CZECH REPUBLIC AND MISSILE DEFENSE: SUPPORTIVE,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000360

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, PM/RSAT FOR DOWLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: MARR PREL PL EZ UK RS
SUBJECT: CZECH REPUBLIC AND MISSILE DEFENSE: SUPPORTIVE,
BUT ONLY AFTER THE ELECTION

REF: A. STATE 44145


B. PRAGUE 283

Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons
1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (S) Summary: The Czech Republic may be a good candidate to
host ground-based ballistic missile defense (BMD)
interceptors and/or a BMD radar. However, Czech involvement
in the project will be contingent on careful handling of the
issue in the domestic political arena. The too-close-to-call
June 2-3 parliamentary elections loom, and politicians
continue to use every available divisive issue for their
advantage. Bilateral missile defense talks at the political
level before June would further raise the profile of BMD in
the Czech Republic, and would likely unleash negative
statements on BMD that would be hard to reverse. Work at the
technical level, such as visits here by survey teams or
travel of a Czech technical expert to Washington, should
present no problem. Most post-election coalition scenarios
would be supportive of BMD in the Czech Republic and, if
properly packaged, there would not likely be strong public
opposition. End Summary.

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CZECH SUPPORTERS OF BMD WERE WILLING TO
RISK TALKS BEFORE JUNE
--------------


2. (S) Poloff and DATT March 22 delivered Ref A demarche on
BMD to Vaclav Cejka, Acting Director of the MOD's Defense
Policy and Strategy Division. That meeting followed March
14th's more informal discussion of the issue between the
Ambassador and Defense Minister Kuehnl (reported Ref B).
Cejka, echoing his Defense Minister, said that a potential
visit by ASD Peter Flory to the Czech Republic in advance of
the elections could be risky, but the Ministry of Defense
would be prepared to host the visit, perhaps under the guise
of "broad political-military discussions." This answer was
relayed to Washington but the unavailability of the exact
date of the Flory visit meant the meeting was not immediately
scheduled with the Czechs. Before a date could be finalized,
a new wave of media reporting on the BMD in the national and
international press raised the issue's profile in the Czech
Republic. Post understands that during this timeframe Petr
Kolar, the Czech Ambassador to the United States, visited ASD
Flory and it was agreed the Czech Republic would not host BMD
discussions before the June elections. Post has learned from
the MFA that Ambassador Kolar's action on the BMD issue was
his own initiative. Although he acted without instruction,
his Ministry believes his message was consistent with current
thinking in the GOCR on BMD.

--------------
A DIVISIVE ELECTION, BUT A MEETING
OF MINDS ABOUT THE BEST TIMING FOR BMD TALKS
--------------


3. (S) Throughout March and April Emboffs have been able to
use the appearance of BMD in the Czech press to initiate
conversations with a range of officials on the question of
Missile Defense in the Czech Republic. The responses are
remarkably similar.

-- MOD: As reported ref B, Defense Minister Kuehnl cautioned
that the pre-election period was a politically delicate time
for any work that might hit the press. He warned that
(highl-pragmatic) Prime Minister Jiri Paroubek could
dstance himself from missile defense if it were to bcome an
electoral liability. Kuehnl said the Minstry of Defense is
interested in further talks but any work on the issue should
not/not be made public before the election. He suggested that
any talks on missile defense be packaged as part of wider
discussions on political and military matters. Kuehnl said
that he saw no problem with private briefings to NATO allies
or Russia on missile defense.

-- MFA: MFA officials likewise agree that the pre-election
period presents a political environment that is more
dangerous to BMD in the Czech Republic than would normally be
the case. Given the controversial nature of BMD, they could

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envisage opposition politicians using the program to attack
the government. Looking ahead, a sense of Czech-US
partnership on the program would be crucial. MFA contacts
said the Czechs' history of hosting Soviet missiles made this
a more sensitive issue in the minds of the Czech electorate
than might otherwise be expected.

-- Parliament: Radim Turek, a CSSD member of the
Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security, believed
that, with proper political handling, BMD could come to the
Czech Republic under any new government, whatever its
political makeup (Note: Turek is personally agnostic on BMD
coming to the Czech Republic). The key, he said, would be how
the new Government sold the project to the Parliament.
Politicians would need something tangible to point at, to
show the benefits to the Czech Republic for hosting BMD.
Enhanced security from overseas missile threats would not be
a successful selling point. The Czech populace, Turek said,
was not convinced that there could be a potential missile
threat to their country. BMD, he said, would be seen as
having the opposite effect, making the Czech Republic more of
a target than it is now. Turek believed that a focus on jobs,
economic investment, or scientific or technical involvement,
or military partnership would be much more effective selling
points for BMD.

-- The Prime Minister's Office: Almost nobody in the MOD, the
MFA, or the Parliament believes that engaging the Prime
Minister on BMD before the election would help the project.
MP Turek alleged the Prime Minister had polled the issue and
determined voters would not give him increased support if he
came out in favor of BMD. Certain members of the foreign
policy community in Prague caution that the issue of BMD, if
raised, must only be discussed directly with the PM himself.
They allege that the PM's national security advisors would
present the information to him in a manner that would
guarantee his opposition (Note: Post's interactions on other
issues with some of the PM's advisors lead us to believe that
there is truth to these allegations). The Prime Minister's
isolation from real information on BMD negotiations is
evident. In response to a reporter's question Paroubek
recently said he had not heard the Czech Republic, Poland and
the UK were candidates for a BMD site, and called media
reporting on the issue "political science fiction."

--------------
COMMENT: WE SHOUD ENGAGE WITH THE
CZECHS ON BMD SOON AFTER THE ELECTIONS
--------------


4. (S) There is no shortage of supporters for BMD within the
national security apparatus of the Czech Republic. However
almost all are agreed that nothing can happen at the
political level before June. The key question will be whether
BMD supporters can gain the necessary political traction with
the new government and new Parliament after the June
elections.


5. (S) Most mainstream Czech parties agree on the general
course of their foreign policy, and are likely to come out in
support of BMD. The exception is the Communist party, which
would always vote against BMD. Naturally, the composition of
the new government will be a key factor. A grand coalition
between ODS and CSSD would be likely to welcome BMD to the
Czech Republic if tangible benefits such as jobs or economic
advantages could be raised in Parliament. A center-right
ODS-KDU-Green coalition government would likely be more
forward leaning on BMD. In contrast, a minority CSSD
government would be a harder sell, both because it would
focus more on domestic economic benefits and because it would
need to forge common ground with the ODS to get the measure
passed. Even in such circumstances we believe that BMD would
have a reasonable chance of being successful.


6. (S) While a political discussion will need to wait for a
new government, there is no reason to avoid working level
contacts. Officials at both MFA and MOD have told us that
technical visits -- whether site survey teams coming to the
CR, or expert Czech officials visiting Washington -- are
possible in the pre-election period, so long as they remain
low-profile.

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7. (S) We encourage a continuing dialogue with Czech
officials on missile defense, including at the planned
bilateral pol-mil talks in Prague April 18-19. One part of
this should be briefing the Czechs on our discussions with
others (notably the Russians),so that they Czechs are
prepared to respond in a coordinated fashion if they are
approached by the Russians or others.
CABANISS