Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRAGUE861
2006-07-28 13:09:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Prague
Cable title:
CZECHS CONFIR THEY LICENSED SALE OF FIVE PASSIVE
VZCZCXYZ0031 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHPG #0861 2091309 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 281309Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7703 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T PRAGUE 000861
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EUR/NCE FR FICHTE, PM/RSAT FOR DOWLEY, OSD/ISP FOR SADOWSKA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2016
TAGS: ETTC EZ STC PARM PGOV PK PREL
SUBJECT: CZECHS CONFIR THEY LICENSED SALE OF FIVE PASSIVE
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS TO PAKISTAN
REF: A. PRAGUE 663
B.IIR 6 824 2004 06
C. 05 STATE 174893
Clasified By: Acting Political-Economic Counselor
Kren Choe Reider for reasons 1.4 (b) + (d).
S E C R E T PRAGUE 000861
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EUR/NCE FR FICHTE, PM/RSAT FOR DOWLEY, OSD/ISP FOR SADOWSKA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2016
TAGS: ETTC EZ STC PARM PGOV PK PREL
SUBJECT: CZECHS CONFIR THEY LICENSED SALE OF FIVE PASSIVE
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS TO PAKISTAN
REF: A. PRAGUE 663
B.IIR 6 824 2004 06
C. 05 STATE 174893
Clasified By: Acting Political-Economic Counselor
Kren Choe Reider for reasons 1.4 (b) + (d).
1. (/NF) Poloff and DATT on July 28 met with MFA CFSP
Director Vaclav Balek to discuss the Czech Republi's sale of
five ASDD-01 passive surveillance detction systems to
Pakistan (Ref A). There had bee rumors that the license for
the sale had been refused at the insistence of the Czech
Ministry of Defense (Ref B). Balek shared that the MOD
Defense Policy Division had been opposed, but had lost out to
other parts of the MOD in favor of the deal. Balek did not
know who at the MOD had supported the deal, commenting that
even the Director of the Defense Policy Division had not
known he had lost out several days after the July 17 issuance
of the license. Balek confirmed that he had personally seen
the license, and that it contained a range of restrictive
requirements designed to prevent proliferation of this
technology (Ref A). Balek believed the manufacturer (ERA)
could be hard pressed to deliver all five systems within the
one-year validity of the license.
2. (S/NF) Comment: The GOCR's position on the Pakistan
ASDD-01 deal remains unchanged. They believe that by imposing
restrictive conditions (Ref A) on the transfer they are
following the U.S. line that while "the United States itself
would not permit the export of this sophisticated technology
... we ask that you refrain from making these transfers until
effective measures have been put in place to mitigate against
unauthorized diversions." (Ref C). End comment.
MUNTER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EUR/NCE FR FICHTE, PM/RSAT FOR DOWLEY, OSD/ISP FOR SADOWSKA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2016
TAGS: ETTC EZ STC PARM PGOV PK PREL
SUBJECT: CZECHS CONFIR THEY LICENSED SALE OF FIVE PASSIVE
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS TO PAKISTAN
REF: A. PRAGUE 663
B.IIR 6 824 2004 06
C. 05 STATE 174893
Clasified By: Acting Political-Economic Counselor
Kren Choe Reider for reasons 1.4 (b) + (d).
1. (/NF) Poloff and DATT on July 28 met with MFA CFSP
Director Vaclav Balek to discuss the Czech Republi's sale of
five ASDD-01 passive surveillance detction systems to
Pakistan (Ref A). There had bee rumors that the license for
the sale had been refused at the insistence of the Czech
Ministry of Defense (Ref B). Balek shared that the MOD
Defense Policy Division had been opposed, but had lost out to
other parts of the MOD in favor of the deal. Balek did not
know who at the MOD had supported the deal, commenting that
even the Director of the Defense Policy Division had not
known he had lost out several days after the July 17 issuance
of the license. Balek confirmed that he had personally seen
the license, and that it contained a range of restrictive
requirements designed to prevent proliferation of this
technology (Ref A). Balek believed the manufacturer (ERA)
could be hard pressed to deliver all five systems within the
one-year validity of the license.
2. (S/NF) Comment: The GOCR's position on the Pakistan
ASDD-01 deal remains unchanged. They believe that by imposing
restrictive conditions (Ref A) on the transfer they are
following the U.S. line that while "the United States itself
would not permit the export of this sophisticated technology
... we ask that you refrain from making these transfers until
effective measures have been put in place to mitigate against
unauthorized diversions." (Ref C). End comment.
MUNTER