POLITICAL ANALYST WEIGHS IN ON ZUMA, ANC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 002122

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/S
NSC FOR AFRICA DIRECTOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR SF
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ANALYST WEIGHS IN ON ZUMA, ANC

REF: A. PRETORIA 1957

B. PRETORIA 1221

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Don Teitelbaum. Reason 1.4 (b).


1. (C) Summary: The ruling African National Congress (ANC)
is currently in turmoil due to the ongoing battles between
opponents and supporters of President Thabo Mbeki, according
to noted political analyst Aubrey Matshiqi. Party deputy
president Jacob Zuma's acquittal on rape charges and the
subsequent May 14 National Executive Committee (NEC) decision
to let him resume his duties have strengthened Zuma's hand in
his quest to succeed Mbeki as ANC president in 2007.
However, Matshiqi -- who is close to party heavyweights Tokyo
Sexwale and Sam Shilowa but is even-handed in his critiques
of all ANC factions -- noted that these gains are likely to
be short-lived. He believes Zuma has a minimal chance of
surviving his corruption trial, and many of Zuma's perceived
supporters in the NEC and elsewhere are simply using him as a
proxy in order to attack Mbeki without scuppering their own
political ambitions. Matshiqi says Mbeki's long-firm support
within the NEC seems to be eroding, and there are widespread
rumors that Mbeki opponents and Zuma supporters will push to
move up the ANC's 2007 national conference to elect new
leadership, to take advantage of Mbeki's growing
unpopularity. Whatever happens, it is increasingly likely
that whoever succeeds Mbeki will have to be acceptable to
both the President's supporters and his detractors. This
reality may keep potential standard-bearers from the party's
"middle" from taking sides in the ongoing fight. End summary.

--------------
ZUMA REINSTATED AT MAY 14 NEC MEETING
--------------


2. (SBU) The ANC's National Executive Committee (except for
Jacob Zuma) met on May 14 to decide whether Zuma should be
allowed to resume his positions in the party following his
acquittal on rape charges (Ref A). The meeting, which
apparently lasted into the morning hours of May 15, concluded
with a decision to lift Zuma's suspension and to allow him to
resume his duties as party deputy president and his
participation in other party structures.

--------------
NEC INCREASINGLY ASSERTIVE
--------------


3. (C) Aubrey Matshiqi, a prominent political analyst with
close ANC ties to Tokyo Sexwale and Gauteng Premier Sam
Shilowa, told PolOff on May 15 that the NEC decision was
largely a formality. He did not have first-hand information
on the previous night's meeting, but had heard no prior
speculation indicating Zuma's reinstatement was contentious.
That said, the NEC -- long perceived as a bastion of support
for Mbeki -- was increasingly independent of the President's
wishes. Matshiqi noted that the NEC's March 2006 decision to
independently investigate the National Intelligence Agency's
"hoax email" scandal (Ref B) rather than accept the report of
the NIA Inspector General was a big blow to Mbeki, who had
advocated acceptance of the IG report.


4. (C) Matshiqi said that he did not yet have a good feeling
for how voting blocks in the NEC were aligning, but he thinks
that generational trends have much to do with Mbeki's loss of
support. Older members of the 60-person body with
long-standing ties to Mbeki -- such as Minister for the
Presidency Essop Pahad, Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad,
and Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils -- are most loyal to
the President because they lack succession aspirations and
are likely to retire when Mbeki's term ends in 2009.
However, members in their 30s, 40s, and early 50s, many of
whom depended solely on Mbeki for their rise to prominence,
appear to be hedging their bets. Matshiqi suggested Deputy
Finance Minister Jabu Moleketi and Deputy Home Affairs
Minister Malusi Gigaba might be in this category.

-------------- --------------
ZUMA SUPPORTERS, MBEKI OPPONENTS WANT CONGRESS MOVED UP
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Matshiqi said that many of Zuma's supporters,
emboldened by his acquittal on rape charges, are quietly
agitating for the ANC party congress to be moved from late
2007 to the beginning or middle of the year. Their reasoning
is twofold. First, they believe that Mbeki is angling to
have Zuma's July 2006 corruption trial delayed so that it is

PRETORIA 00002122 002 OF 003


in its end stages during the party congress. If the congress
is moved forward so that it takes place in the trial's early
stages, they believe Zuma's chances of election will be
greater. Second, Zuma supporters figure that Mbeki's
resources will allow him to wear down support for Zuma over
time. An early congress will allow them to strike before
Mbeki is able to build his own popularity.


6. (C) Matshiqi noted that many Mbeki opponents also support
an earlier congress, although not for any love of Zuma. The
party leadership and rank-and-file are full of Mbeki
antagonists who also do not want to see Zuma elected as party
president. However, most of them believe Zuma is almost
certain of being convicted on corruption charges. They
gamble that if Zuma is elected as party president and then
convicted and forced to step down, this would rob Mbeki of
the ability to force through his chosen successor. Matshiqi
was unclear whether the idea to move up the date of the
congress could gather critical mass, but he said that the
National Policy Conference scheduled for the end of 2006
(where the party will debate its congress platform) is where
such a motion could be tabled.

