Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRETORIA4790
2006-11-21 15:54:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Pretoria
Cable title:  

SOUTH AFRICA'S UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRIORITIES

Tags:  PREL UNSC SF 
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DEPT FOR S/P, P, AF, EUR, EAP, NEA, IO/UNP, AF/S

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2016
TAGS: PREL UNSC SF
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA'S UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRIORITIES

REF: PRETORIA 4540

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Bost. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
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TAGS: PREL UNSC SF
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA'S UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRIORITIES

REF: PRETORIA 4540

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Bost. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

--------------
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
--------------


1. (C) Post-apartheid South Africa begins its first stint as
a non-permanent UNSC member on 01 January with an ambitious
agenda. The SAG naturally will promote its "Africa agenda"
and will seek to keep the Council focused on efforts to
resolve the continent's conflicts. But, South Africa also
can be expected to engage actively on high-profile issues
like Iran, North Korea and the Middle East, on special
interests such as Haiti, and on broader themes like
proliferation/disarmament, UN reform, and peacebuilding.
South Africa will be a responsible, independent, and
sometimes forceful voice on the Council as a self-proclaimed
champion of the developing world. However, Pretoria may be
hard pressed to balance the conflicting expectations of its
developing and developed country audiences as it auditions
for a permanent UNSC seat.


2. (C) Ultimately, SAG policy on issues of direct national
interest will be pragmatic, while questions of little
practical relevance to South Africans may be treated more
ideologically. Here's where we expect South Africa to fall
on the issues listed above:

-- Iran: Stubbornly insisting there is no "smoking gun"
proving a nuclear weapons program, South Africa will maneuver
to avoid imposition of sanctions and steadfastly defend
Tehran's right to "peaceful" uses of nuclear energy. If
forced to a vote on compliance with UNSCR 1696, however,
Pretoria will be loathe to undercut the Council and will
likely vote based on the facts or abstain.

-- North Korea: Despite fundamental opposition to sanctions,
the SAG is much more open to stern international measures
following the DPRK's nuclear test.

-- Middle East: Pretoria has strong historic sympathies for
the Palestinian cause, but is open to arguments about the
need for balance in resolution texts.

-- Haiti: South Africa's position has shifted in recent
months to coincide more closely with U.S. interests, from
supporting Aristide (who still lives in Pretoria) to backing
the elected Preval regime.

-- Nonproliferation: The SAG will be an outspoken and active
nonproliferation advocate, but will criticize weapons states
for shirking NPT disarmament obligations.

-- UN Reform: South Africa is interested in UN reform,
although we will disagree on specifics. Their main focus,
however is Security Council expansion (to include South
Africa).

-- Peacebuilding: With peacekeepers in a range of African
trouble spots, the SAG is convinced of the importance of
post-conflict reconstruction and consequently is intrigued by
the UN Peacebuilding Commission concept.


3. (C) While we anticipate some disagreements on hot button
issues like the Middle East and Iran, the United States and
South Africa share fundamental values, including a commitment
to democracy, free markets, human rights, the rule of law,
and tolerance. This offers a strong basis for cooperation
and dialogue. We recommend high-level engagement on Security
Council issues of mutual interest, early consultations and
regular information sharing to facilitate SAG decision-making
processes, and emphasis on U.S. support for multilateralism
and South African priorities to ward off knee-jerk
"North-South" ideological misperceptions. END SUMMARY AND
INTRODUCTION.

