CZECHS: WE ARE LIKELY TO OFFER A BASE, WITH NO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000803

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE, PM/RSAT FOR DOWLEY, OSD/ISP FOR
SADOWSKA, OSD/FP FOR MINATELLI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2016
TAGS: MARR PREL EZ
SUBJECT: CZECHS: WE ARE LIKELY TO OFFER A BASE, WITH NO
STRINGS ATTACHED

REF: A. PRAGUE 771


B. PRAGUE 757

Classified By: Ambassador William Cabaniss
for reasons 1.4 (b) + (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary and comment: Czech Deputy FM Pojar and his
Political Director briefed the Ambassador July 13 on their
strategy to manage political and public opinion regarding the
possible basing of a U.S. missile defense (MD) site in the
Czech Republic. They stressed that the GOCR would not/not
make any kind of quid-pro-quo requests for hosting an MD
site. Based on his consultations with key politicians from
all major parties during the ongoing negotiations on the
formation of a new government, Pojar said that all the likely
security policy leaders favored continued discussions with
the USG. Pojar said he was confident that the Czech Republic,
if selected to host a base, could secure the necessary
Parliamentary approval. Pojar is engaging in a sophisticated
public relations campaign, leveraging supporters of MD from
across Czech society. Pojar also asked the Embassy to engage
with certain Czech politicians to dispel some of the myths
surrounding MD and to highlight the benefits to both the
Czech Republic and to Europe that such cooperation would
entail. Surveys of the Czech candidate sites for a base begin
July 18. Pojar thinks that if the Czechs are found to have a
desirable site, high-level discussions between the U.S. and
the Czech Republic should follow immediately upon formation
of a new government, something he thinks is possible within
the next month. We believe that this timetable for
discussions with the U.S. is flexible. Despite the lack of a
formed government, the pro-MD leadership currently running
the ministries will likely be receptive to earlier political
meetings if the U.S. schedule requires it. End summary and
comment.


2. (S/NF) The Ambassador met July 13 with Czech Deputy FM
Thomas Pojar and MFA Political Director Martin Povejsil at
their invitation to discuss the next political steps on the
Czech Republic,s candidacy to host a U.S. missile defense
site. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for the
Czechs, willingness to compete to host an MD site and
offered to work together to achieve the best possible result.
In response to Czech questions about the timeline for MD
decision-making in the U.S., poloff explained that a decision
on candidate MD sites would most likely be taken in late
August or early September. At that time, in addition to
considering the technical merits of each site, the USG would
have to assess the political viability of basing a site in
the Czech Republic. While a full vote of Parliament
delivering final legal authority would not/not be necessary
by that time, the predicted political viability of the Czech
candidacy would be a significant factor.

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The Political Strategy:
Reach out to both friends and skeptics
--------------


3. (S/NF) Pojar believed that while challenges remain, an
eventual political &yes8 to MD in the Czech Republic was a
strong likelihood. Faced with uncertainty as to who would be
decision makers on MD in the future government (ref A),Pojar
had canvassed the likely future leaders. They all support
further work with the USG on possible basing of a MD site in
the Czech Republic. Recent debate on the issue in the media
had revealed significant levels of support for the project
within the Czech political leadership and with
opinion-makers. However, ensuring a positive answer in the
Parliament would require further engagement with politicians
who are currently skeptical about MD. The Ambassador agreed
that the Embassy would engage with key parliamentarians to
answer their concerns.


4. (S/NF) Pojar stressed that the GOCR would not/not make
requests of the United States in any kind of quid-pro-quo
exchange for hosting an MD site. However, he did warn that,
during public and parliamentary debate on the issue, some
players would continue to publicly call for such linkages as
including the Czech Republic in the Visa Waiver Program.
While the United States should not view such calls as
indicative of the GOCR position, Pojar believes addressing
such non-related issues could only benefit management of the
public debate on MD.

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PRAGUE 00000803 002 OF 003


Framing MD for Czech/European Audience
--------------


5. (S/NF) Pojar said the political process would require a
discussion on the nature of the relationship between the
United States and its Czech ally. He advised that framing MD
from the following perspective would be especially helpful in
managing the political dynamic and public debate:


6. (S/NF) One, MD is a transatlantic issue. A political
focus on MD as an isolated issue, without references to
overall context, would cause problems. Better results would
come from an American and Czech approach that portrayed MD in
the wider context of the Euro-Atlantic relationship, and the
place of the Czech Republic in the international security
community. Pojar believed that careful handling of the issue
would help all concerned remember the benefits for the Czech
Republic and for Europe as a whole.


7. (S/NF) Two, MD has direct economic benefits to the Czech
Republic. Pojar stressed that the Social Democrats (the
second largest party),which currently does not have a
defined position on MD, would be especially receptive to the
economic arguments of MD. (Note: CSSD are not necessarily
opposed to MD. It was a CSSD-led coalition government that
originally expressed Czech interest in hosting a U.S. missile
defense base. End note) Specifically, information such as
employment gains, size of accompanying investment in the
Czech Republic, and local procurement prospects, would
resonate with the public and with parliamentarians caught up
in the populist side of MD benefits.


