PREVAL REVIVES DDR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001543

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR
DRL
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR ASEC KCRM HA
SUBJECT: PREVAL REVIVES DDR

REF: PAUP 1481

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons
1.4(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary. President Preval has asked MINUSTAH to
develop and prepare to implement a Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration ((DDR) plan to serve as the
carrot in his "carrot and stick" policy to combat
Port-au-Prince's armed gangs (reftel). MINUSTAH's DDR
department is preparing a program to offer an option of
vocational education or micro-enterprise grants for up to
1,000 participants. MINUSTAH's police (UNPol) are prepared
to manage weapons collections. DDR staff stress that the GoH
must make key policy determinations, most importantly the
eligibility requirements for the participants. The
government has yet to settle its policy: presidential
advisor Alix "Boulon Fils-Aime has agreed "in principle" to
become president of a national disarmament committee, but
continues to press for and closely monitor MINUSTAH progress
in combating gang activity and pacifying neighborhoods in the
Cite Militaire district, adjacent to the gang strongholds in
Cite Soleil. DDR staff over the past year had worked to
develop a broader strategy focused on violence suppression
and community development after the failure of its
traditional approach of weapons for benefits exchange failed
under the interim government. MINUSTAH leadership, however,
feels obliged to support Preval's policy and is encouraged
that that he is committed to a more aggressive security
posture. Post shares the reservations regarding a
re-initiation of a weapons exchange, but notes positive
developments since the last attempts to implement DDR;
notably, the direct involvement of President Preval and his
commitment to the permanent presence of security forces in
gang-controlled areas, whether the gangs agree to DDR or not.

The Carrot
--------------


2. (SBU) In response to a request made by President Preval to
MINUSTAH leaders on Saturday, August 5, DDR staff at MINUSTAH
are scrambling to finish a plan that will offer participants
the option of receiving vocational education or a grant and
training to operate a small business. Preval set a target
implementation date of September 4, and DDR staff are
attempting to meet that deadline, but they doubt that
MINUSTAH and the GoH will have finalized all aspects of the
program by that time.


3. (SBU) DDR staffer Eric Calpas informed Polcouns on August
16 that the DDR section would divert nearly all of its
budget, roughly $3.6 million for FY07, to the new program.
The department would assign all staff, totaling 56
countrywide, to the implementation of the program. Those in
the field (rughly half) were in the process of re-locating
toPort-au-Prince. Calpas planned to accommodate up o 1,000
participants, who would the choice of reeiving vocational
education in one of seven exising Port-au-Prince vocational
schools or a grantand ongoing training to set up a
micro-enterprise (He confided that he had approached
business laders about the possibility of employing the
paricipants, but encountered "a lot of nervousness" o their
part.) MINUSTAH would pay tuition directy to the schools
and offer participants a subsistence allowance (yet to be
determined) while in school. Calpas estimated that grants,
training, and subsistence to those entering micro-enterprises
would total roughly $3,000 per person over 18 months. The
DDR department had already made arrangements with the
vocational schools and had identified local NGOs to support
the micro-enterprise initiative.


4. (SBU) Calpas stressed that UNPol would take
responsibility for collecting and enforcing discipline,
removing participants if they failed to uphold their
commitment. The GoH would settle critical policy questions,
most importantly the eligibility standards for individuals
and the numbers and types of weapons required in exchange for
benefits. Calpas admitted that the program would attract not
only gang members, but a large number of Haitians across the

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spectrum of the poorer classes. The GoH, he underlined,
would have sort out the issue of fairness. Preval had said
that the GoH would establish a national disarmament committee
to liaise with MINUSTAH and coordinate among the ministries,
and GoH sources had indicated that presidential advisor Alix
"Boulon" Fils-Aime would become the committee's president,
but MINUSTAH had yet to establish formal contact with
Fils-Aime. (Note: Fils-Aime confirmed to Polcouns on August
17 on the phone that he had "agreed in principle" to become
the president of the disarmament committee, but wanted
specific assurances, along with official publication, of his
responsibilities before formally accepting the position. End
Note.)

