Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PORTMORESBY381
2006-09-13 07:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Moresby
Cable title:  

SOLOMON ISLANDS: PM KICKS AUSTRALIA IN THE SHIN

Tags:  PREL PINR BP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT MORESBY 000381 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EAP/ANP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR BP
SUBJECT: SOLOMON ISLANDS: PM KICKS AUSTRALIA IN THE SHIN

REF: A) PORT MORESBY 353 B) PORT MORESBY 203

CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Fitts, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Port
Moresby, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT MORESBY 000381

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EAP/ANP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR BP
SUBJECT: SOLOMON ISLANDS: PM KICKS AUSTRALIA IN THE SHIN

REF: A) PORT MORESBY 353 B) PORT MORESBY 203

CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Fitts, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Port
Moresby, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



1.(C) SUMMARY: The decision by the Solomon Islands PM to PNG the
Australian High Commissioner seems a reflection of his personal
(and rather adolescent) frustration over the large RAMSI role in
Solomon decision making. He does not appear to have a specific
strategy in taking a poke at his country's largest benefactor.
His September 13 meetings with special envoys from Australia and
New Zealand went poorly and Australia is likely to take some
steps in retaliation. Both sides have been careful thus far to
confine the friction to the bilateral relationship and try to
keep RAMSI above the fray. Ambassador intends to express his
personal concern over these developments to SIG FM Patteson Oti,
who we believe backed the PM's decision. END SUMMARY

2.(C) In a Sept 12 letter to Prime Minister Howard, Solomon
Islands Prime Minister Sogavare declared Australian High
Commissioner Patrick Cole personna non grata. This followed a
Sept 11 phone call between the two PMs in which Howard declined
Sogavare's request to withdraw Cole. Separately, the SIG
advised GOA that Cole had spent too much time talking to
opposition figures and had opposed two of the terms of reference
for Sogavare's Commission of Inquiry into the April riots. Of
course, in doing so, Cole was respectively; doing his job and
reflecting Australian government policy.

3.(C) In fact, Sogavare and the people behind him have been
increasingly rankled by the large role that Australia and other
RAMSI members play in Solomon Islands affairs (ref B). A main
bone of contention is the Commission of Inquiry that Sogavare
has launched into the April riots which seems designed to shift
blame on the police and away from his political cronies who are
in jail charged with inciting the violence and now with planning
murder (Ref A). Encouraged by the RAMSI-provided advisors, the
Attorney General had challenged the terms of reference for that
Commission in court. Sogavare has since repeatedly charged that
Australia was improperly interfering the Solomon Islands courts.

On Sept 7, the Solomon court rejected the A/G's petition, which
would seem to refute the PM's contention, but Sogavare has
continued to charge improper Australian interference.

4.(C) Despite the court decision, Australia and other observers
remain extremely concerned with the PM's motivation for the
Commission and two senior envoys from Australia and New Zealand
were already scheduled to meet with the PM Sept 13. Deputy
Secretaries of the Foreign Departments, respectively Australia's

SIPDIS
David Ritchie and New Zealand's John Larkindale arrived in the
midst of this furor with a widely expanded agenda.

5.(C) The atmospherics around the meeting were not good.
Sogavare canceled the scheduled 8:30 session, claiming it hadn't
been set up through proper channels. In a radio interview, he
said the meeting was rescheduled for 2:30, but sent no other
notice. When the envoys showed up, the PM's staff professed no
knowledge of any new meeting.

6.(C) The meeting itself, when it finally convened, was little
better. There was no meeting of the minds, with Sogavare
refusing to back down on his move and the envoy's pointing out
how difficult this made it for them to justify their nation's
large-scale commitment to Solomon Islands.

7.(C) We understand (please hold close) that as a next step
Australia now has cleared, but not finally approved, a proposal
to cancel all outstanding visas held by Solomon Island
parliamentarians. Each would be reconsidered on a case-by-case
basis. This would have some real teeth as the only
non-Australian routes out of Solomon Islands are twice weekly
flights to Port Moresby and to Vanuatu. In addition,
Australian/New Zealand personnel with RAMSI would be barred from
participating in the Commission of Inquiry.

8.(C) COMMENT: Observers are at a loss to come up with a
rational political motivation for Sogavare's action. Though
many in the political elite will be privately pleased to see him
take a poke at Australia, the general public would become
concerned indeed if it perceived that his actions would
jeopardize RAMSI's ability to keep the peace, which has made an
enormous improvement to their lives. Any such unease could cost
him heavily in the no-confidence vote now scheduled for October

2.

9.(C) There may be no careful rationale. Clearly, Sogavare

PORT MORES 00000381 002 OF 002


resents Australia's role. One month back, he complained to the
Ambassador that RAMSI (by which he meant Australia) should be
"here to help us decide. But they should not make the
decisions." The main impression we gained from his demeanor is
that of a frustrated adolescent, dependent and resenting that
dependence; wanting to go on an all night binge without anyone
telling him he shouldn't.

10.(C) With the concurrence of Australian authorities, we
believe it most effective for our two countries convey separate
messages, but with common themes. Consequently, Ambassador
intends to express to SIG FM Patteson Oti, his personal concern
over the recent steps, making it clear that an official reaction
may also be in the offing.
FITTS