Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRAGUE95
2006-01-27 17:21:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Prague
Cable title:  

VERA-E SYSTEM: CZECH MOD HARDLINERS WANT TO TALK

Tags:  ETTC EZ KSTC PARM PREL PTER 
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VZCZCXRO4662
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHPG #0095/01 0271721
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 271721Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6886
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY 0066
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1675
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0083
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000095 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, PM/RSAT FOR FORTIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016
TAGS: ETTC EZ KSTC PARM PREL PTER
SUBJECT: VERA-E SYSTEM: CZECH MOD HARDLINERS WANT TO TALK

REF: 2005 STATE 174893

Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons 1.5 (b) & (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000095

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, PM/RSAT FOR FORTIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016
TAGS: ETTC EZ KSTC PARM PREL PTER
SUBJECT: VERA-E SYSTEM: CZECH MOD HARDLINERS WANT TO TALK

REF: 2005 STATE 174893

Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons 1.5 (b) & (d)


1. (U) This is an action request, please see paragraphs 13
and 14.


2. (S/NF) Summary. In a significant change from previous
practice, the Armaments Division of the Czech Ministry of
Defense has broken its silence towards the U.S. on its views
about sales of the VERA-E passive surveillance detection
system. Through contacts, we knew the Armaments Division has
consistently supported increased exports of Czech passive
surveillance technology. That office had been the only key
player unwilling to discuss VERA-E with U.S. officials. The
Armaments Division has now approached us with specific
questions about the consistency of U.S. concerns over Czech
arms sales to countries that have already purchased U.S.
arms. In support of their position the Czechs are now citing
China's efforts to develop its own passive surveillance
technology. Seeking to end U.S. objections to VERA sales, the
Armaments Division has also proposed a more positive step:
greater U.S.- Czech technical collaboration in the field of
passive surveillance. Embassy Prague seeks guidance on the
proposal in para 13 and the appropriate response to the
questions contained in para 14. End summary.


3. (U) DATT, ODC Deputy, and PolOff met January 27 with:
Josef Taborsky, Senior Program Manager, MOD Armaments
Division; and Richard Macha, Lt Col Lubor Koudleka, and Josef
Stastny, of the MOD's International Relations Branch.


--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
ARE YOU AMERICANS CONSISTENT?
SHOW US HOW YOU HANDLE YOUR OWN ARMS SALES
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---


4. (S/NF) Leading the meeting for the Czech side,
International Relations Branch Director Macha said that the
Armaments Division (and the MOD generally) would like general
information about the licensing scheme for U.S. military

technology exports. He also said the MOD would like to
consult with the United States on concrete examples of such
transfers. Accordingly the MOD asked for the text of a
real-world agreement covering a U.S. technology export that
would prevent the misuse of sensitive U.S. technologies by
third parties. As a suggested case, the Czechs gave the
example of Pakistan's acquisition of the P-3 Orion, equipped
with the AN/ALR66C electronic support measures system and the
EP2060 pulse analyzer. The MOD would like to examine
provisions within the agreement that prevent proliferation of
the technology to China.


5. (S/NF) DATT acknowledged the already-close cooperation
between the U.S. and the Czech Republic on selecting
appropriate destinations for VERA, noting the United States
placed great value on the Czechs' willingness to consult with
us on our strategic interests before making a decision on a
sale. In response to Macha's first question, DATT and PolOff
outlined the work of the State Department's Directorate of
Defense Trade Controls, and the consultative role of the
interagency community. Emboffs did not address the idea of
providing a sample of an agreement covering a U.S.
military-technology transfer.


--- --- --- ---
LETS COLLABORATE
--- --- --- ---


6. (S/NF) Macha said the MOD would be interested in working
closely with U.S. technical experts to establish the
parameters for a downgraded version of the VERA-E system, one
which would be appropriate for export to non-NATO countries:
"Our main goal is to ask our more knowledgeable partner how
to do it." The MOD would also like to invite a technical team
to the Czech Republic to jointly address the adequacy of
nonproliferation countermeasures in their passive
surveillance systems. Macha said such a team could choose to

PRAGUE 00000095 002 OF 003


demonstrate U.S. concerns about proliferation to third
countries by breaking/overcoming the countermeasures
currently present in the ASDD-01 system. In addition to
technical meetings, the MOD would welcome agreement of a way
forward at upcoming U.S. Czech Pol-Mil talks, notionally
scheduled for the spring (Note: dates for these talks have
not yet been finalized. End note.).


7. (S/NF) Taborsky spoke at length about the loss of Czech
sales due to the Czechs voluntary desire to protect U.S.
strategic interests. He said Ukraine had been quick to sell
the Kolchuga system to countries that had sought the Czech
ASDD-01 and been denied. Macha further mentioned that China
was now developing its own passive surveillance detection
system and wondered to us whether it would be better to allow
China to arm itself with the VERA-E, a known system, rather
than with a system with unknown operating characteristics and
capabilities. DATT responded that the United States was
interested in the Czechs maintaining their hi-tech defense
industry, and the USG realized that the brains behind this
cutting edge technology would best be kept gainfully employed
at ERA, where they would be less vulnerable to financial
offers from potentially-hostile countries seeking to buy
their knowledge.


