Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PORTAUPRINCE2031
2006-10-24 15:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Au Prince
Cable title:  

MINUSTAH/HNP ATTACKED IN CITE SOLEIL

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL HA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8655
PP RUEHQU
DE RUEHPU #2031/01 2971531
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241531Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4382
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1261
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1099
RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC 0604
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1015
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 002031 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL HA
SUBJECT: MINUSTAH/HNP ATTACKED IN CITE SOLEIL

PORT AU PR 00002031 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JANET A. SANDERSON, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 002031

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL HA
SUBJECT: MINUSTAH/HNP ATTACKED IN CITE SOLEIL

PORT AU PR 00002031 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JANET A. SANDERSON, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary. A MINUSTAH operation to clear rubble from
an area near a Cite Soleil checkpoint on October 19 generated
fierce protests from local residents. The operation
ultimately resulted in an armed battle between Cite Soleil
gang members and HNP/MINUSTAH forces. Attackers firing three
to four automatic weapons pinned down a contingent of roughly
20 Brazilian soldiers and engineers plus a seven-member HNP
SWAT team for one hour before a MINUSTAH relief force arrived
to chase off the attackers, according to a U.S. police
advisor accompanying the SWAT unit. Medecins Sans Frontier
(MSF) reported that it received five casualties from the
conflict, all local residents: one person dead on arrival and
four persons injured. MSF could not specify whether the
casualties had participated in the fight. MINUSTAH officials
appear to have undertaken the rubble-clearing operation
without consulting with the community, and at least one
resident reportedly claimed that what MINUSTAH regarded as
disused rubble was her dwelling. The incident highlights the
fragile rapport between Cite Soleil residents and MINUSTAH
forces and the tenuous involvement of Haitian police (HNP) so
far in the effort to pacify Cite Soleil residents. End
Summary.
--------------
THE FIGHT
--------------


2. (C) Robert Cook, an American UNPOL SWAT advisor at the
scene, gave the following account of the incident to poloff:
On the morning of October 19, his team of seven SWAT team
members (five HNP and two UNPOL) accompanied a patrol of
16-17 Brazilian peacekeepers in Cite Soleil to provide
security for engineers who were razing buildings adjacent to
Checkpoint #16, a MINUSTAH base containing approximately 200
soldiers in the Boston area of Cite Soleil. The purpose of
the demolition was to provide MINUSTAH troops at the
checkpoint with a better defensive position. After the

bulldozing began, an angry crowd began to build, some of whom
began throwing rocks, according to press reports.
Approximately 15 minutes later the peacekeepers came under
fire from three or four semi-automatic weapons (which Cook
said sounded like AK-47s) from roughly 100 yards away. The
peacekeepers took cover, returned fire, and radioed for
assistance. The attackers pinned down the peacekeepers for an
hour, during which time the gunfire periodically swelled and
lulled, until a contingent of Brazilian and Peruvian troops
arrived in armored personnel carriers (APCs) armed with heavy
machine guns. As soon as the rescuing troops began to envelop
the attackers, positions, the attackers fled.

--------------
THE AFTERMATH
--------------


3. (U) MSF informed Poloff on October 23 that they had
treated four Haitians suffering from gunshot wounds and
confirmed one death resulting from the fight. A Reuters news
report on October 20 cited witnesses claiming MINUSTAH
peacekeepers had killed three people during the incident.
Cook reported that he observed no "bodies, hits, or blood
trails," and MINUSTAH announced on October 20 that they were
unable to confirm any casualties.


4. (C) Though MINUSTAH military leaders claimed privately
that they had consulted with community leaders before
undertaking the October 19 operation, MINUSTAH political
staff relayed to Polcouns that the military leadership had
not laid the necessary groundwork. The political staff
believed that military had made an understandable mistake,
treating what appeared to be abandoned and partially
collapsed housing as rubble to be cleared away. In the
context of Cite Soleil, however, residents regard any
standing structure as having some value, and residents would
expect at the very least to be paid if MINUSTAH destroyed a
dwelling. Recognizing their error, MINUSTAH political staff
reported that engineers planned to reconstruct the structures
they had bulldozed during their operation.

--------------

PORT AU PR 00002031 002.2 OF 002


HNP ROLE
--------------


5. (C) MINUSTAH and GoH leaders report that President Preval
insisted that the HNP take part in efforts to establish order
in Cite Soleil. As a result, MINUSTAH began including HNP
SWAT and crowd control (CIMO) units in its patrols at the
beginning of October. Cook explained that the official role
of his SWAT team is to "observe and advise," during patrols,
but that it has no operational or command responsibility. In
fact, the SWAT unit lacks the firepower and protection
necessary to engage the well-armed gangs. Typically, a
seven-member SWAT team, carried in an old and bullet-riddled
armored SUV accompanies a convoy of five or six heavily armed
and armored APCs in a morning patrol through the streets of
Cite Soleil. Cook stated that the SWAT team is the most
vulnerable and lightly-armed segment of the patrol, carrying
only handguns and riding in a vehicle (which he said
resembles a "cheese grater") with "questionable" ability to
resist rifle fire. On occasion, the patrols will stop, the
soldiers in the APCs will exit, and the convoy will assume a
defensive position while troops check out a building for
weapons or search for a wanted gang member. Cook could
remember only one other instance since SWAT joined the
patrols that the officers come under fire when they received
a few "pot shots."


6. (C) COMMENT. This incident highlights the fragility of
the GoH/MINUSTAH effort to establish stability within Cite
Soleil. Though gang leaders have supposedly committed to the
disarmament process, they evidently remain willing and able
to attack MINUSTAH troops. Despite significant progress by
MINUSTAH in gaining the confidence of Cite Soleil residents,
miscalculations in dealing with the community can still lead
to bitter conflict. Finally, with no immediate prospect for
the reopening of police stations and establishing a normal
HNP presence in Cite Soleil, the integration of HNP forces
into the GoH/MINUSTAH security plan for Cite Soleil remains
mostly symbolic. We hope that MINUSTAH can minimize the
negative impact of this incident on their overall efforts
through a swift damage control effort with community leaders
and a practical "lessons learned" exercise.
SANDERSON