CZECHS SUPPORT INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO, EU

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001053

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR ERIC FICHTE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2016
TAGS: PREL UNAUS UNMIK PGOV YI EU EZ
SUBJECT: CZECHS SUPPORT INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO, EU
MEMBERSHIP FOR SERBIA

REF: A. STATE 135734

B. PRAGUE 0744

Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mike Dodman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. The Czechs agree with the U.S. position on
Kosovo and Serbia on every material point. While the Czechs
support the status talks, they are pessimistic about the
outcome: Serbs will never willingly agree to an independent
Kosovo. Czech MFA officials plan a visit to the Balkans the
week of August 28 to assess the situation. They will also
meet with regional V-4 partners, plus Slovenia and Austria,
to search for ways to provide support and incentives to
Serbia. The Czechs support closer EU integration for Serbia,
and agree that the Serbs must comply with ICTY before SAA
talks can continue. However, the Czechs do not see a
consensus within the EU on what constitutes ICTY compliance.
The Czechs also do not believe ICTY compliance ought to be a
prerequisite for Serbian-NATO cooperation. End summary.


2. (C) Polec Counselor and Poloff met with MFA Director of
Southeast and Eastern Europe Department Tomas Szunyog on
August 23 to deliver Reftel A and discuss the resolution of
status talks on Kosovo. Szunyog confirmed that the Czech
position on Kosovo, which is consistent with the U.S.
position, remains unchanged (see Ref B). (Note: the Czechs
are currently negotiating the formation of a new national
government. Szunyog assured us that Czech policy on Kosovo
and the Balkans would remain unchanged no matter which
party(ies) form the new government. End note.)


3. (C) To assess the current situation in the region, Szunyog
and the new MFA Director General for Territory I (Europe)
Jana Houbaskova will visit Vienna, Belgrade, and possibly
Podgorica and/or Pristina the week of August 28. He also
described plans to increase the Czech diplomatic presence in
the Balkans: (a) a one-person liaison office will be opened
in Pristina in mid-September, housed in the Slovak mission;
(b) a one-person Embassy will be opened in Skopje, and (3)
the operation of a summer office in Podgorica may be extended
through the fall, or possibly to the end of the year if
funding permits.


4. (C) Szunyog described current EU efforts to provide
incentives to Serbia to cooperate fully in the status talks.
With respect to the EU perspective, the Czechs hope SAA
negotiations will begin anew in the fall, but agree that ICTY
compliance is required first. (However, the Czechs are
somewhat flexible of what constitutes compliance, and would
likely accept DiCarlo's certification of compliance even if
the Serbs fail to turn Mladic over to the Hague.) In the
meantime, to keep the prospect of future EU and NATO
membership alive in the minds of the Serb leadership, Szunyog
suggested involving them in as many EU-related "bureaucratic
meetings" as possible, and possibly granting them NATO
observer status. The Czechs believe that cooperation with
NATO should be less dependent on ICTY compliance than EU
integration.


5. (C) In addition to EU efforts, the Czechs are working on a
regional basis with their V-4 partners (Poland, Slovakia, and
Hungary),together with Slovenia and Austria, to explore ways
to support Serbia. Szunyog said the group, led by Austria,
plans to present a paper in mid-September. Nevertheless,
Szunyog was pessimistic about the impact of incentives on the
Serbs. At best, he thought the prospect of EU membership or
other incentives might persuade the Serbs not to fight an
outcome that grants independence to Kosovo. But no incentive
will induce the Serbs to willingly agree to that outcome.


6. (C) Comment. The Czechs remain reliable allies on issues
relating to Kosovo and the Balkans, and, unlike some EU
member states, are strong advocates for Serbian-EU
integration. End comment.
CABANISS