HAITI ELECTIONS: PLANNERS APPLY LESSONS LEARNED

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MARR ASEC HA
SUBJECT: HAITI ELECTIONS: PLANNERS APPLY LESSONS LEARNED

REF: PAUP 2991

Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. UN Mission (MINUSTAH) officials are
confident they will be much better prepared to conduct the
second round of national elections and working to apply
lessons learned from the first round. MINUSTAH has ordered
its military planners to develop the overall security plan,
taking over work done by the UN Police (UNPol) for the first
round, and thereby forcing MINUSTAH commanders to integrate
their resources with UNPol and the Haitian National Police
(HNP). A team of senior MINUSTAH officials traveled to the
regions the week of Monday, April 3, to evaluate each
region's planning and recommendations. Elections advisors
have refined their logistics planning, training for poll
workers, and procedures at the national vote tabulation
center (VTC). Post shares the assessment that preparations
and logistics are likely to be much improved from the first
round. We share the concern of many, however, that local
rivalries emerging in the second round runoff format creates
the potential for more disturbances. We are encouraged that
MINUSTAH security planners are aware of this possibility and
adjusting their plans accordingly, and do not expect that
local disturbances will threaten the successful conclusion of
the second round.

SECURITY PREPARATIONS
--------------


2. (C) UNPol elections security chief Neil Warriner (a member
of the U.S. UNPol contingent who enjoys the special
confidence of UNPol Commissioner Muir) told Polcouns on April
2 that a team of MINUSTAH leaders were in the midst of a
security review of in each of Haiti's departments to evaluate
security planning. The team included electoral operations
chief Barry Macleod, Muir, and additional UNPol and MINUSTAH
military staff. Macleod and Muir have made MINUSTAH's
civilian regional directors responsible for developing
operational plans for security in each of their departments
in coordination with their military, police, and civilian
personnel. An integrated team from MINUSTAH headquarters,
led by Warriner, will evaluate each plan and allocate
resources accordingly. Warriner highlighted the potential
for the increased possibility of disturbances as local
rivalries come to the fore in the second round, and said that
planners would focus on a political analysis of potential
trouble spots in their assessments.


3. (C) Warriner stressed that in contrast to the first
round, where UNPol and HNP developed the security and
operational plan with no input from MINUSTAH's military
leaders, SRSG Valdes and Macleod had ordered MINUSTAH
commanders to take the lead in drawing up security
requirements and coordinate their planning with UNPol and the
HNP. Warriner said that military and UNPol had supported
each other locally during the first round because of
established working relationships. Because MINUSTAH's
military leadership had failed to integrate their planning
security cooperation at the national level, however, that
cooperation had remained ad hoc and communications and joint
actions had been less efficient. Warriner expected that as a
result of the unified planning process, MINUSTAH would be
much better able to respond to security threats during the
second round. He noted that the abilities of each military
contingent continued to vary: the Jordanians remained the
weakest performers and the Uruguayans had exhibited a
surprising to take command decisions. The Sri Lankans,
Argentineans, and Peruvians had performed admirably. As a
result of the withdrawal of the joint Moroccan/Spanish
contingent, MINUSTAH would depend on Uruguayan forces,
including newly arrived additional troops, to improve their
performance and shoulder greater responsibilities.

ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS
--------------


4. (SBU) MINUSTAH elections chief Gerardo LeChevallier and
members of his staff told Polcouns on March 30 and in
subsequent conversations that preparations were on schedule
for the second round on April 21. They are focusing
improvements in three areas: transport of sensitive material
to and from voting centers, poll-worker training, and
improved efficiency at the VTC in Port-au-Prince. With the
first round complete, MINUSTAH now had a complete picture of
transportation and requirements and would reallocate
resources accordingly. Planners were also working to improve
the procedures to account for "process verbaux" (tally sheets
- PVs) from voting centers, through departmental electoral
offices (BEDs) and on to the VTC. Unlike the first round,
MINUSTAH and the CEP would now have the ability to track any
individual PV back to its voting center (2.3% of completed
PVs remained unaccounted for at the VTC after the first
round.)


5. (SBU) MINUSTAH technicians and CEP officials are also
concentrating on improved training for all poll workers,
which has already begun. LeChevallier related that
significant problems arose in the first round when BED and
BEC presidents, who had in many cases not approved the lists
of approved poll workers from the CEP, simply substituted
personnel trained in advance of the first round with
untrained workers on election day. MINUSTAH and CEP
personnel had taken pains to identify suitable poll workers
for the second round whom BED and BEC presidents also
approved. MINUSTAH staff related that while they had refined
training procedures, significant improvements in poll-worker
performance should result simply from having everyone
trained.


6. (C) MINUSTAH staff placed particular emphasis on improving
procedures at the VTC. The majority of delays in the
counting process after the first round resulted from
irregularities with PVs that required adjudication by CEP
legal staff in order to be counted . CEP legal staff for the
most part failed to meet their responsibilities, delaying the
count and requiring the intervention of CEP DG Bernard and
CEP counselors who were present in the VTC only
intermittently. Problems arose with PVs principally as a
result of several last minute changes in the location of
voting centers (PVs were pre-programmed in the system with a
numerical and geographic indicator) and inconsistencies or
problems in reading the hand-written PVs. MINUSTAH and CEP
officials will work to have the locations of voting centers
identified and programmed in the system well in advance --
the CEP still plans on moving a few voting centers and
opening annexes. With the candidates list already
determined, the CEP will also be able provide pre-printed PVs
to voting centers. Finally, CEP Director Bernard is working
to ensure the efficient and professional performance of CEP
legal staff on hand at the VTC to deal quickly deal with any
discrepancies.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) With the first round having served as a dress
rehearsal, we are confident that preparations, logistics, and
electoral staff performance will improve for the second
round. In addition, with the presidential race decided, a
likely smaller turnout should pose less strain on the system
and lead to a quicker count of the result. We share the
analysis of many MINUSTAH officials and Haitian observers
that the potential threat of spoliers will be greater in the
second round particularly in central and southern provinces,
where local rivalries appear to be more heated. Fortunately,
it does not appear that the races in Port-au-Prince will
generate disorder among the supporters of the competing
candidates. Disruptions are likely to remain localized,
however, and should not endanger the overall completion of
the second round and the installation of the parliament.

SANDERSON