review, UNMIK assigned an additional set of

PRISTINA 00001088 002 OF 003


competencies to the two new ministries in April 2006. The
MOJ and MOIA should play an important role in
counterterrorism as they gain more competencies.
Nevertheless, UNMIK retains the ultimate authority in law
enforcement and continues to exercise operational control
over the KPS.


8. (U) Despite these advances, Kosovo lacks an official
domestic intelligence collection organization, and its
counterterrorism efforts are also hampered by weak border
control. The Kosovo border police service is young, lacks
basic equipment and only has a mandate to patrol the green
border (areas where are no official, manned borders or
boundary gates) from two to three kilometers from the actual
border and administrative boundary lines. NATO KFOR has
roving teams patrolling the green border right up to the
border and administrative boundary lines, but terrorists
could exploit numerous passable roads leading into Kosovo
which lack borders or boundary gates. Border police are also
poorly paid and thus are susceptible to corruption.


9. (U) Witness intimidation is also an obstacle to combating
terrorism in Kosovo. While there have been no new terrorism
cases this year, UNMIK's Department of Justice (DOJ) reports
that intimidation of witnesses during investigation and trial
phases has hampered current terror prosecutions. According
to UNMIK DOJ, a weak domestic witness protection program and
the absence of witness relocation agreements with other
countries make it difficult to convince witnesses to come
forward. Moreover, international officials still handle
terrorism cases due to fears over local officials'
susceptibility to intimidation.


10. (U) While Kosovo officials struggled to bring the
perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice in 2006, domestic
extremists, acting individually or in groups, continued to
commit inter-ethnic violence and threaten public security and
order. In early December, groups of armed, masked men
reportedly presenting themselves as members of the Albanian
National Army (AKSH) intermittently stopped pedestrians and
vehicles in western Kosovo to check their identification
documents. These incidents occurred in the same area and
bore a striking resemblance to those involving a group
calling itself the Kosovo Independence Army (UPK) that
threatened public security in late 2005. On December 5, the
masked men fired at KPS officers in the village of Gercine
near Gjakove. These groups have not issued statements or
made any public requests so far. AKSH's Tirana-based
spokesman Gafurr Adili told Kosovo media that these groups
are not affiliated with the AKSH.


11. (U) AKSH made its first and sole public proclamation in
Kosovo at a commemoration for two former Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) fighters in the central Drenica region in 2004.
Previously, it has been active in western Macedonia and
southern Serbia. It calls for the unification of all
Albanian-inhabited lands into one state through armed
struggle, but claims its units do not operate anywhere in
Kosovo except in the north, which it considers to be under
Serbian occupation. Although there have been numerous
instances in recent years of masked men, dressed in black
blocking roads, Ardili has repeatedly rejected their AKSH
affiliation. In November, the town of Gllogovc in Drenica
was covered in leaflets distributed on AKSH's behalf
denouncing the appearance of armed masked groups attired in
uniforms bearing AKSH insignia in the region.

END REPORT


12. (U) Significant incidents in 2006 have included:

-- January 4 - A rocket-propelled grenade hit a regular local
bus to Belgrade near Suhareke, but did not explode. There
were 57 passengers on board (26 Albanians, 21 Gorani, eight
Bosniaks, one Turk and one Chinese national),and none were

PRISTINA 00001088 003 OF 003


injured.

-- January 6 - An Albanian and a Serb working as security
guards at the municipal court liaison office in Gracanica
were shot and wounded in a drive-by shooting. Two Kosovo
Albanians were convicted.

-- May 6 - Shots were fired at the vehicle driven by the
secretary of the Diocese of Raska and Prizren near Zvecan.

SIPDIS
Two Serb KPS members are suspected of involvement in the
incident.

-- May 11 - A Serb was killed and another was seriously
wounded in an armed robbery at a petrol station in the
village of Grabovac near Zvecan.

-- June 1 - A Serb was killed in an ambush on the
Zvecan-Zitkovac road.

-- June 19 - An elderly Serb returnee was found killed in his
house in Klina.

-- August 26 - A hand grenade was thrown at the Dolce Vita
Cafe in north Mitrovica, injuring nine people, including a
British national. A 16-year-old Kosovo Albanian was
detained in connection with the incident.

-- September 11 - An explosion in the village of Shtupelj
near Klina destroyed a Serb returnee family's reconstructed
house.

-- September 15 - A bomb exploded in the parked private
vehicle of Minister of Internal Affairs Fatmir Rexhepi in
Gjilan.

-- September 16 - A bomb exploded in the parked official
vehicle of an advisor to Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Lutfi
Haziri.

-- September 17 - A bomb exploded in the parked vehicle of a
local businessman in Ferizaj.

-- September 19 - Four Serb returnees were injured, one
seriously, when a grenade was thrown at their apartment in
Kline.

-- October 4 - A bomb exploded in the yard of the house of an
advisor and confidante of DPM Lutfi Haziri in Gjilan.

-- December 8 - An explosive device destroyed part of the
railroad tracks at the entrance to the bridge in the village
of Mihalic near Vushtrri. A train that regularly carries
Serbs who live north of the Ibar River to the Serbian
enclaves south of the Ibar River was due to cross the bridge
roughly an hour later.


13. (U) Post's point of contact on this issue is political
officer Tracey Thornton. She can be reached at
381-38-549-526, ext. 3110 or by e-mail at
thorntontr@state.gov.


14. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable in its
entirety for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW