ROCKY START FOR DDR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001881

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR
DRL
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR ASEC KCRM KJUS HA
SUBJECT: ROCKY START FOR DDR


Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
.


1. (C) Summary. Forty-seven gang members from Cite Soleil
on September 26 finished a week-long orientation program for
the revamped Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
(DDR) program (ref A),though follow-on activities remain in
doubt as MINUSTAH DDR staff attempt to ensure with the GoH
the standards for the program as they proceed. President
Preval reportedly directed the negotiations resulting in the
surrender of 29 weapons during the week of September 11 in
exchange for the acceptance of 55 Cite Soleil gang members
into the DDR program. Though Preval assured SRSG Mulet that
the Haitian police (HNP) would make surrendered weapons
available for registration and ballistics testing, UN police
were unsuccessful in following-up with HNP Director Andresol
as of September 28. Alix Fils-Aime, the president of The
GoH's National Committee for DDR (CNDDR),informed MINUSTAH
DDR chief Desmond Molloy that the GoH has taken possession of
another 30 weapons and identified 52 additional participants
to start the next round of DDR on October 2. Fils-Aime on
September 27 asked emboffs to directly coordinate USAID
community development efforts with the CNDDR while
underlining that the GoH, rather than MINUSTAH, was the final
authority on disarmament policy. Emboffs pledged to explore
possibilities for cooperation with the disarmament committee,
but stressed that any cooperation with the DDR committee was
contingent on transparent standards for participation in the
program, including proper registration and disposition of
surrendered weapons. DDR policy is the most visible among a
variety of issues where the GoH exerting "ownership" of key
issues. Despite some resulting friction, Molloy supports
Fils-Aime and remains committed to the CNDDR. Post does as
well, but we will join with MINUSTAH in insisting that the
GoH adhere to transparent and acceptable standards,
especially regarding surrendered weapons.
End Summary.

DDR Begins
--------------


2. (C) MINUSTAH DDR staff on September 18 initiated the
orientation program for 47 participants at Camp Santo, a
MINUSTAH facility located two kilometers northeast of the
Port-au-Prince airport. MINUSTAH and GoH contacts report
that President Preval had directed the negotiations leading
to the weapons hand over on September 13 and entry of 55 gang
members into the DDR program. Fils-Aime informed Molloy that
the GoH brokered the arrangement only on Saturday, September
16, giving DDR staff just the weekend to prepare to accept
the participants at the orientation camp the following
Monday. Molloy related to polcouns that Fils-Aime made clear
in informing Molloy that the CNDDR would exercise control
over the DDR process and expected MINUSTAH to implement their
decisions. Fils-Aime himself went to Cite Soleil on
September 13 and took possession of the weapons in the
presence of Cite Soleil gang leaders. (Note: Radio
Megastar, the favored media outlet of the Cite Soleil gangs,
accurately reported the weapons surrender the day it
occurred, but the event otherwise garnered no press. The GoH
never formally acknowledged its initiation of DDR. End Note.)


3. (C) Gang leaders identified 53 DDR participants, divided
by neighborhood: 10 from the Simon Pele neighborhood,
(controlled by William "Ti Blan" Baptiste); 30 individuals
from Bellecourt (Amaral Duclonat); 4 from Boston (Evans
Jeune),and 9 from Brooklin (affiliation unknown). Ministry
of interior official and disarmament committee member Emnual
Gouttier related to Polcouns that he went to Cite Soliel on
September 18, the first day of the orientation program, to
oversee transport arrangements for the participants and that
the gang leaders had come out to observe the proceedings.
Coincidentally, a Brazilian patrol had passed close by at the
same time, causing everyone to disappear within seconds,
"like a power-point slide disappearing from a screen." It
took him several minutes to reassemble everyone and convince
them that the GoH had not arranged a trap.


4. (C) Molloy told polcouns on September 26 that 47 gang

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members from the original list successfully completed the
one-week program (Note: The GoH provided bus transport to
and from Camp Santo and Cite Soleil each day. End Note) Of
those, MINUSTAH could confirm the identities of only 38; the
others had provided either false identification or no
identification. The orientation program included a medical
evaluation, presentations promoting non-violent behavior, and
assessments of the participants suitability for follow-on
vocational training or inclusion in a micro-enterprise. Of
most interest to the participants, according to DDR staff,
was the chance to eat three regular meals a day.


