Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PRAGUE1306
2006-10-19 14:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Prague
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL WITH CZECH DEFENSE

Tags:  PGOV PREL EZ NATO EAIR MARR MOPS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPG #1306/01 2921441
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191441Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8112
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1779
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001306 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE, PM FOR DOWLEY, OSD FOR SADOWSKA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ NATO EAIR MARR MOPS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL WITH CZECH DEFENSE
MINISTER JIRI SEDIVY

Classified By: Ambassador Richard Graber for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001306

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE, PM FOR DOWLEY, OSD FOR SADOWSKA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ NATO EAIR MARR MOPS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL WITH CZECH DEFENSE
MINISTER JIRI SEDIVY

Classified By: Ambassador Richard Graber for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador made his introductory call on
Czech Defense Minister Jiri Sedivy October 17. Topics
discussed included missile defense, U.S. assistance for Czech
defense reform, and Czech aircraft manufacturer
AeroVodochody. Sedivy, just a month in the job, displayed an
interest in an effective and productive political-military
relationship with the United States. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Graber made his introductory call on
Defense Minister Jiri Sedivy October 17 to get acquainted and
discuss a wide range of political-military issues. Czech
Director for Defense and Security Policy Ivan Dvorak also
attended.

-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
STRATEGY, DEFENSE BUDGET SHORTFALLS, AND FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------

3. (C) Sedviy, acknowledging the possible short-term nature
of his stay in the job, outlined to the Ambassador his plans
to steer the Ministry of Defense towards greater
effectiveness. He said that short, medium, and long-term
plans in the Ministry all suffered from the defect of
spreading the activities of the Czech armed forces in too
many directions. Sedivy said he wished to refocus efforts to
ensure that key priorities received the resources they
needed. As an example Sedivy said that he could not foresee a
territorial threat (of invasion) to the Czech Republic or
NATO countries in at least the next twenty years. Under such
circumstances it would make sense to devote resources to
expeditionary rapid reaction type forces. The Ambassador
congratulated Sedivy on "Strong Campaigner," the Czechs'

ongoing large-scale exercise. (Note: The exercise is in the
process of certifying the first of two Czech brigades as NATO
ready. End note.)


4. (C) Sedivy also said that he is working to ensure Czech
military deployments in 2007 will not be affected despite
cuts of about ten percent to the defense budget. Outlining
his main priorities, Sedivy said he would work to ensure that
NATO and EU defense commitments were met in addition to
ensuring that the Czech military provided the quality of life
and career path opportunities that would keep personnel from
leaving the armed forces. He said he was working with key
members of Parliament to propose a law that would guarantee a
minimum level of defense expenditure over the next five
years.

-------------- -------------- ---
MISSILE DEFENSE
-------------- -------------- ---

5. (C) Turning to missile defense (MD) Sedivy portrayed
recent U.S.-Czech consultations on MD as merely a step on a
long road of such cooperation that had begun in 2002. He
acknowledged the current Czech Government had not taken a
formal position on MD. Sedivy said that both he and PM
Topolanek were very much in favor of hosting "an element" of
missile defense. Building a MD capability was consistent with
the printed strategies of both NATO and the Czech Republic.
According to Sedivy the key for Czech public acceptance of
the system was the portrayal of the bilateral MD project as
part of a "multilayered and multilateral system of defenses."
He believed that a paragraph or sentence in the final
communique at the Riga summit could be very helpful. Such
wording would ideally say that missile defense is feasible
and that NATO supports it. Depoliticization of the debate
would be crucial, as unscrupulous politicians would seek to
manipulate the issue for short-term domestic political gain.
Ambassador Graber noted that recent statements by some Czech
leaders on missile defense had been unfortunate because they
had claimed the U.S. would not make a decision before the
beginning of 2007 on which country to approach. The
Ambassador emphasized that a decision could come earlier. DM
Sedivy agreed that such statements had not been helpful and
highlighted the efforts he is making to educate Czech
politicians on the facts surrounding missile defense.

--------------
MANPADS
--------------

6. (C) Sedivy formally presented the Ambassador with a letter
of request for U.S. assistance in the destruction of 1400
SA-7 MANPADS (Note: A U.S. MANPADS survey team is already
scheduled to visit the Czech Republic in mid-November).

-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
FUNDING FOR DEFENSE REFORM ADVISORS

-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------

7. (C) Sedivy asked the Ambassador if the U.S. would be open
to revisiting or reviewing a November 2005 agreement that the
Czech Republic would reduce its reliance on U.S. Foreign
Military Financing to pay for the services of defense reform
advisors CUBIC Defense Applications Group (Note: That
agreement would see FMF funding for CUBIC incrementally
falling from USD 1.3 million to zero over a period of three
years. End note). Sedivy said he knew the company from
personal experience and was convinced that they could have a
significant impact. The Ambassador responded that the United
States still believed the November 2005 agreement was the
best way forward, but said that Sedivy's concerns could be
discussed further at the staff level if so requested.

-------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
MILITARY AIRLIFT OPTIONS
-------------- -------------- -------------- --------------

8. (C) Acknowledging the Czech Republic's shortage of
military air transport options, Sedivy said he had signed a
letter of intent for the Czech Republic to sign-up for one
hundred flight hours in NATO's C-17 initiative. The
challenge, he said, would be for the Czech Republic to find a
use for all hundred hours of flight time. He mentioned that
some elements of the program were unclear and that the Czechs
would explore the possibility of "selling" some of their
hours if they could not use them. Sedivy viewed the Czech
participation in the project as an investment in NATO that
had benefits beyond the airlift hours that the Czechs would
receive.


9. (C) When prompted by the Ambassador to discuss a possible
Czech acquisition of C-130 aircraft, Sedivy appeared less
well briefed. He said that financial uncertainty was having
an impact. Security and Defense Policy Director Dvorak added
that there was not a positive outlook for a C-130 purchase,
and that some confusion remained (presumably in Parliament)
about why the Czech Republic would require both access to
C-17 aircraft and acquisition of C-130s. Sedivy commented
that his current focus was on "finding solutions to focus
resources" at this time.

-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
L-159 - PLEASE HELP US SELL OUR PLANE
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------

10. (C) Sedivy asked the Ambassador for assistance in
marketing the L-159 subsonic fighter jet, citing the excess
inventory currently in the possession of the Czech Air Force
(Note: this aircraft was originally produced in a cooperative
venture between Boeing and Czech manufacturer AeroVodochody.
Boeing has since withdrawn. End note.). The Ambassador
responded that the Embassy would be happy to assist the
Czechs consult with Washington to see if such assistance
could be provided. (Note: In 2005 a Czech private military
marketing firm approached the Embassy with a similar request;
however, they appeared to lose interest when briefed on the
50 percent U.S. content rule for USG advocacy. End note).

--------------
COMMENT
--------------

11. (C) Sedivy has been in the job for just over a month, and
is clearly still familiarizing himself with some of the
issues. He displayed an interest in an effective and
productive political-military relationship with the United
States, and ensuring that the Czech Republic meets its
international commitments. His positions on missile defense
and on NATO C-17 initiative were encouraging, while his lack
of knowledge on C-130 acquisition indicates that this is not
a high priority within his ministry at this time.
GRABER