Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRETORIA3202
2006-08-04 12:08:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Pretoria
Cable title:  

SOUTH AFRICA: SEMINAR ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HUGO CHAVEZ

Tags:  ETRD ECON USTR SF VE 
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VZCZCXRO0625
PP RUEHDU RUEHJO
DE RUEHSA #3202/01 2161208
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041208Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4924
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0253
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 0129
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 3181
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 8018
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 5002
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 003202 

SIPDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR/PCOLEMAN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD ECON USTR SF VE
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA: SEMINAR ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HUGO CHAVEZ
AND THE FTAA


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 003202

SIPDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR/PCOLEMAN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD ECON USTR SF VE
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA: SEMINAR ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HUGO CHAVEZ
AND THE FTAA



1. (U) Summary. The University of South Africa (Unisa) and the
Embassy of Venezuela sponsored a July 28 presentation by Jos
Briceo Ruiz of the Universidad de los Andes on the foreign policy
of Hugo Chavez as it pertains to the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA). The main points brought up in Ruiz's speech were: 1)
Venezuela's perception that it was the target of a Washington-backed
coup in 2002 plays a key role in its foreign policy, inducing a
distrust of the U.S. beyond mere pragmatism; 2)Venezuela's three
pillars of foreign policy are the promotion of a multipolar world,
South-South cooperation, and collaboration within Latin America; 3)
Venezuela has sought to ally itself with a variety of regional
powers, including Russia, China, South Africa, India, and Brazil; 4)
Venezuela's proposed alternative to the FTAA, the Bolivarian
Alternative for the Americas (ALBA),is a political and social
initiative with some economic elements that seeks to unify Latin
America an alternative to the United States; and 5) the future of
ALBA depends upon participation by MERCOSUR states, which is not
immediately likely. End Summary.

--------------
Background
--------------


2. (U) Unisa's Centre for Latin American Studies hosted the
presentation in Pretoria, drawing an audience of about 25 people
from the South African government, diplomatic missions, and the
university's faculty. The Charge d'Affaires of the Venezuelan
Embassy opened the seminar with a brief speech thanking Unisa and
Dr. Ruiz, who is a faculty member at the Universidad de los Andes,
Mrida, Venezuela. The following is a summary of his presentation.

--------------
Three Pillars of Foreign Policy
--------------


3. (U) According to Ruiz, the Hugo Chavez administration bases its
foreign policy upon three pillars: the promotion of a "multipolar
world," South-South cooperation, and Bolivarian cooperation in South
America. The three are closely related. Venezuela will align
itself against the United States to create alternate poles of power,
preferably establishing those poles in the underdeveloped world and
ideally in Latin America. Especially after 2002, Venezuela has

vocally opposed the dominant place of the United States in global
politics. Whenever possible, Chavez seeks to build relationships
with regional powers, particularly in the third world. Its
"independent foreign policy" stresses the importance of restoring
the sort of balance "present during the Cold War" by aligning with
Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa, China, and others against
perceived U.S. dominance and reviving organizations of third-world
states to encourage developing states to look to each other for
progress rather than to the West. Above all else, Chavez stresses
that Latin America shares a culture and economic interests -- a
Bolivarian vision -- and should band together to face the United
States and European from a position of strength.

--------------
1999-2001: General Criticism of the FTAA
--------------


4. (U) Ruiz identified three stages in Venezuela's move away from
the FTAA during the Chavez administration: general criticism,
forthright skepticism, and radical opposition.


5. (U) Ruiz noted that Venezuela entered into FTAA negotiations in
1994, under the rule of Rafael Caldera's center-left administration.
Although the subsequent Chavez regime was at ideological odds with
the United States' vision for the FTAA from its first days in
office, Ruiz sees little continuity or clarity of purpose in that
opposition from 1999 through 2001. Government documents reveal a
great deal of interest in trade deals with various partners --
MERCOSUR, the Andean Community of Nations, and the European Union,
among others - but Venezuela continued to participate in the FTAA
process, albeit with ever-increasing reluctance. This indecision
can be attributed to the Chavez government's focus on domestic
change within Venezuela. It was forging an entirely new political
infrastructure while battling a determined opposition.

--------------
2002: Skepticism
--------------


6. (U) Domestic matters came to a head in April 2002, when a coup
briefly toppled Chavez. This episode is a defining point in the
Chavez presidency, marking a sharp deterioration in relations with
the U.S. and a growing sense of persecution in Caracas. Regardless
of the veracity of the Chavistas' claims that Washington encouraged

PRETORIA 00003202 002 OF 002


the coup, Ruiz stated that there is a widespread belief in
government circles that Washington is out to get Chavez. By 2002,
Venezuela was an unenthusiastic participant in FTAA negotiations.
While Chavez did not reject the FTAA outright -- he maintained that
an agreement could be mutually beneficial depending on the treaty
content -- his government began to search for an alternative Latin
American trade federation. Chavez eventually proposed the
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) in place of the FTAA.
ALBA was to be a strictly Latin American organization, resisting
the hegemonic power of the United States and focusing on
"cooperation" between states instead of the "competitive" focus of
the FTAA, which Chavez perceived as inherently hazardous to the
Americas' developing economies. However, ALBA had little substance
at first. Ruiz relates that when the Cuban government asked Chavez
for further details of the proposal in 2002, he had none to give.

--------------
2003-Present: Radical Opposition to the FTAA
--------------


7. (U) After 2003, ALBA gained substance, stressing "economic
complementarity." Instead of a lower general tariff promoting
head-on competition between economic sectors, an ALBA deal would see
assistance or importation in a weak sector in exchange for providing
a good or service that the trading partner needs. In December, 2004
Cuba and Venezuela signed an agreement within the ALBA framework, in
which Cuba sent 20,000 medical personnel and teachers to Venezuela
in exchange for 96,000 barrels-per-day of inexpensive oil. Bolivia
joined ALBA in 2006.
According to Ruiz, ALBA is only partly an economic vehicle; it is
also concerned with promoting certain political and social goals of
the Chavez administration and, as such, is a concept often
indistinguishable from Venezuelan foreign policy. The name is
attached to a variety of projects designed to oppose United States
hegemony, including energy cooperation projects with Caribbean
states and Argentina and a proposed Latin American network to
compete with CNN and American TV.


8. (U) Ruiz told his audience that effectively the future of ALBA
lies with the MERCOSUR states. Venezuela has long desired to be a
full member of MERCOSUR, and any realistic alternative to the FTAA
must include Argentina and Brazil, with Chile preferably included.
MERCOSUR has rejected the FTAA on practical grounds, demanding an
open agricultural market from the U.S. and greater freedom for
regional development planning, but the organization is founded on
neoliberal economic principles and is not a natural partner for the
Chavez regime, despite the recent liberal revival in South America
and the close relationship between Chavez and Brazilian President
Lula. Although MERCOSUR flirts with ALBA, Ruiz acknowledges that
none of its major powers are likely to reject the FTAA outright;
they are far too committed to trade with the developed nations.

BOST