8. (S/NF) Taborsky presented a Czech idea for collaboration
between the United States and the Czech Republic on
developing future technology in this field. He suggested the
creation of a joint U.S. DOD - Czech MOD research and
development project, with funding from both governments. When
the DATT and ODC Deputy clarified that the private sector
takes the lead in developing military technology for the
United States, the Czechs responded that they would also
welcome a joint venture involving a U.S. firm.


9. (S/NF) DATT noted the United States would soon provide the
MOD with a letter outlining the test results for the
U.S-owned VERA-E system. Such information would assist the
Czechs in their marketing efforts to countries that were the
most appropriate destinations (understood by both sides to be
NATO allies and other aligned countries such as Australia).
While welcoming the idea of a letter as a positive step,
Taborsky said there had been little interest in the VERA-E
among NATO allies and it would be good to see the United
States' high regard for the VERA-E system demonstrated by
further U.S. orders.

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
WHO ARE THE POTENTIAL BUYERS THESE DAYS?
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

10 (S/NF) PolOff asked Macha which countries were currently
considered potential customers for either the ASDD-01 or
VERA-E systems. Macha responded that only one country,
Pakistan, was considered a current case. (Note: ERA (the
manufacturer) had applied to the MOD for a preliminary
opinion on a sale of one downgraded system to Pakistan. ERA
had previously been granted permission for a 6-month lease to
Pakistan, but that license had been abandoned because
Pakistan had chosen to buy the system instead and would need
a new license (ref A)). Macha said the MOD would advise ERA
that it would not render an opinion on the case until after
further discussion with the U.S. in the Spring. PolOff asked
about rumors that India and Malaysia were interested in new
purchases. Macha indicated it would also be helpful to learn
U.S. opinion about a transfer to Malaysia (Note: We do
not/not consider this a formal request. See para 15). Macha
also said there had been interest from Greece and Australia.

11. (S/NF) (Comment:) We are at a point of danger and
opportunity. The MOD's Armaments Division, which has been
deeply cynical about U.S. motives for blocking VERA exports,
has decided to try to move beyond a status quo that does not
allow for widespread sales. From their perspective, any
change is good. If we cannot show them that the United States
has deployed effective methods to prevent proliferation of
our own technology, then the Armaments Division will argue
within the GOCR that U.S. decision-making is driven more by
economic concerns than strategic ones. Under such
circumstances they would argue that the Czechs should be no
more accommodating to U.S. strategic concerns than the U.S.

PRAGUE 00000095 003 OF 003


is itself. That line of reasoning could win converts within
the GOCR, even though it willfully makes incorrect
assumptions about the equivalency of U.S. and Czech military
systems in the field of passive surveillance.


12. (S/NF) (Comment continued) In terms of the proposed
collaboration. VERA's supporters in the Czech Republic feel
the U.S. could have no objection to the sale of a system with
characteristics that were defined by a joint U.S.-Czech team.
They do acknowledge the difficulty of downgrading a system to
the extent that it eliminates U.S. strategic concerns without
leaving the resulting platform so ineffective that there is
no market interest. Any future U.S. collaboration with the
Czechs in developing next-generation technology would do much
to relieve the political pressure within the GOCR to
authorize sales to countries that are of concern to the
United States.


13. (S/NF) (Action request) Robust engagement with the Czechs
on these topics will be crucial to preserving their political
willingness to pre-clear VERA and ASDD-01 sales with the
United States. This summer will likely see the arrival of new
defense and foreign ministers and the departure for a new
assignment of the head of the MFA's licensing department, who
has been very supportive of U.S. positions. New incumbents in
these positions, and in the GOCR generally, may need to be
convinced that the Czech defense industry's jewel in the
crown should continue to forgo tens of millions of dollars of
business because of U.S. strategic interests. Post recommends
acceptance of the Czech offer for collaboration of technical
experts on counterproliferation measures mentioned in para 6.
The U.S. has already confirmed it would "welcome further
dialogue and cooperation with the Czech Republic on the
specific capabilities and the licensing conditions or
provisos of the ASDD-01 to be sold to Pakistan, as well as
any other safeguard measures employed to protect the
technology." (ref A)

14 (S/NF) (Action request continued) Post further requests:
A) The Department provide a response to the Czech's question
surrounding the P-3 Orion transfer to Pakistan mentioned in
para 4. B) A statement of the U.S. position regarding the
Czech's suggestion for collaboration on joint development of
next-generation military technologies (para 8). (End action
request)


15. (S/NF) (Comment continued) While the MOD is interested in
learning U.S. opinion about a possible sale to Malaysia, we
do not believe that our answer to this theoretical case would
do more than arm our critics with more examples of U.S.
opposition to a sale. The MOD is not the guardian of the
consultative mechanism worked out between the GOCR and the
United States. That function rests with the MFA, and Post
will seek confirmation that the GOCR would like a formal
opinion on a Malaysia sale. If such a request is made, the
way in which we deliver our (likely negative) response must
form part of our engagement on the issues raised above. Post
recommends the Department solicit interagency opinion on a
Malaysia case only when the Czech MFA formally requests such
an opinion and only as part of an integrated response that
will keep the consultative process alive. (End comment)
DODMAN