Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PORTOFSPAIN1126
2006-09-22 21:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Of Spain
Cable title:  

PM MANNING FRUSTRATED OVER CARICOM RESPONSE TO

Tags:  EPET UNSC PREL PGOV VE TD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
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DE RUEHSP #1126/01 2652114
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 222114Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7395
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3610
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0415
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0437
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEBAAA/DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0058
C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT OF SPAIN 001126 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR, WHA/EPSC, EB/ESC/IEC/EPC
DOE FOR OFFICE OF POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: EPET UNSC PREL PGOV VE TD
SUBJECT: PM MANNING FRUSTRATED OVER CARICOM RESPONSE TO
PETROCARIBE BUT SUPPORTS CARICOM "DECISION" TO SUPPORT
VENEZUELA AT UNSC

REF: PORT OF SPAIN 1040

Classified By: DCM Eugene Sweeney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT OF SPAIN 001126

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR, WHA/EPSC, EB/ESC/IEC/EPC
DOE FOR OFFICE OF POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: EPET UNSC PREL PGOV VE TD
SUBJECT: PM MANNING FRUSTRATED OVER CARICOM RESPONSE TO
PETROCARIBE BUT SUPPORTS CARICOM "DECISION" TO SUPPORT
VENEZUELA AT UNSC

REF: PORT OF SPAIN 1040

Classified By: DCM Eugene Sweeney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 8 meeting with DOE A/S Karen
Harbert and WHA DAS Patrick Duddy, PM Manning voiced
frustration with CARICOM colleagues over their stance on
Petrocaribe but at the same time said he would go along with
a "CARICOM decision" to support Venezuela's bid for a UNSC
seat. Outlining a greater T&T role in CARICOM, Manning
repeated his proposal for the U.S. to pay the cost of T&T
patrolling the Eastern Caribbean for drug traffickers, and he
expressed confidence that his Caribbean neighbors' suspicions
of T&T's regional energy objectives had subsided since T&T
launched its CARICOM petroleum fund. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Assistant Secretary of Energy Karen Harbert and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Patrick Duddy met with Prime
Minister Manning on September 8 in Port of Spain. Also
attending were Embassy DCM and Econ Chief (notetaker) and
from DOE Gary Ward and Sam Browne. This message reports PM
Manning's comments on Venezuela's Petrocaribe initiative,
CARICOM views on the upcoming UN Security Council vote, and
his thinking on how Trinidad and Tobago might play a larger
role in CARICOM. His comments on U.S.-T&T relations are
reported septel.

-------------- --
Frustration with CARICOM embrace of Petrocaribe
-------------- --


3. (C) Harbert and Duddy welcomed Manning's recent public
statements on the risk to regional energy security posed by
Venezuela's Petrocaribe initiative. In response, Manning
voiced frustration with CARICOM colleagues' embrace of
Petrocaribe, predicting that if they continue on their
present course, they will effectively "shut the door" on T&T
and its role as a guarantor of regional energy security. If
T&T in turn is forced to find new markets for its oil, he
continued, it may not be easy to shift supply back to the

region if/when his CARICOM neighbors face an energy crisis.
They would have only themselves to blame, he suggested, as
they were focusing solely on short term benefits and ignoring
the long term negative implications for energy security and
economic development. Still, he allowed that some CARICOM
members had declined to cede control of domestic storage to
PDVSA, demonstrating they were sensitive to the risk.


4. (C) Manning said that T&T wanted to maintain good
relations with all of its neighbors, particularly one so
large and so close as Venezuela, but this had been made
difficult because Venezuela did not like T&T's response to
Petrocaribe. While hypothesizing that Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez might seek to visit T&T in the near future,
Manning was not optimistic that a political agreement would
be reached on joint development of gas deposits along their
maritime border, even if technical discussions on gas
unitization continue to make progress. As such, Manning was
"pretty certain" that T&T would not be in a position to act
on plans to further expand its production capacity for
liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the shorter term, because
those plans were contingent on future supplies of Venezuelan
gas.


5. (C) Manning indicated that T&T would be happy to expand
its current business refining a small volume of Venezuelan
crude to sell to other Caribbean islands, but he doubted
whether Venezuela's Caribbean strategy envisages such a role
for T&T. Nevertheless, he would continue seeking to improve
relations with Venezuela. Later in the conversation, Manning
said pointedly that "T&T does not want to become collateral
damage" in the U.S.-Venezuela relationship.

--------------
CARICOM won't support Guatemala for UNSC seat
--------------


6. (C) Asked by DAS Duddy about the upcoming UNSC vote,
Manning said T&T would abide by the "CARICOM decision" to
support Venezuela. Asked if CARICOM had really taken such a
position, he responded yes, explaining that his CARICOM


colleagues had agreed that they could not "turn their backs"
on Belize by supporting Guatemala. By contrast, Guyana had
given a green light to support Caracas, maintaining that any
friction in its relations with Venezuela should not stand the
way of a CARICOM consensus. Challenged on Chavez,s
problematical role on the global stage, Manning dismissed
Chavez,s activities as mostly rhetoric.

-------------- --
Seeking a bigger T&T role in CARICOM and beyond
-------------- --


7. (C) Manning spoke of T&T's current rapid growth as
conferring a responsibility toward the rest of CARICOM.
Moreover, the Caribbean was T&T's largest market after the
U.S., so anything that happens there has an impact on T&T.
Drug trafficking is a key challenge for the region. T&T is
buying more boats and helicopters to patrol its own waters,
but traffickers can - and already are - moving operations to
other islands such as Grenada that have nowhere near T&T's
interdiction capability.


8. (C) Manning then repeated his previous offer to use T&T
assets to patrol the eastern Caribbean if the U.S. would pay
for the additional cost. Politically it would be much easier
for T&T boats to enter other Caribbean nations' territorial
waters, he commented, because no one thinks T&T has hegemonic
objectives in the region. (See septel for further comments
by Manning on Caribbean drug trade and U.S. engagement in
regional drug interdiction.)


9. (C) A/S Harbert raised the CARICOM Energy Task Force.
Manning ascribed the slow initial progress of the Task Force
to suspicions among other members over T&T's prominent role
in launching it. Such a reaction was predictable and not
unreasonable, he added, but he was confident that the
suspicions had now subsided, particularly after T&T had set
up a CARICOM petroleum fund.


10. (C) Manning stressed that T&T was determined to avoid the
path of other resource-rich developing countries that have
failed to translate export income into tangible benefits for
ordinary people. He previewed a soon-to-be launched
initiative with seven African oil producing countries, from
Nigeria to Angola, aimed at sharing T&T's experience and
offering technical assistance in areas such as managing oil
wealth and commercializing flared natural gas.


11. (C) COMMENT: Manning's comments on Petrocaribe made
clear that he does not trust Venezuela's motives and that he
agrees with us on the dangers of Petrocaribe. Moreover, his
public approach to Petrocaribe has paralleled our own,
stating in a factual and low-key way the clear economic and
security implications. Nevertheless, his concerns about
Venezuela do not appear to outweigh his interest in
associating T&T with the rest of CARICOM, as he seeks to
build credibility with his CARICOM colleagues. He also
believes he cannot afford to burn bridges with Venezuela.
END COMMENT.


12. (U) A/S Harbert did not clear this message.
AUSTIN