--------------
SOUTH AFRICAN UNSC PRIORITIES/STRATEGIES
--------------


4. (C) Africa Agenda: South Africa's top priority during

PRETORIA 00004790 002.2 OF 007


its two-year stint on the UN Security Council will be to
promote its "African agenda," which largely means focusing
resources and attention on preventing and resolving Africa's
conflicts. In his seven years as President, Thabo Mbeki has
devoted enormous personal effort and national resources to
African conflict resolution, trusting that stability will be
transformational -- leading to development and growth across
the continent. Mbeki is an Africanist at heart, believing
that slavery, colonialism, the Cold War, and now an "unjust"
international order have restrained the continent from
realizing its potential. His ambitious "African Renaissance"
and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) projects
are designed to shift the debate on the continent's future
and lay the groundwork for stability, better governance, and
development. Even as the ANC's internal succession battle
intensifies in advance of national elections in 2009, we
believe Mbeki will continue to promote his Africa
initiatives, which he hopes will define his legacy.


5. (C) Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Complementing its
African agenda, South Africa is increasingly convinced of the
importance of post-conflict reconstruction, in part because
the countries where the SAG has focused the most attention
(DRC and Burundi) are now entering the rebuilding phase.
With the ANC confident of carrying a significant proportion
of the electorate through at least 2014, the SAG takes a
long-term approach to this transformational process and
encourages partners to do the same. Mbeki criticized the
international community October 31 for focusing too much on
conflict resolution, and not "going all the way to ensure
countries emerging from conflict do not revert to violence."
Pretoria will seek ways to use its Council seat to encourage
greater international consensus, action, and long-term
commitments on post-conflict issues. In this vein, South
Africa has been interested in discussions on developing a UN
Peacebuilding Commission.


6. (C) Voice for the South?: As the outgoing Chair of the
G-77 and a recent NAM Chair, South Africa views itself as a
spokesperson for the "South" and will consider itself
obligated to use its Council seat to promote a greater voice
for the developing world in international institutions.
South Africa constantly points to the "power imbalances" in
international organizations and strongly supports
comprehensive UN reform, including an expanded Security
Council (read: one with a South African permanent seat). FM
Dlamini-Zuma even suggested October 19 that the UNSC veto
should be eliminated because it is "undemocratic." On the
other hand, South Africa has sophisticated commercial and
trade interests and a history of pragmatic decision-making on
issues of national importance. SAG policy will be strongly
pro-South where ideological and national interests overlap,
such as promoting African peace and prosperity or halting WMD
proliferation. But interests are likely to trump ideology
where the two collide, no matter the rhetoric.


7. (C) Nonproliferation and Disarmament: As one of the few
countries to end voluntarily its nuclear weapons program,
South Africa carries significant moral weight on nuclear
issues. Pretoria is a strong and active voice on the IAEA
Board of Governors and will chair the Nuclear Suppliers Group
for 2007-2008. The SAG consistently underscores its
fundamental support for the NPT, and argues that the
international community (particularly the United States) has
focused too much attention on nonproliferation to the
exclusion of the Treaty's disarmament objectives. South
Africa's vocal support for the peaceful use of nuclear energy
is about both the principle of protecting developing
countries' rights and South African commercial interest in
developing Pebble Bed Modular Reactor technologies. The SAG
is playing an expanding role on the conventional side as
well. It became the first African state to join Wassenaar
last year and maintains a continuing interest in controlling
proliferation of small arms and light weapons on the
continent.


8. (C) Dialogue, Not Sanctions: South Africa will be
reluctant to support the imposition of UN Chapter VII
sanctions despite the vital role international sanctions
played in effectively opposing the apartheid regime. SAG
officials argue that dialogue is (nearly always) preferable
to pressure, and they rarely acknowledge that sticks and
carrots can work together to promote change. Pretoria has

PRETORIA 00004790 003.2 OF 007


profound faith that if two sides talk enough -- like the ANC
did with the National Party -- a peaceful, negotiated
agreement is possible. The South African leadership prides
itself on being open to dialogue with absolutely everyone.