5. (C) Molloy dubbed the first orientation a success,
noting that participants willingly participated and completed
the program, but raised several concerns. Participants told
DDR staff that their gang leaders worked out the arrangement
with the GoH; they themselves did not disarm. Every
participant indicated that they wanted to receive training as
mechanics and become truck drivers, apparently because they
understood that President Preval promised they would go to
work as truck drivers for the parastatal heavy equipment
agency (CNE, "Centre National de Equipment"). The GoH also
delivered to each participant a payment of roughly US$100
(4000 Haitian Gourdes) in Cite Soleil in addition to the
support that DDR staff agreed to with the disarmament
committee (DDR staff also made a $100 payment to each
participant at the successful conclusion of the program).
Molloy also suspected, based on information provided by UNPol
colleagues, that three of the DDR participants were Ti Blan's
"top lieutenants," sent to spy on the DDR process. Most
troubling, gang leader Beloney Pierre over the weekend
beginning September 24 reportedly re-instigated kidnapping
and attacks against MINUSTAH forces in the northern Cite
Soleil neighborhood of Bois Neuf, presumably breaking any
pledge he made to the GoH.

What Weapons?
--------------


6. (C) As of September 28, the GoH had failed to make
available to MINUSTAH the surrendered weapons for
examination, entry into the joint MINUSTAH/HNP weapons
database, and ballistics testing. A very agitated Molloy
told polcouns that though Preval and Fils-Aime assured SRSG
Mulet that HNP Director General Andresol would provide UNPol
officers access to the weapons, Andresol had been out of
touch for the past two days. As a result, Molloy recommended
to Mulet that MINUSTAH suspend all further DDR activities
until MINUSTAH registered the weapons and Fils-Aime clarified
issues of transparency and standards the GoH would uphold in
identifying future DDR participants. Fils-Aime had already
earlier that day informed Molloy that the Cite Coleil gang
leaders had turned and additional 30 weapons, and that as a
result the CNDDR accepted an additional 52 DDR participants.



7. (C) Polcouns stressed to Fils-Aime during a meeting on
September 27 (see para 8) that any cooperation between the
embassy and the CNDDR was contingent on the proper
disposition of surrendered weapons. Fils-Aime offered his
personal assurances that he had taken care of the matter and
that it would no longer be a problem ("If I was
lackadaisical, I apologize, but it won't be a problem
again.") Fils-Aime showed polcouns the list of the 30
surrendered weapons, but declined to provide a copy, saying
the list would be distributed "in due time." The weapons,
listed with their serial numbers, included M-14s M-4s, T-65s,
two Kalishnikovs, one Uzi, and two 38 caliber pistols.
Fils-Aime claimed that all were in working order.

U.S. Cooperation
--------------


8. (C) At Fils-Aime's request, polcouns and USAID's
technical officer for community development accompanied the
chief of party for the embassy's principle implementing
partner for social projects, the International Organization
for Migration's (IOM) chief of party on September 27 to
discuss areas of potential cooperation between the CNDDR and

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the embassy. Fils-Aime explained that the CNDDR wanted to
jump start community projects in Cite Soleil and the slums of
Port-au-Prince, notably in the areas of drainage and water
supply, school renovation, job creation, and micro-credit.
He proposed that IOM meet with the committee's community
partners in these neighborhoods to better coordinate ze IOM
programs with the committee's. Fils-Aime took some exception
to IOM's suggestion that the CNDDR, through MINUSTAH,
initiate a wider consultative process with other NGOs.
Fils-Aime declared at several points during the conversation
that "the Government of Haiti is in charge of disarmament
policy, not MINUSTAH," and that he preferred the flexibility
of dealing directly with individual partners as he worked to
get initial projects off the ground. After further
clarifying that the CNDDR should expand its consultations and
coordinate with all relevant donors and NGO's as soon as
possible, Emboffs agreed to a meeting with CNDDR partners
with USAID and IOM on September 30.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) We are not overly concerned with Fils-Aime's desire
to exert control over the DDR process and the resulting
tensions with MINUSTAH. Fils-Aime, who is a strong
personality in his own right, is also responding to direct
pressure from Preval to quickly pacify Cite Soleil and resist
perceived international efforts to limit Preval's ability to
devise "Haitian solutions" to Haiti's problems. Molloy
confided that he felt "exposed" as he tried to support the
work of the CNDDR and ensure the program's standards at the
same time. He maintains, however, that Fils-Aime is doing an
admirable job under difficult circumstances: Molloy remains
committed to preserving a supportive relationship between
MINUSTAH and the CNDDR. Based on preliminary conversations,
we believe there is potential for useful collaboration with
the CNDDR.. We will make the point with Fils-Aime and other
GoH officials, however, that adherence to acceptable
standards, particularly the completely transparent and proper
disposition of surrendered weapons, is a minimum condition
for continued cooperation on DDR and other security-related
areas.


SANDERSON