PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE CZECH POLICY TOWARD IRAN, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000755

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016
TAGS: PREL ETTC MNUC PGOV EUN EZ IR
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE CZECH POLICY TOWARD IRAN, AND
CZECH OBSERVATIONS ON EU AND IRAN

REF: A. PRAGUE 745

B. PRAGUE 746

Classified By: ADCM Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary and comment: This is the final of three
cables on Czech-Iranian relations. The Czech Government is
likely to remain solidly aligned with the USG on Iran. Czech
mainstream parties whose platforms are supportive of USG
positions vis-a-vis the Iranian nuclear issue will occupy 174
of the 200 seats in the new Chamber of Deputies. Only the
unreformed Communist Party and certain leftist factions of
the Social Democratic Party remain either ambivalent or
hostile to our objectives in Iran. The GOCR, already locked
in a serious dispute with Iran over the hosting of Radio
Farda, is unlikely to modify its policies to enable
assistance to Iran's nuclear program outside of a USG and EU3
approved-framework. End summary and comment.

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Czech Internal Political Dynamics and Future Iran Policy
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2. (C) Despite the uncertainly following the Czech Republic's
June election stalemate, the Czechs' relatively strong
policies vis-a-vis Iran are unlikely to change in the near
future. There is near unanimity among most major parties on
the issue, with the exception of the Communist Party and a
left-wing bloc of Social Democrats (CSSD) led by former
Foreign Minister Jan Kavan and Vladimir Lastuvka -- neither
of whom won seats in the June elections. Potential
center-right coalition partners such Civic Democrats,
Christian Democrats and most of the Green Party are generally
Atlanticist in orientation, mistrustful of Iran,s
intentions, and committed to preventing Iran's acquisition of
nuclear materials. The more moderate factions of the CSSD,
who have been ascendant since the CSSD came to power in 1998,
are equally uncomfortable with Iran's nuclear ambitions.
Successive CSSD governments under PMs Zeman, Spidla, Gross,
and Paroubek have pursued Iran policies broadly congruent
with USG goals in the region, despite the pressure of Iran's
de facto trade embargo against the Czech Republic in
retaliation for Radio Farda broadcasts (Ref A).


3. (C) Although the Czech Republic's unreformed Communist
Party (KSCM) has often been at the center of provocative
events such as the visit of an Iranian parliamentary
delegation to Prague in late 2005, the KSCM may actually be
less skeptical of U.S. policy than certain small factions
within CSSD. KSCM may take advantage of official
invitations, visits, and similar provocations as a gesture to
their anti-U.S., anti-NATO, and (to a lesser extent) anti-EU
constituents, but they have no significant ideological or
political attraction to the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Rhetorical support for Iran serves as an essentially
cost-free method of differentiating themselves from other
parties and, more recently, appealing to latent anti-American
sentiment. It is also unlikely that this still-stigmatized
party will hold sufficient influence in a new coalition to
directly influence policy on critical issues such as Iran.


4. (C) Furthermore, even in the unlikely event that KSCM
gained some authority in a future government, it is uncertain
that they would pursue a major shift in Czech policy.
Flirting with Iran carries some political benefits for the
Communists at the moment with no corresponding cost; this
could change if the KSCM had a more substantive policy role.
(Note: Although reflective of different times and political
circumstances, it is also worth noting that Communist
Czechoslovakia, freed by ideology from the tension of
competing political and commercial objectives, had a
commendable nonproliferation record. End note)


5. (C) The Lastuvka/Kavan wing of the CSSD on the other hand,
presents a somewhat different picture. Fortunately this
leftist faction of the CSSD remains a minority within the
party. Although neither Lastuvka nor Kavan sit in the new
parliament (and with 53 freshmen CSSD MPs in the new chamber,
it is still difficult to determine how "factions" will
ultimately sort themselves out),their thinking may still
retain influence in the party. According to Israeli DCM Walid
el-Haya, when confronted with concerns about Iran,s weapons
program, Lastuvka bluntly told el-Haya that he considers an
Iranian nuclear weapon to be "an accomplished fact," and
implied that the Czechs should simply protect their own
interests in such circumstances. Furthermore, former
Parliamentarian and FM Jan Kavan has gone consistently on
record expressing his support for Czech participation in all
aspects of the Iranian energy sector, including its nuclear

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program. MEP Jana Hybaskova, who served as Ambassador to
Kuwait while Kavan was FM, told Poloff that Kavan has for
years been attracted by the possibility of lucrative
contracts for Czech firms involved in such services.
(Hybaskova has also been critical of outgoing PM Paroubek for
allegedly being more concerned about potential exports of
Czech trolley cars than non-proliferation threats, although
admits that this has not had any impact on actual Czech
policies towards Iran.)