Out with the New, In with the Old
--------------


5. (SBU) Preval's request has forced the DDR department to
suspend its efforts to move toward broader anti-gang and
community development initiatives and back toward a weapons
exchange program. DDR chief Desmond Molloy had over the past
twelve months reshaped his department's workplan to focus on
the broader goals he labeled "violence suppression" and
"community security." He would have preferred, he admitted
to Polcouns several weeks ago, to have changed officially the
name of his department and its programs to distance them from
previous failures, but UN bureaucracy made that impossible.
(Note: Molloy in late July made the rounds of the bilateral
missions, including a call on the Ambassador, to emphasize
his department's new approach and re-establish support within
the international community. End Note.) Calpas (acting for
Molloy while he is on leave) told Polcouns during their
August 16 conversation that the DDR department hoped to
preserve the new approach and still implement broader
programs they had begun to develop, but were now dependent on
donor contributions since they had redirected their own
budget to respond to Preval.

The Stick
--------------


6. (C) Immediately following the discussion with Calpas,
UNPol Commissioner Graham Muir confirmed to Polcouns that
UNPol was prepared to take an active role in the projected
DDR program. Equally important, at the urging of Preval,
UNPol was now fully integrated in the intensified MINUSTAH
effort to pacify the Cite Militaire, immediately to the east
of Cite Soleil on the other side of route national 1, and
bordered on the other side by the airport road,
Port-au-Prince's most critical business artery. According to
Muir, Preval had made clear that he wanted MINUSTAH to have
ultimately completely secured Cite Militaire all along route
national 1 to decisively demonstrate to the gangs in Cite
Soleil that there was no way out of their neighborhoods and
disarmament was their only option. Preval called meetings
with senior MINUSTAH leadership to go over tactical plans on
almost a daily basis -- Preval had called MINUSTAH leaders
and senior Haitian security personnel to another meeting at
the palace that evening.


7. (C) Apart from seeking pacification of the area around
Cite Soleil, Preval was pushing MINUSTAH to devise special
operation tactics to eliminate the worst gang leaders without
provoking wider fire fights or inflicting collateral damage.
Muir reported that MINUSTAH commanders were often required to
remind Preval of the limits of their capabilities. (In a
separate earlier conversation with a MINUSTAH political
department official, she related that Preval had asked why
MINUSTAH could not track the gang leaders from vans with
surveillance devices from the periphery of Cite Soleil, "like
you see in the movies.")


8. (C) As a result of Preval's urging, UNPol and the HNP had
established static checkpoints and, with MINUSTAH military
forces, patrolled along airport and road and route national

1. Additionally, Senegalese, Chinese, and Nigerian Formed
Police Units (FPUs) had followed behind MINUSTAH troops and
established permanent posts in Cite Militaire. Muir singled
out the Senegalese in particular, who "spoke French, are

PORT AU PR 00001543 003 OF 003


comfortable with the population, only fire when fired on, and
fire back at the right people." MINUSTAH and UNPol were
taking control of Cite Militaire block by block with the
support of the population. The final steps in the process
were to tighten the noose around resident gang leaders
William Baptiste, "Ti Blanc," and "Beloney." If MINUSTAH
captured or killed either of them in the process, it would
serve as a warning to the remaining gang leaders in Cite
Soleil.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Though the re-initiation of a weapons exchange program
as a central element of anti-gang policy is cause for
concern, all other indications are that Preval, after a
period of coming to grips with the issue, is committed to
decisive action to deal with the gang problem. Moreover, for
the first time since the establishment of the MINUSTAH
mission in 2004, Preval's initiative has spurred its
military, police, and civil elements to act in an integrated
fashion in lockstep support of government policy. Success,
however, is not guaranteed. The government must still take
difficult policy decisions regarding eligibility for the
program and demonstrate a longer-term ability to maintain
focus and cabinet discipline to carry through the carrot and
stick policy. Fils-Aime, the disarmament czar apparent, is
capable and a hard worker, but he is not yet up to speed on
MINUSTAH plans and has not been involved in any of the
discussions between the Preval government and the gang
leaders. Ultimately, the success of this iteration of DDR
will likely not be measured by the number of weapons
collected, but by the ability of MINUSTAH and the GoH to
maintain a permanent law-enforcement presence in areas
currently controlled by the gangs.


SANDERSON