--------------
ALLIANCE PARTNERS TORN OVER ZUMA
--------------


7. (C) Asked about the Congress of South African Trade
Unions' recent lack of enthusiasm for Zuma, Matshiqi said
that COSATU is having its own leadership tribulations, partly
related to Zuma. COSATU will hold a leadership conference
later this year, and Secretary General Zwelenzima Vavi is
fighting for his political life. He has taken flack over
COSATU's Zimbabwe efforts, with many advocating greater focus
on internal matters. COSATU's influential gender committee
said prior to Zuma's rape trial that he should be presumed
guilty until proven innocent. Matshiqi believes that
COSATU's generally lukewarm support for Zuma since the start
of the rape trial stems from Vavi's desire to mollify
COSATU's female members and stay in control.


8. (C) Although more firmly behind Zuma than COSATU, the
South African Communist Party (SACP) also is experiencing
Zuma angst. While Secretary General Blade Nzimande and Young
Communist League leader Buti Manamela have been two of Zuma's
strongest supporters, the party's leading intellectual,
Deputy Secretary General Jeremy Cronin, has been openly
critical of the party's unquestioning support. Kasrils, who
sits on the SACP Politburo, also has taken heat for his role
in the Zuma rape trial. Many think that his personal
friendship with the accuser and the fact that she contacted
him before reporting the rape suggest he was involved in a
conspiracy against Zuma.

--------------
ZUMA FLYING HIGH...FOR NOW
--------------


9. (C) Given his rape acquittal and reinstatement as ANC
deputy president, Matshiqi said Zuma is in a good position
right now, but he does not expect it to last. The corruption
case against Zuma is extremely strong, and Matshiqi thinks a
guilty verdict is likely. Also, Matshiqi argues Zuma will
not fare well when he undergoes widespread scrutiny as a
candidate. Matshiqi characterized Zuma as a populist with no
ideas, saying even his current supporters are likely to be
spooked by his inability to formulate a vision for South
Africa's future. (Note: Matshiqi is clearly no fan of Zuma,
but his writings and media appearances have shown him to be
even-handed in his critiques of various camps in the ANC.
End note.) His backers from the left may panic should Zuma
appear likely to win the ANC presidency, given Zuma's clearly
stated free-market preferences. Matshiqi said few of the
business leaders he has spoken with about a Zuma presidency
expressed any reservations. The only big change they
anticipate is that Zuma's strong backers in the Indian
business community would be likely to receive a bigger share
of the government spending "pie."

--------------
SUCCESSION JOCKEYING ON BACK BURNER
--------------


10. (C) Matshiqi said that ANC succession jockeying is quiet
following Zuma's acquittal. No one with an eye on the
presidency is willing to stick his or her head out because
there is a perception that Mbeki has political "empty

PRETORIA 00002122 003 OF 003


coffins" waiting for anyone who declares an interest. As
long as the pro- and anti-Mbeki camps continue to battle,
viable potential successors are likely to lie low. Matshiqi
said the shame of it is that the "middle" of the ANC, which
generally supports Mbeki's policies but not his autocratic
leadership, has been browbeaten by the President into staying
silent. This middle, which he believes constitutes more than
two-thirds of party members (as well as potential candidates
like Sexwale and Cyril Ramaphosa) could prove a unifying
force, but they lack a standard bearer to lead them.
Ultimately, Matshiqi believes that neither Mbeki's supporters
nor his detractors will win outright control over succession,
so the next ANC president will have to be someone palatable
to both camps. (Note: Observations of Matshiqi and others on
the various candidates will be reported septel. End note.)

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Matshiqi is one of the Mission's most astute and
knowledgeable contacts on ANC developments, and despite his
admittedly close ties to Sexwale and Shilowa, he is
even-handed in his critiques of the party. Since leaving
Shilowa's office in 2000, he has worked as an independent
analyst and has consulted for several political parties,
including the ANC. His comments suggest that the party faces
a difficult period in the runup to next year's ANC congress.
With no opposition party in a position to take advantage of
the vulnerabilities presented by the ANC's internal
rivalries, the party lacks external motivation to resolve
succession in a timely fashion. The bigger question is the
effect such battles have on the political development of the
ANC and South Africa as a whole. With no viable challenger
to ANC dominance in 2009, the democratic process of choosing
South Africa's next president essentially unfolds within ANC
ranks. If succession discussions are handled in a
transparent and inclusive way, the battle may force the party
to hammer out internal differences, conduct necessary policy
discussions, review the relationship with alliance partners,
and unite its ranks behind a common vision for South Africa's
future. If not, the party risks eroding loyalty and
increasing apathy among the rank-and-file, particularly
first-time voters who will have no personal memories of
struggle days. Rival camps' abuse of the state apparatus, as
in the intelligence scandal, to fight their battles is
worrisome as well.


12. (C) Comment continued: How the battle for the ANC will
turn out is anyone's guess, but Thabo Mbeki will largely
define it. As Matshiqi and several others have noted, Mbeki
is committed to a successor who will carry on his modernizing
vision for both South Africa and the rest of the continent.
His manipulation of the party and some of his political
decisions (such as his imposition of female candidates during
the March 2006 local elections despite local opposition) may
impede his ability to influence the debate. While he has
clearly negated any suggestion of amending the constitution
to permit him a third term as President, Mbeki's refusal to
rule himself out as a candidate for the party presidency also
is mobilizing his opponents. Nevertheless, Mbeki's proven
skill at manipulating party structures should not be
underestimated.

TEITELBAUM