Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PORTAUPRINCE2104
2006-11-03 14:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Au Prince
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF INL A/S ANNE W.

Tags:  PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM KJUS HA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHPU #2104/01 3071428
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031428Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4447
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1270
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1107
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL//OLE/OI//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 002104 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR
DRL
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM KJUS HA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF INL A/S ANNE W.
PATTERSON'S VISIT TO HAITI, NOVEMBER 2-4.

Classified By: Classified by Charge d'Affairs Thomas C. Tighe for reaso
n 1.4(b).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 002104

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR
DRL
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM KJUS HA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF INL A/S ANNE W.
PATTERSON'S VISIT TO HAITI, NOVEMBER 2-4.

Classified By: Classified by Charge d'Affairs Thomas C. Tighe for reaso
n 1.4(b).


1. (C) With your visit approaching, Haiti remains in a kind
of suspended animation as its population awaits to see what
lasting results are produced by President Preval's initiative
to control criminality emanating from the slum area of Cite
Soleil and break the power of the Cite Soleil gangs.
Preval's policy, based on direct negotiations with gang
leaders, an incremental increase in the presence of MINUSTAH
and Haitian police (HNP) forces in Cite Soleil, and the
promise of increased social benefits for gang affiliates, has
over the past several weeks produced a marked increase in
public order and decrease in kidnapping. Cite Soleil gangs
remain heavily armed with their organizations intact,
however, and MINUSTAH and the GoH have managed to establish
only the most fragile of relationships with Cite Soleil
residents they hope to wean away from the gangs. Though Cite
Soleil remains the focus of public attention, Haitians are
also coming to grips with a new security reality in the wake
of the instability that characterized the end of the last
Aristide administration and the interim government. The
reality is that, independent of the gangs, both petty and
serious crime are much more widespread than has been
traditionally been the case throughout Haiti, and Haitians
will have to accustom themselves to a level of criminality
common to most of the other larger cities throughout the
hemisphere.


2. (C) In the meantime, GoH and MINUSTAH efforts to
implement a more comprehensive security policy and HNP reform
proceed haltingly. President Preval's demand that the HNP
take a more visible role in and around Cite Soleil has
diverted much of HNP Director General Andresol's attention to
reform. Additionally, preparations for the final round of

national and local elections in December 3 will occupy both
MINUSTAH's and the HNP's leadership in the coming weeks.
Andresol has taken some key steps in recent weeks, replacing
departmental level police chiefs, many of whom were
implicated in corruption and drug trafficking, arresting
police officers in Port-au-Prince accused of involvement in
corruption and kidnapping, and establishing a close working
relationship with the government's chief prosecutor for
Port-au-Prince, Claudy Gassant, to ensure that the GoH builds
strong cases against corrupt officers. With the help of
MINUSTAH advisors, the performance of the HNP's special crowd
control (CIMO),SWAT, and anti-kidnapping units has also
improved remarkably. The HNP distinguished themselves by
their restrained and professional performance during the
elections, and the CIMO unit has done an excellent job of
policing smaller demonstrations since then.


3. (C) Implementation of the MINUSTAH-drafted HNP reform
plan hinges on two areas: vetting and certification of
existing officers, and the establishment of a functioning
administration within the HNP to manage personnel, equipment,
procurement, budgeting, and the range of other functions a
large organization requires. DG Andresol estimates that
between one third and one quarter of current HNP officers
would be dismissed under a credible vetting regime, and
though he has demonstrated firm commitment cleaning out his
force, he also worries about the impact of a vetting program
at a time when President Preval insists on maintaining
maximum police presence on the streets. No less crippling
for Andresol is the almost complete lack of a functioning
administration, which limits both his ability to conduct
joint efforts with MINUSTAH -- he cannot be sure that his
officers will show up when ordered -- and direct his force's
own daily operations.


4. (C) Our role in supporting the HNP and the reform plans
remains central. Though MINUSTAH maintains primary
responsibility for providing technical assistance, and other
donors, notably Canada and France, have also discussed
providing technical support, our material support for the
HNP, which ranges from arms and ammunition to the uniforms on
their backs and the food their cadets eat at the academy, is
the critical factor enabling the HNP to assume greater

PORT AU PR 00002104 002 OF 002


responsibility for basic security and to even contemplate
utilizing MINUSTAH resources in implementing more ambitious
reform.


5. (C) Your GoH interlocutors, particularly Prime Minister
Alexis, are likely to stress the need for increased
consultation and coordination. This stems from the
perception that under the interim government, Haitian
officials lost control of basic policy issues, including
security policy, to the international donors, who duplicate
efforts and do not always respect Haitian sovereignty. With
respect to police assistance, this impression is largely
unfounded, though GoH officials do chafe under the conditions
that we attach to our provision of lethal materials. Rather
than argue the point, we continue to express our willingness
to consult and cooperate in any manner which the GoH sees
fit, and stress our commitment to the long-term effort of
building an HNP that is self-sustaining and serves to protect
the Haitian people. Your interlocutors will also raise the
need for more assistance in combating international narcotics
trafficking in Haiti. President Preval himself believes that
lack of anti-narcotics support from the U.S. during his first
term hampered his ability to govern. Counter-drug
cooperation did suffer as a result of unreliable GoH
counterparts during the interim government, and the Haitian
coast guard, a key partner of ours but long the poor
step-sister of Haitian security forces, suffered
disproportionately under Arstide and the interim government.
We are hopeful that under the GoH we can both re-establish
significant anti-narcotics operations with the
newly-established anti-drug unit within the HNP, butress the
role of the coast guard, and cement commitment of senior GoH
officials in attacking the powerful drug traffickers that
operate within Haiti.


6. (C) In sum, we are heartened by the commitment of DG
Andresol and the senior levels of the GoH to reform the HNP,
attack corruption, and re-establish law and order throughout
Haiti. However, the lack of material and human resources at
every level of the government, combined with the immediate
exigency of providing some semblance of law and order makes
it extraordinarily difficult for these officials to plan and
implement longer-term goals. Our security assistance program
aims to take those difficulties into account, while
maintaining a mix of friendly encouragement and pressure to
move reform forward.
TIGHE