RADIO FARDA DISPUTE AT CENTER STAGE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000754

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE, PM/RSAT FOR DOWLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016
TAGS: PREL ETRD ETTC ENRG PGOV PINR CVIS EZ IR
SUBJECT: RADIO FARDA DISPUTE AT CENTER STAGE IN
CZECH-IRANIAN RELATIONS


Classified By: ADCM Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) INTRODUCTION and SUMMARY: This is the first of
three cables on Czech-Iranian relations. This message looks
at several aspects of current ties, notably the impact of
Prague-based broadcasting to Iran. The other two cables will
focus more directly on non-proliferation. Czech-Iranian
relations have not been particularly close since 1989, but
they chilled noticeably with the 1998 launch of
Farsi-language Radio Farda. The Radio Farda controversy
prompted a de facto trade embargo. Despite this, the GOCR
strongly supports Radio Farda, as well as USG and IAEA
efforts to prevent acquisition of a nuclear weapon; despite
the uncertainty surrounding the recent election deadlock,
these policies are unlikely to change in the foreseeable
future. END SUMMARY.

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Radio Farda Draws Iran's Ire...and a Boycott
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2. (C) Radio Farda, RFE/RL's Prague-based, pop-heavy
Farsi-language broadcasts directed toward Iran, is the most
significant bilateral challenge between the Czech Republic
and Iran. It seriously impacts all aspects of their
relationship, including the nuclear issue. The Farda
broadcasts began in 1998, and were an irritant in Czech-Iran
relations from the outset. This discord, however, became far
more pronounced in 2003, when format changes and increased
airtime for Radio Farda precipitated a significant downturn
in Czech-Iranian relations. Former MFA Iran Desk officer
Jaroslav Mrazek described the Iranian reaction as one that
turned "correct, if not friendly, relations" into a
relationship that is "low-key, low-level, and cold".


3. (C) The 2003 intensification of Radio Farda's broadcast
schedule quickly triggered a political and economic backlash
from Iran. Aside from strong condemnation of the Czech
Republic in diplomatic and political channels, Radio Farda
prompted an unannounced and selective Iranian economic
boycott of Czech goods and services. According to numerous
government and media sources, bilateral Czech trade with Iran
dropped over 40% in 2004 from 2003. Although reliable 2005
statistics are not yet available, there was no significant
recovery last year. According to the Czech MFA, Iranian
officials, while publicly denying the existence of a boycott,
have admitted to Czech diplomats that such a policy is in
effect and that it will remain in place as long as Radio
Farda continues its broadcasts.


4. (C) The de facto Iranian boycott is, however, not an
ironclad one. Much of the Czech Republic's pre-2003 trade
with Iran took the form of relatively large-scale contracts
rather then consumer goods, with much of this trade required
approval from the MFA and a bewildering array of other
Iranian government agencies. According to Mrazek, today these
contracts are often either disapproved or simply never clear
the licensing process. Programs that the Iranian Government
views as promoting their strategic interests or as otherwise
advantageous, however, are licensed without problem. The
Czech MFA also expressed little doubt that corruption plays
no small role in the completion of the licensing process.

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Relations in Context: Bushehr and Czech-Iranian Trade
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5. (SBU) The Czechs and Iranians have long-standing
cultural and trade ties that date back to before the Second
World War. Interestingly, ideological differences did little
to prevent trade and student exchanges between Communist
Czechoslovakia and Imperial Iran, and even at the height of
the Cold War there were significant numbers of Czech
engineers living and working on various projects in Iran, as
well as many Iranian students studying at Czech Universities.
According to noted Arabist and current MEP Jana Hybaskova,
this relationship deteriorated soon after the Velvet
Revolution. The new democratic Czechoslovak government
dramatically revised previously-contracted construction
projects for an Iranian (non-nuclear) power plant whose
previous terms (agreed to for political reasons by the
Communist Government) were not economically viable. The
Czechs completed only about half of the facilities for which
they had contracted and the fallout of the project
considerably strained commercial relations, which continued
to deteriorate during the 1990s.