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Czechs Paint a Discouraging Picture of the EU and Iran
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6. (C) Several Czech diplomats and observers present a
somewhat pessimistic image of a dissolute EU that is unable
(and to some extent unwilling) to effectively face the
Iranian nuclear issue. MFA Security Policy Director Petr
Kaiser told Poloff that the vanguard position of the EU3
countries has allowed other EU members to effectively
disengage from this difficult and contentious issue. He said
the structure of various EU meetings and conferences on the
issue had simply consisted of the EU3 countries briefing
other states. According to Kaiser, with the EU demanding, at
most, a passive acquiescence to the EU3 policy direction,
many states have been willing to adopt more detached and
circumspect attitudes toward Iran and rely the U.S. and its
EU3 partners to move the issue forward, with all of the
potential difficulties that such progress will entail. Kaiser
stated that, along with the Czechs, he considered Holland,
Poland, and Slovakia the most assertive and the most
constructive non-EU3 partners on the issue.


7. (C) Conservative MEP Jana Hybaskova essentially mirrored
Kaiser's bleak picture of the EU in a separate discussion.
According to Hybaskova, many EP members are woefully
uninformed on the issue and unduly influenced and buffeted by
currents of opinion, some either inaccurate or irrelevant to
the debate. Several of Hybaskova's colleagues, for example,
emerged from meeting with the Iranian Ambassador in Brussels
parroting the ambassador's line that "Iran only has
low-enriched uranium for power plants, not highly enriched
uranium needed for weapons"; they were evidently either
unaware or unconcerned that the enrichment process is the
same for both types. She also indicated that a significant
number of her colleagues maintained ties and conducted events
with representatives of PMOI/Mek (People's Movement of
Iran/Mujahedin e Khalq) from Paris. Domestic politics within
member states also exert a heavy influence on EP views of
Iran. Although many MEPs have been galvanized by
Ahmadenejad's fiery recent rhetoric (Hybaskova was gathering
MEP signatures on a petition to at least symbolically declare
the Iranian President persona non grata in advance of the
World Cup in Germany),both Hybaskova and Kaiser stated that
the Iran crisis would "demand U.S. leadership."

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Some General Czech Views of Iran
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8. (C) During the course of our discussions with Czech
officials working on Iran, several took the opportunity to
pass on reports and impressions from their staff in Tehran,
and also other general MFA impressions of Iran. Although the
Czech Republic is a small country, their long-term commercial
and diplomatic presence in Iran, their prowess in civil and
nuclear engineering, and their status as a proactive and
aggressive USG partner on security issues help frame their
views. On Iran, as with other security matters, the Czechs
fight well above their weight class.


9. (C) THE INDIA EXAMPLE. Ludvik Mrazek from the MFA
Department of Middle Eastern and African Affairs expressed a
sentiment, based upon his close work the Iranians in the
past, that Iran had drawn some counterproductive conclusions
from the example of India. In Iran,s view, India,s defiant
nuclear tests of 1998, far from carrying any substantial
penalties, have helped India emerge into the top tier of
regional and even global leaders. Iran views India's
emergence as a fully declared nuclear power as critical to
Indian economic and diplomatic achievements in recent years.
While supportive of recent USG initiatives involving the
Indian nuclear program, GOCR officials have also privately
expressed concern about the initiative's effect on the global
nonproliferation regime. They see in Iran a strong
illustration of their apprehensions.


10. (C) IRAN,S PUBLIC AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. According to
Petr Kaiser, the Czech Charge, in Tehran presents an image

PRAGUE 00000755 003 OF 003


to the GOCR of an Iranian public strongly supportive of their
country's nuclear ambitions. The Iranians see themselves as a
historically important power with a destiny to assume a
leadership position in the region; nuclear power - and even
nuclear weapons - are inseparable from that status.
Discouragingly, the Czech mission related that even
relatively liberal and reformist elements of Iranian society
share the conviction that Iran has an unquestioned right to a
full nuclear program. While some Iranians may see the drive
to enhance their nuclear capabilities unwise, provocative, or
a poor use of resources, virtually none see the effort itself
as illegitimate. In the Czech view, looking for political
space with which to divide different elements of the Iranian
body politic on the nuclear issue will be a challenging task.


11. (C) INTERNAL STRUGGLES AND THE STABILITY OF THE IRANIAN
REGIME. Czech diplomats, including both Mrazek and the Czech
Charge' in Tehran, while mindful of the support the
government has on the nuclear issue, are not as certain of
the overall stability of the Ahmadenejad regime. The Czech
Mission in Teheran sees Ahmadenejad producing a significant
change in the upper echelons of the government and directly
challenging the established interests of the clerical
establishment. In this view, Ahmadenejad is surrounding
himself with his former colleagues from within Revolutionary
Guards Corps, the intelligence and security services, and the
military. Their background and expertise lie within the
national security apparatus, and their formative experiences
were the brutal internal and external struggles surrounding
the Iran-Iraq War. The Czechs see in Teheran signs of veiled
clashes between the conservative clerics who have ruled Iran
since the Revolution and Ahmadenejad's "New Guard" of former
security officials. They consider the likely result to be
more such hidden power struggles and, along with them,
significantly reduced flexibility in negotiations involving
nuclear issues.
CABANISS