8. (S/NF) Three, MD would not weaken NATO. Povejsil pointed
out that most Czech supporters of the MD concept believed
strongly in transatlantic security cooperation. He said this
core group of supporters is susceptible to allegations that a
U.S. MD system would be part of an overall reduction in the
United States, commitment to NATO. He said that
clarification on the U.S.
system,s potential synergies with a NATO system would be
very helpful. Some Czechs, he said, feared that the U.S.
might reduce its overall enthusiasm for NATO in the long
term. Supporters of MD would welcome statements that
countered that impression.


9. (S/NF) Four, MD is not aimed at Russia. Turning to the
issue of the Czech President Vaclav Klaus, Pojar shared that
he did not expect significant opposition, but the matter
would have to be handled carefully. Klaus was particularly
sensitive on matters of national sovereignty, and on
inflaming Russia. However, Klaus was also deeply committed to
the transatlantic security relationship, particularly as a
balance to Brussels. Povejsil thought Klaus, concerns about
Russia might be met if given better information on the purely
defensive nature of the proposed MD site. (Note: Pojar
believed that Klaus, who cherishes the prestige of official
travel, would be very susceptible to suggestions from U.S.
leaders during his regular visits to the United States.)


10. (S/NF) Pojar also believed expressions of positive
international opinion could have significant influence in the
Czech Republic. Neighboring countries attitudes to the
project were unknown to the Czech populace. If such attitudes
were positive, that could reassure some skeptics that
important bilateral relationships would not be negatively
influenced by the presence of a base. Such opinion could also
be useful in countering the inevitable Russian complaints and
propaganda.

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The Public Diplomacy Strategy:
Answer the critics
--------------


11. (S/NF) Pojar claimed that problematic issues in the
recent media debate on MD reflected a public diplomacy
challenge, rather than any real policy differences between
the U.S. and the Czech Republic. Pojar shared that the Czech
experience in successfully handling public opinion on the eve
of the Iraq war was also proving useful for missile defense.
He and Povejsil had put considerable time into developing and
managing a strategy to influence the public debate. They had
ensured the few outrageous statements on MD in the press were
met with carefully crafted opinion pieces arguing in favor of
the project. Pojar and Povejsil shared that they will host a
July 14 meeting with the leaders of think tanks and NGOs,

PRAGUE 00000803 003 OF 003


which support MD for the Czech Republic. The meeting will
examine where the difficult issues might lie, and coordinate
how non-government opinion-makers will write positively on MD
(Note: Pojar won his appointment to become Deputy FM as a
result of his long successful experience in working in this
pro-U.S. NGO community. End note). Pojar also shared that,
during the course of his other duties, he had already
conferred with Romanian officials on their management of
domestic political opinion when offering the U.S. military
basing rights in the country.

-------------- --------------
When is the time for high-level political negotiations?
-------------- --------------


12. (S/NF) Povejsil explained that the best time for
high-level political engagement by U.S. officials would be in
the first days of a new Czech government. Pojar agreed that a
high-level U.S. visit to Prague in advance of the formation
of a new government could be less than ideal if the Czech
side of the table might have to leave their jobs within days
or weeks. Both Povejsil and Pojar said that, should
high-level political negotiations become necessary in advance
of the formation of a government, they were ready to fly to
Washington themselves at short notice (Note: Pojar shared
that under most scenarios he would remain in his job at the
Foreign Ministry and would be a likely point of continuity on
the MD issue. End note).

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Comment
--------------


13. (S/NF) Pojar, Povejsil and their pro-MD allies have done
major work in crafting a strategy to get the Czech Republic
to "yes," even when faced with the additional hurdle of
dealing with the uncertainty of ongoing negotiations on the
shape of the next government. There are signs that that
their public affairs strategy is working better than
originally expected, and public nature of the debate on MD
has morphed in to one of the strengths of the Czech hope to
host a U.S. base.


14. (S/NF) Success is by no means guaranteed. Pragmatism
continues to rule. While it appears that a majority of Czech
politicians, if voting their conscience, could support a U.S.
base in the Czech Republic, none of them would give up their
chance of forming a government in a principled stand either
for or against a base. However, the ongoing negotiations on a
government are slowly inching towards some kind of
accommodation between the two largest parties. That scenario
would eliminate the influence of smaller parties such as
KDU-CSL which harbors some strong MD skeptics, and the
Communists and Greens, who oppose. Post intends to discuss
the missile defense program with several prominent Czech
parliamentarians in the coming days.


15. (S/NF) Pojar suggested that the time for to implement a
more aggressive political action plan on missile defense
would come immediately following a decision by the U.S. that
a Czech site looked like the best candidate in the region.
Technical site surveys begin July 18. Their findings may lead
to a flurry of enthusiastic organized political activity in
Prague.
CABANISS