CAMBODIA: MORE ON RANARIDDH'S RESIGNATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000472

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM CB
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: MORE ON RANARIDDH'S RESIGNATION

REF: REFTEL: PHNOM PENH 460

Classified By: Poloff Brent Soderborg, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. FUNCINPEC Deputy Secretary General Ung
Huot says that Prince Ranariddh's decision last week to
resign as National Assembly President was based principally
on a desire to concentrate more on strengthening the party,
but Hun Sen's personal attacks and the danger that he might
be voted out of the Assembly presidency under the new 50%
plus one rule were also considerations. Huot emphasized the
FUNCINPEC view that Ranariddh getting out and seeing the
people might help reverse FUNCINPEC'S decline and benefit the
party in the 2007 commune elections and the 2008 general
election. End Summary.

FUNCINPEC: Focusing on Upcoming Elections
--------------


2. (C) On March 8, FUNCINPEC official Ung Huot, accompanied
by his assistant Sander Demontero, met with DCM and Poloff on
behalf of Prince Ranariddh and FUNCINPEC to explain the
reasons for Ranariddh's decision last week to resign as
National Assembly President. As reported reftel, Huot stated
that the Prince was too busy with his duties presiding over
the National Assembly, and as party President needs to be
more involved to stop the declining popular support for
FUNCINPEC. Following his resignation, Ranariddh immediately
started reorganizing the party, proposing that party
Inspector General Prince Chakrapong and party Secretary
General Prince Sirivudh swap positions within FUNCINPEC, and
nominating four deputy secretaries-general: Chhim Seak Leng,
Por Bun Sreu, Tea Chamrat, and Ung Huot. Huot said
Ranariddh's greater involvement will revitalize the party and
it is important that Ranariddh has the will to make changes.
He cited the 2004 IRI poll that showed Ranariddh had a 67%
approval rating (the highest rating of any politician in the
survey) while FUNCINPEC only got about 18% of the popular
vote. If Ranariddh can boost FUNCINPEC supporters' morale,
the party's chances in the 2007 communal elections look very
good. Huot indicated that while FUNCINPEC's platform for the
2007/2008 elections would remain based on the monarchy,
development of democracy, and fighting poverty, the party's
tactics will change, with Ranariddh himself getting out into
the provinces to shore up local support. If FUNCINPEC can
win 40 seats in the 2008 election; in Huot's words, Hun Sen
won't be able to kick FUNCINPEC around anymore.


3. (C) Huot referred to the Constitutional change in the
two-thirds majority rule in parliament as another factor in
Ranariddh's resignation. Huot said that since 2003, Hun Sen
has felt like a hostage to FUNCINPEC and the two-thirds rule.
With 50% plus one now in effect, Hun Sen can shuffle the
Cabinet at will, since the CPP has 73 seats and only 63 votes
are required. Although it was uncertain that the CPP would
actually propose to have him removed, Ranariddh felt that he
could easily have been voted out, so he resigned as a
preemptive move. Cambodia should be ready for political
instability or true democracy, Huot said, because in the new
system a simple majority in the parliament could vote Hun Sen
himself out of office.


4. (C) Although he feels personally insulted by Hun Sen's
accusations of corruption and the improper role of a
mistress, neither of which is new to Cambodian politics,
Ranariddh wants the coalition to continue through the end of
the current term. Huot noted Sam Rainsy's "new face" since
returning, and how Rainsy made up with Hun Sen saying he was
wrong to criticize the PM all those years. Rainsy then
proposed the 50% plus one rule for parliament and Hun Sen
agreed. Huot said that with 50% plus one, FUNCINPEC can do
little if Hun Sen and the CPP want to invite Sam Rainsy into
the government; but in his view, the CPP would not do
something that stupid and Rainsy would not be brought into
the government before 2008.


5. (C) At the end of the meeting, Huot noted that there
appears to be a love-hate relationship between the United
States and FUNCINPEC. The USG and, in particular, specific
members of Congress, had been too hard on FUNCINPEC, and
relations are not as good as they once were. DCM noted that
the USG probably has more friends in FUNCINPEC than any other
party in Cambodia and wants to maintain close relations with
FUNCINPEC. However, he emphasized that the United States
supports the democratic process and does not endorse one
party over another.

Comment
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PHNOM PENH 00000472 002 OF 002




6. (C) Ranariddh and FUNCINPEC are perhaps reading too much
into the two year-old IRI survey results and ignoring the
realities of the current Cambodian political climate. While
Ranariddh's campaigning late in the 2003 election cycle did
appear to pay some dividends for FUNCINPEC, it is unlikely
that his personal charisma can have the same effect in the
coming elections. FUNCINPEC still needs to establish an
independent identity and demonstrate it can deliver on issues
constituents care about.
Storella