9. (C) A Talented Multilateral Tactician: Although new to
the Security Council environment, the SAG contains a number
of leaders who worked the apartheid-era sanctions and
understand how the game is played. South Africa's natural
preference is for consensus decision-making and Pretoria
takes pride in helping to broker compromise, particularly
between developed and developing countries. The working
levels have been honing their multilateral diplomacy skills
in a variety of organizations for the past decade.
Generally, SAG representatives are capable and committed to
finding mutually acceptable solutions no matter how difficult
the issue. They will be up front about their own redlines
(almost always defined in terms of "principle") and will
consider creative tactics to avoid confrontation. When it
suits their interests, the SAG argues that certain functional
or regional organizations have "primary jurisdiction" over
key issues. For example, Pretoria has argued that
discussions of Iran should be confined to the IAEA, not the
UNSC. On Cote d'Ivoire, it recently objected to a draft
French resolution because it purportedly conflicted with the
AU Peace and Security Council resolution on the same issue.
The SAG Achilles' heel is a bureaucracy plagued by capacity
shortcomings resulting from apartheid's lingering effects,
which may impede timely decision-making and communication
with New York.


10. (C) Permanent Seat: Perhaps most importantly, South
Africa hopes to use its non-permanent seat to lay the
groundwork for eventual permanent membership on the Council.
Pretoria will try to prove to various audiences -- AU
members, the "South," contenders from other regions, the P-5,
the Secretary General, and the UN bureaucracy -- that it is a
serious candidate deserving international support. Its
African rivals for the Council seat, particularly Nigeria,
will be watching with interest how Pretoria plays its cards.

--------------
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ISSUES
--------------

North Korea
--------------


11. (S) True to its belief in dialogue, South Africa
continues to engage with the DPRK, albeit cautiously. Trade
is negligible between the two countries, but several
high-level visits were exchanged over the past 18 months and
North Korea opened an Embassy in Pretoria just this year.
The SAG is careful to follow a public line clearly
emphasizing the primacy of the six-party talks and to consult
with the parties before major visits. Prior to the DPRK's
nuclear test, South Africa had opposed sanctions or other
direct UNSC involvement, instead advocating further
diplomatic efforts to bring North Korea into the
international mainstream. Since the test, Pretoria's
profound commitment to nonproliferation has caused South
Africa to make a deliberate exception to its no-sanctions
policy, while still keeping the door open for further
dialogue.


Iran
--------------


12. (C) Despite being an NPT "true believer" and the global
poster child for nuclear disarmament, South Africa has a
blind spot where Iran is concerned. Arguably motivated by
some combination of apartheid-era loyalties, current energy
dependence, NAM relationships, an instinctive predisposition
toward the underdog, and fear of a potentially escalating
crisis, South Africa has taken a deeply unhelpful position on
Iran's nuclear weapons program. At the IAEA Board of
Governors and in other fora, the SAG has been all "carrot."
It gives legitimacy to Iran's arguments by maintaining there
is no "smoking gun" proving the existence of a nuclear
weapons program. It stresses nations' rights to peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. It downplays Iran's lack of
cooperation. Senior SAG officials meet regularly and

PRETORIA 00004790 004.2 OF 007


publicly with the Iranian leadership.


13. (S/NF) While Pretoria appears increasingly uncomfortable
with Tehran's behavior and rhetoric, it will be difficult for
South Africa to reverse its long-standing position without
admitting a massive error in judgment and simultaneously
risking Tehran's wrath. If UNSC dynamics provide an opening
for a face-saving SAG policy reversal, it is worth
considering when and how that leverage might be most
effectively deployed. Post believes that South Africa's
general opposition to sanctions will place it in the Chinese
and Russian camp if that option is considered. However, if
asked to vote on a resolution detailing Iranian noncompliance
with UNSCR 1696, South Africa likely will vote the facts, or
at worst abstain. Pretoria may voice concerns about the
implications of 1696, but South Africa respects international
law and will obey it to the letter.


Democratic Republic of the Congo
--------------


14. (C) South Africa will press to keep the UN deeply
involved in the DRC, including the continuation of a robust
peacekeeping force for some time. The DRC is the SAG's
number one Africa priority. Mbeki believes that the success
of the current transition in Congo will transform the entire
continent. South Africa has significant commercial interests
in the DRC in the telecommunications, mining, and energy
sectors, and it hopes to expand these investments.


