NEW TRUCE QUELLS GANG VIOLENCE - FOR NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001342

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA MARKINGS AND QUOTE MARKINGS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016
TAGS: PINS ASEC PGOV HA
SUBJECT: NEW TRUCE QUELLS GANG VIOLENCE - FOR NOW

Classified By: (U) Classified by Amb. Janet A. Sanderson for reason 1.4
(b,d).


1. (C) Summary: MINUSTAH's top gang expert reports that
on July 21 Cite Soleil's most powerful gang leader, Evens
Jeune, re-imposed a truce to end the recent violence and
kidnappings that have Port-au-Prince. MINUSTAH says there
have been no hostile actions reported in the Airport Road
area bordering Cite Soleil since late morning July 21.
Jeune,s motives in easing and then re-imposing the truce are
unclear, but his actions may be intended to underscore his
power both to the government and to other gang leaders.
While any reduction in the recent upsurge in violence is
welcome, it is nonetheless worrying that Jeune apparently has
the ability to turn the pressure up or down at will. End
summary.


2. (C) ADCM met late July 22 with Lizbeth Cullity, Deputy
Chief of MINUSTAH's Political Affairs Section and its
principal gang expert. Cullity has lived in Haiti since the
1980s and for more than ten years headed the UN Human Rights
Office in Port-au-Prince. She provided the following update
on current gang developments.

Evens Jeune Re-imposes Truce
--------------


3. (C) Cite Soleil gang leader Evens Jeune met with other
gangsters July 21 to insist on an end to the recent upsurge
in violence. Jeune, also known as "Ti Couto" (little
knife) for his penchant for dismembering his victims, is the
most powerful gang leader in the area. He threatened to kill
any of the other gangsters who disobeyed his order.


4. (C) The recent uptick in violence - especially
lucrative kidnappings - was largely due to financial
pressures on lower- and mid-level gang members. Jeune and a
few other senior leaders benefit from regular pay-offs from
businessmen who want to continue operations in industrial
areas near Cite Soleil, and from other income streams, such
as market taxes. But other gang members, who are dependent
on revenues from kidnapping and petty crime, suffered
financially during the gang truce that brought relative peace
to Port-au-Prince following Preval's election. (Note: A
prominent businessman who operates a factory on Airport Road
offered a similar economic analysis of the recent violence.
End note.)


5. (C) Lower-level gang members also grew impatient with
empty overtures from the GOH, which produced no concrete
results. A series of Preval emissaries - including
Jean-Jacques Joel, Rene Momplaisir, and Rene Civil - were in
contact with the gang leaders. But the gang members saw no
progress in addressing their demands, notably for some form
of amnesty. Gang members particularly distrust Preval
confidant Bob Manuel, whom they recall as an aggressive
Minister of State for Public Safety under whose tenure some
18 gang leaders were killed.


6. (C) About a month ago, Jeune realized that pressure was
mounting from mid-level gangsters. He took several steps to
reassert his authority. He personally oversaw the capture,
torture, and execution of two young Haitian National Police
recruits who mistakenly entered Cite Soleil. When gang
leader "Amiral" seized a generator from rival "Blade,"
Jeune insisted it be returned and showed no respect to
Amiral. Jeune authorized gang leader "Ti Blan" to
challenge MINUSTAH directly, including by threatening that a
MINUSTAH presence would not be tolerated in the Pele or Cite
Militaire neighborhoods adjacent to Cite Soleil. Finally,
Jeune "declared war" and permitted the gang members to
begin the violence we have witnessed in the past several
weeks.


7. (C) Comment: Jeune's reasons for stopping the violence
July 21 are less clear. One possibility is that, after
several weeks of kidnapping, the lower-level gang members
have replenished their coffers and are content to stand down.
Another is that he wanted to send a signal both to other
gang leaders and to the GOH that he has the capability to
unleash or restrain the gangs as he chooses. A third is that
he was somehow induced by Preval's intermediaries to call
the truce. GOH threats of action against the gangs may have
been a contributing factor in his decision, but probably were
not decisive in view of limited MINUSTAH and HNP capability.
End Comment.

Background on Evens Jeune
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PORT AU PR 00001342 002 OF 002




8. (C) According to Cullity, Jeune is a young man, perhaps
in his early twenties. He is "just a punk" who rose to
become the number two and "hatchet man" (literally) for
gang leader "Labanier". Labanier was closely affiliated
with Lavalas, but then learned in 2002 that Aristide wanted
him killed. Labanier shopped around for a country to give
him political asylum in exchange for telling what he knew
about Aristide,s nefarious activities. Eventually,
businessman Andy Apaid, who had been financing the gang,
arranged for Labanier to leave. Before he could get out,
however, Jeune killed him and assumed control of the gang.
Unlike Labanier, Jeune is not political. He is openly
dismissive of Lavalasien efforts to manipulate the gang now.
Jeune's power in Cite Soleil stems not merely from his
ruthlessness, but also from his "Boston" gang's control of
the key access roads into Cite Soleil, which are significant
both strategically and financially.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Cullity is a recognized expert on the Cite Soleil
gangs and we have a high degree of confidence in her
information. Jeune's motives for re-imposing the
post-election truce on July 21 remain unclear, but indeed
there has been a return to calm since then. While we're
happy to see the end of - or at least a pause in - the
recent upsurge in violence, it is also deeply worrying that
Jeune appears to have the ability to turn the pressure on or
off at will. Moreover, when lower-level gang members run out
of the proceeds of their latest kidnappings, the cycle of
violence seems likely to begin again.
SANDERSON