PRAGUE 00000754 002 OF 003



6. (C) Even as the market for large-scale engineering
sputtered and concern over Iran's nuclear program grew, some
Czech political figures, particularly former Social Democrat
Foreign Minster Jan Kavan, remained attracted to the "holy
grail" of engineering partnerships and participation in the
Iranian energy sector. In 2000, the GOCR implemented (under
USG pressure) a restrictive law that proscribed any form of
Czech participation in Iran,s Bushehr nuclear plant, a
measure that, according to the Deputy Director of the MFA's
UN Department Pavel Klucky (whose office oversees UN
sanctions and IAEA-related issues),earned the Czechs
considerable ire among fellow NSG members. According to
Klucky, this law applies exclusively to the Bushehr plant;
assistance to all other Iranian nuclear facilities is subject
to compliance with EU Regulation 1334 covering dual-use
technologies. Any potential contracts are further examined
against relevant export control regimes (including ours;
septel).


7. (SBU) The desire to move past the problematic recent trade
history between the Czechs and the Iranians has, on at least
one occasion, prompted ill-advised remarks from Czech
leaders. In December 2005, Iranian state press outlets stated
that Minister of Trade and Industry Milan Urban suggested
during trade talks that the Czech Republic could be prepared
to assist the Iranian nuclear program, but other GOCR
elements moved quickly to dismiss the idea. Trade Ministry
spokesmen later explained that this would occur only within
the context of a more general improvement in trade relations,
and asserted that Urban had meant that such cooperation would
only be possible if Iran were back in full compliance with
appropriate IAEA requirements and supervision.

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Radio Farda's Impact on the Nuclear Issue
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8. (C) The Radio Farda controversy has been important even
in the nuclear issue, with Czech support for RFE/RL having
virtually eliminated much of the Czech participation in an
Iranian energy sector where Czech engineers had once figured
prominently. Iranian officials have frequently told both
private Czech citizens and public officials that there would
considerable financial trade rewards for the Czechs if they
would end Radio Farda broadcasts. These benefits, moreover,
would not apply only to the nuclear industry. Septel will
consider Czech-Iran proliferation concerns and issues.

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Radio Farda Keeps Diplomatic Ties "Low and Very Cool"
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9. (C) If Radio Farda has provoked a strongly negative
economic reaction from Iran, its diplomatic fallout has been,
to most observers, also disproportionate. Both sides withdrew
their ambassadors soon after the initiation of broadcasts in

1998. Since then, the post of Iranian Charge in Prague has
been occupied by diplomats of incrementally lesser rank and
reputation. According to Mr. Mrazek of the MFA, the last
Iranian Charge, Hussain Rezvani, departed Prague nearly six
months ago and will not be replaced until later this summer.
The acting Charge is a Third Secretary; the new Charge is
also supposedly a relatively low-ranking diplomat. The MFA
has had virtually no contact with the Embassy since last
winter.


10. (C) According to numerous MFA officials, before Mr.
Rezvani's departure from Prague, the Farda controversy
dominated nearly all discussions and discourse with the
Iranians. Rezvani made numerous entreaties to GOCR to cut
off Farda broadcasts and, explicitly acknowledging an embargo
that his government has denied imposing, also dangled before
the Czechs the prospect of contracts, improved trade terms,
and more cordial relationship if only the Radio Farda
broadcasts would stop and the Czech President "apologize to
the Iranian people." The GOCR was not interested.


11. (C) The frost in Czech-Iranian diplomatic relations
extends to travel and visa regimes as well. According to MOI
statistics, only 69 Iranian citizens enjoy permanent
residency in the Czech Republic, including asylum cases. MFA
Consular Department Director Ivo Svoboda told Poloff that
travel ties between the two countries are nearly non-existent
and that there are no direct flights between Tehran and
Prague. Iranian travelers are subject the strictest and most
onerous visa conditions permitted by Czech law. They must,
among other requirements, obtain a visa even to transit the

PRAGUE 00000754 003 OF 003


passenger terminal en route to other countries (a requirement
imposed on only a dozen other countries in the world),and
they must present the adjudicating Czech Consular officials
an official letter of invitation, show financial resources
within Iran, and pay a substantial deposit (similar to a
bond) that they forfeit to the Czech Government if they fail
to return to Iran. Applicants are screened against an
Interior Ministry database for security risks or other
issues. According to Svoboda, Iranian travelers are
considered a very high risk for both illegal migration and
security purposes.
CABANISS