15. (SBU) South Africa played a key role in the DRC peace
negotiations, which led to the signing of the Global and
All-Inclusive Agreement in Pretoria in December 2002, and
currently has 1,206 troops deployed as part of MONUC. It
also has been deeply involved in security sector reform,
collaborating with the Netherlands and Belgium, and its
Independent Electoral Commission provided extensive support
for the recent DRC elections. South African ministries have
a range of partnership programs in the DRC, from police
training to civil service reform.


Middle East
--------------


16. (C) South Africa will push to keep the
Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Lebanese conflicts on the
Council agenda. The African National Congress (ANC) remains
strongly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, from the ANC's
days as a liberation movement. South Africa consistently and
publicly condemns Israeli military operations in the West
Bank, Gaza, and Lebanon. Deputy FM Pahad reiterated as
recently as November 8 that the UNSC failure to protect
civilians in Gaza "only serves to weaken their credibility
and confidence in the Security Council."


17. (C) While South Africa is consistently critical of
Israeli actions, it attempts to maintain a semblance of
balance on Middle East issues. The South African Government
refused to sever ties with the Government of Israel during
the recent Lebanon crisis, despite strong pressure from key
constituencies, including the trade union federation COSATU
and the South African Communist Party. Like many transition
countries, South Africa has toyed with playing an (informal)
mediation role in the Middle East.


Sudan
--------------


18. (C) In Darfur, South Africa supports the transition from
AMIS to a UN peacekeeping force, although not against the
will of Khartoum. South Africa has 398 peacekeepers and 126
civilian police serving in AMIS. South Africa has publicly
committed several times, most recently on November 17, to
send additional troops to AMIS. While the political will to
deploy more troops exists, the South African military is
overstretched in the DRC and Burundi, and would have
difficulty sending significant numbers of additional troops
to Darfur.


19. (SBU) South African diplomats have expressed concern

PRETORIA 00004790 005.2 OF 007


that the international focus on Darfur has deflected
attention from implementation of the North-South
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which remains South Africa's
primary focus in Sudan. South Africa chairs the AU
Post-Conflict Ministerial Committee on the Sudan, which is
charged with developing plans for post-conflict
reconstruction in southern Sudan (although it has
accomplished little). Pretoria plans to open a consulate in
Juba and has funded a $3 million training program for
Government of South Sudan/Sudan People's Liberation Movement
officials, focused largely on building capacity in public
administration and finance.


Cote d'Ivoire
--------------


20. (C) South Africa will remain an active participant in
Cote d'Ivoire, arguing for focused UN attention on elections
and disarmament. The SAG may argue against the imposition of
additional sanctions (at least on President Gbagbo's camp).
President Mbeki stepped down as the AU's Cote d'Ivoire
mediator in October, following a turbulent and largely
ineffective two years as the AU point person. Mbeki said
that he was withdrawing because South Africa's membership on
the UNSC might conflict with its AU mandate on Cote d'Ivoire.
Many analysts believe that ECOWAS pressured Mbeki to
relinquish his mediator role, a theory supported by the fact
that no SAG concerns have been expressed about potential
conflicts of interest in other trouble spots.


21. (C) Originally appointed by then-AU Chairman Olusegun
Obasanjo in November 2004, Mbeki successfully negotiated the
Pretoria Agreement in April 2005, which in theory resolved
the major electoral and disarmament issues. The agreement,
however, was never implemented, and over time, South Africa
became increasingly perceived as biased toward President
Gbagbo's position. The New Forces rebels repeatedly asked
Mbeki to step down as mediator. The SAG has had a small
number of troops deployed in Cote d'Ivoire since 2005 and
also trained approximately 135 troops to provide close
protection for Ivoirian Ministers.


