CZECHS AGREE THAT KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE IS INEVITABLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000434

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, PM/RSAT FOR DOWLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2016
TAGS: NATO MARR PREL EZ
SUBJECT: CZECHS AGREE THAT KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE IS INEVITABLE

REF: STATE 59894

Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons
1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Czech Republic agrees that independence
for Kosovo is an inevitability. The GOCR believes UN Special
Envoy Martti Ahtisaari must make more rapid progress if he is
to have any chance of completing his work within the
envisaged timeframe. They believe the hope of EU accession
will not be sufficient to entice the Serbs into a more
cooperative frame of mind. End Summary.


2. (C) ADCM April 24 discussed reftel demarche on U.S. Kosovo
policy with Tomas Szunyog, Director of the MFA's Eastern
Europe Division. Szunyog welcomed the demarche, saying that
the Czech Republic sometimes felt that there could be more
transparency from members of the Contact Group and that this
message was exactly the kind of communication that promoted
the engagement of the international community. Szunyog said
the Czech Republic was one hundred percent in agreement with
the U.S. position, including on the inevitability of
independence for Kosovo. He wondered what kind of limitations
on independence might be debated in the future, believing
that there might be calls for modified independence which
might feature restrictions on a Kosovo military force, and
prohibitions on Kosovo merging with a neighboring country.


3. (C) On the political front, Szunyog saw positive signs in
Prime Minister Ceku's statements on minorities. While deeds
were not always encouraging, words such as these were a
positive step. Szunyog reiterated the long-standing Czech
policy that protection of minority rights must be a key
element of any final solution.


4. (C) Szunyog said his government did not see a need for a
Bosnia-like strong civilian mission in Kosovo in the future,
but recommended continuation of a significant military
presence for the foreseeable future. Szunyog said the EU was
likely to focus its assistance on areas where it was most
comfortable, including justice, home affairs, and economic
expertise.


5. (C) Szunyog shared that the Austrian Presidency had
scheduled a meeting of MFA regional directors for April 26 to
discuss Kosovo, a meeting he believed stemmed from EU
impatience with the speed of progress being achieved by UN
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. The end of Ahtisaari's
mandate in November meant that all proposals would have to be
ready by late summer. Szunyog believed that the "ground up"
approach was the correct one in principle, but felt that the
results must now be transformed into a document for
examination by all parties, including the Contact Group. He
recognized that such an approach carried the risk of creating
a solution that was unacceptable to the Kosovars, the Serbs,
or both, but he felt that the need for progress made the risk
worthwhile. Any document would have to fully incorporate the
principles of the Contact Group. In a worst-case scenario it
would be possible that the international community might have
to impose a plan. Szunyog also believed that the Serbian
leadership would favor a 20-year process rather than a quick
resolution of the Kosovo issue. He cautioned that the lure of
eventual EU membership for Serbia should not be
overestimated. Under the most optimistic of timelines Serbian
membership of the EU would take place in 10-15 years, making
it politically useless to Serb politicians seeking voter
support.

6 (C) Comment: Martti Ahtisaari will visit Prague May 19 to
meet with Prime Minister Jiri Paroubek. Paroubek personally
favors dismemberment of Kosovo in order to protect Serbs but
has decided not to let his personal biases influence his
government's more orthodox Kosovo policy. The Czechs plan to
stay deeply involved in the region, and will continue to
maintain more that half of their worldwide total of deployed
troops in Kosovo. End comment.
DODMAN