PPREVAL TO GANGS: DISARM OR DIE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 001481

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR
DRL
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA
SUBJECT: PPREVAL TO GANGS: DISARM OR DIE

REF: PAUP 1460

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons
1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Six days after announcing he preferred "dialogue" to
a military solution, President Preval on August 9 publicly
demanded that gangs "surrender their arms or die" in a
surprise visit to Cite Militaire, a Port-au-Prince slum
adjacent to the gang stronghold of Cite Soleil. Preval's
visit and statement came as a surprise -- MINUSTAH officials
told the Ambassador that the request from Preval to arrange
security came only on the morning of the visit -- but the
media reported Preval mixing with local residents delighted
to see their president and chanting in favor of disarmament.
A sampling of opinion from an embassy reception the same
evening, revealed relief and support for the president's
statement, including from many elites who are prone to
distrust him. Presidential Counselor Gabriel Varret told
Polcouns that the statement reflected what Preval had been
saying in private for weeks. "The president is stubborn.
He's decided these guys will disarm."


2. (C) Prime Minister Alexis told the Ambassador at the same
reception that Preval's statement was a "clear and
definitive" step forward in dealing with the gangs.
Discussions with gang leaders had been ongoing but only to
make clear that they had to either take the carrot or face
the stick. The PM maintained that offering the gangs an
alternative was still the "most reasonable" policy. The
communities where gangs were entrenched needed to see that
the government was not ignoring their concerns and intended
to better their condition.


3. (C) The PM related that security remained the government's
top priority; that he and the president were working from
"six until midnight" to find a solution. Consultation and
cooperation with MINUSTAH on security strategy was
comprehensive, and the president had full confidence in
MINUSTAH's ability to take necessary action. MINUSTAH and
Haitian police (HNP) had, as of the morning of August 8,
completely secured airport road. He would appear at the
chamber of deputies the senate in the following two days with
the Senior Committee for the National Police (CSPN --
composed of the PM, the ministers of justice and interior,
the state secretary for public security, and the police
director general) to brief parliament on the government's
security policy. He had delayed this appearance, though
parliament had criticized him, until he had something
concrete to report.


4. (C) Comment. Preval claimed that his previous statement
regarding dialogue had been misunderstood. But the negative
reaction to his support for dialogue and continuing violence
over the past six days, particularly on airport road, seem to
finally have put Preval in a position where he had to
forcefully respond. Polcouns on August 8 suggested to
presidential advisor Alix Fils-Aime that the government was
heading toward a crisis. "It is a crisis," he responded, and
the people are losing confidence in our ability to respond by
the day." Prime Minister Alexis is also somewhat vindicated
by Preval's public statement. His tough talk at the end of
July that the government would insist on "the carrot or the
stick" seemed toothless in the context of Preval's silence
and government inaction. Preval on August 8 arranged for
another meeting with gang leaders at the palace (sources vary
whether three or four appeared),which presidential advisor
Robert Manual indicated to the Ambassador did not produce
results. With Preval also highlighting in his statement that
the HNP had killed 17 "bandits" earlier in the week in areas
immediately adjacent to Cite Soleil, Preval appears to have
resolved to confront the Cite Soleil gangs if necessary.
SANDERSON