Burundi
--------------


22. (C) Although the ONUB mission in Burundi ends December
31, South Africa will continue to push for active UNSC
support for the Burundi peace process and post-conflict
reconstruction. South Africa, under the leadership of former
President Nelson Mandela, led the negotiations of the Arusha
peace accords in August 2000, and has worked tirelessly to
keep the peace process on track. South Africa deployed its
own troops in October 2001 to oversee the return of Burundian
rebels. That mission was later subsumed by the African Union
peacekeeping force in May 2003 (AMIB) and the UN in June 2004
(ONUB).


23. (SBU) South African Minister for Safety and Security
Charles Nqakula continues to serve as "Facilitator" for the
ongoing peace talks between the Government of Burundi and the
one remaining rebel group that has not put down its arms, the
Palipehutu-FNL. While the two parties signed a Comprehensive
Cease-fire Agreement in Dar es Salaam on September 7, the FNL
has refused to return to Bujumbura and implementation remains
on hold. South Africa currently has 865 troops serving as
part of ONUB. These forces will likely remain in Burundi
under an AU mandate after the UN mission ends, augmented by
another 150 "VIP protectors," to guard the FNL leadership and
support the demobilization and disarmament of the FNL
fighters.


Zimbabwe
--------------


24. (C) South Africa likely will attempt to keep Zimbabwe
off the UN Security Council agenda. Zimbabwe continues to be
one of South Africa's most difficult challenges. Senior
South African officials are increasingly frustrated by
President Mugabe's erratic rule, and we believe President
Mbeki would like to see new leadership in Zimbabwe. South

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Africa has tried a number of behind-the-scenes initiatives to
spur change, including a proposed loan, negotiations on a
compromise constitution, encouraging Mugabe's timely
retirement, and intelligence operations. Yet, Pretoria has
refused to criticize publicly the Mugabe regime, believing
that "quiet diplomacy" and internal negotiations are the best
ways to effect change. Unless the situation deteriorates to
the point that there is widespread violence or outside troops
are required to maintain stability, we believe South Africa
will argue strongly against any UNSC action on Zimbabwe.


Haiti
--------------


25. (S/NF) South Africa is likely to support the UN
peacekeeping mission and reconstruction in Haiti, consistent
with U.S. objectives. President Mbeki and FM Dlamini-Zuma
initially had challenged the legality of Aristide's departure
from Haiti. Pretoria accepted hosting President Aristide in
May 2004. The SAG arranged for Aristide to hold press
conferences in Pretoria, during which he railed against the
United States and possibly sent coded messages to his
supporters. South Africa also unhelpfully floated the idea
of African Union "mediation" in Haiti.


26. (C) Since the February 2006 elections in Haiti, the tone
of South Africa's policy has shifted significantly.
President Mbeki congratulated President-elect Preval on
February 18, said that the election reflected the will of the
Haitian people, and stated South Africa's willingness to
"assist the people of Haiti." Former President Aristide has
been remarkably quiet since the elections, and we understand
he is increasingly comfortable in Pretoria as a professor at
the University of South Africa. South Africa is even
considering providing bilateral assistance to Haiti in the
areas of health and education.


Western Sahara
--------------


27. (C) Because of their sympathies for the Saharawi cause,
which Pretoria tellingly compares to the Palestinian
"liberation struggle", South Africa likely will attempt to
play a role on the Western Sahara question. South Africa is
one of the few states to have recognized the "Saharawi Arab
Democratic Republic" (in 2004),and relations between South
Africa and Morocco remain tense. When accepting the
credential of the Saharawi ambassador in December 2004, Mbeki
said that "it is not correct for Morocco to continue to defy
United Nations' decreed international positions by occupying
Western Sahara."


Counterterrorism
--------------


28. (S) South Africa is committed to combating terrorism and
extremism around the world, including the illicit financial
networks used by terrorist and criminal groups. Analysts and
government officials are concerned about terrorism in the
Horn of Africa. The SAG is conscientious about complying
with relevant UN obligations. SAG law enforcement works
closely but quietly with U.S. authorities on specific cases
of concern. Nevertheless, Pretoria frequently disagrees with
the U.S. on specific approaches and tactics, and is
scrupulously compliant with South African law. The SAG
remains concerned that UNSCR 1540 requirements infringe on
member states' sovereignty and that developing countries
simply do not have the capacity to fulfill the many complex
reporting requirements imposed by the various sanctions and
nonproliferation regimes. The U.S. counterterrorism message
does not always resonate in South Africa. Many prominent ANC
figures -- including Nelson Mandela -- remain on the official
USG list of terrorists banned from travel to the States.
Ordinary South Africans oppose military involvement in Iraq
and believe the GWOT has fueled extremism. We have seen
increasing willingness to discuss counterterrorism issues in
the domestic context as preparations to host the 2010 World
Cup get into gear. South Africa will give practical support
when it counts, but is unlikely to be a standard bearer in
the war on terror.

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Everything Else
--------------


29. (C) South Africa admittedly has little expertise on
other issues before the Security Council, but is trying to
bone up. The SAG will approach areas such as Afghanistan,
Burma, Cyprus, Georgia/Abkhazia, Timor, and the Balkans on
the merits, but will be deeply susceptible to the G-77 and/or
NAM point of view. On USG priorities, it will be important
to reach out to the SAG well in advance to educate the
working levels and decision-makers and to communicate how our
position supports South African, AU, or developing world
interests.

--------------
RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------


30. (C) Engagement: We recommend high-level engagement with
the South Africans on our UNSC and foreign policy priorities.
In general, involving President Mbeki in key decisions will
result in better outcomes for U.S. interests than leaving
issues to the more ideological ForMin Dlamini-Zuma. South
Africa perceives itself as a leader of Africa and the "South"
and responds well to senior-level visits and meetings that
reinforce the perception of its importance. In recent
months, several key international leaders have visited South
Africa, including Chinese Premier Wen (June),Russian
President Putin (September),and Indian PM Singh (October).
Mbeki publicly accepted Putin's offer to "mentor" South
Africa on Security Council membership.


31. (C) Consult Early: We recommend early consultations
with South African Government policymakers on UNSC issues.
SAG decision-making is often laborious and involves multiple
stakeholders. The sooner we can highlight issues and provide
timely information, the more likely we are to bring
Pretoria's position in line with our own. The monthly DFA-P5
meetings in Pretoria (reftel) and DFA's regular consultations
with G-8 Embassies are an excellent opportunity to flag
potential issues and develop consensus. Last-minute
demarches on complex issues are more likely to result in
knee-jerk, "pro-South" positions.


32. (S/NF) Provide Information: South Africa's Department
of Foreign Affairs is undergoing significant transformation
and often lacks the capacity to provide timely and accurate
information to senior policymakers. The system of reporting
between South African embassies and Pretoria often does not
work effectively, particularly in the classified arena.
Proving background papers and briefing to policymakers and
substantive experts, including increased intelligence sharing
as appropriate, will help South Africa develop more informed
and nuanced positions.


33. (C) Underscore Common Interests: Many SAG policymakers,
even at senior levels, do not appreciate the strong support
that exists within the USG for many of their African
priorities. We should seek opportunities to inform SAG
officials about the U.S. support for the African Union,
NEPAD, SADC, as well as increases in development assistance
to Africa.


34. (C) Emphasize Multilateralism, Fairness, and Balance:
South Africa consistently stresses the importance of
"multilateralism," often contrasting this approach with its
perception that certain countries (read: the U.S) are
"unilateralists" who pursue their own short-term national
interests at the expense of the developing world and the
greater good. The more we can package our policy in
multilateral terms and emphasize the principles of fairness
and balance underlying our policy arguments, the more
effective we will be in convincing Pretoria to support U.S.
objectives.

BOST