Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS907
2006-02-13 14:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

PSI: INTERAGENCY BILATERAL MEETING WITH FRENCH

Tags:  KNNP PARM MNUC ETTC PREL FR CH 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000907 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE AND ISN/CPI
DHS FOR ICE
COMMERCE FOR BIS/OEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015
TAGS: KNNP PARM MNUC ETTC PREL FR CH
SUBJECT: PSI: INTERAGENCY BILATERAL MEETING WITH FRENCH
REGARDING VIBRAFUGE

REF: A. 05 STATE 60756

B. 05 PARIS 5566

C. 05 PARIS 7154

D. 05 STATE 205282

E. PARIS 335

Classified By: DCM KARL HOFMANN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B),(D),AND (H).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000907

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE AND ISN/CPI
DHS FOR ICE
COMMERCE FOR BIS/OEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015
TAGS: KNNP PARM MNUC ETTC PREL FR CH
SUBJECT: PSI: INTERAGENCY BILATERAL MEETING WITH FRENCH
REGARDING VIBRAFUGE

REF: A. 05 STATE 60756

B. 05 PARIS 5566

C. 05 PARIS 7154

D. 05 STATE 205282

E. PARIS 335

Classified By: DCM KARL HOFMANN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B),(D),AND (H).


1. (C) Summary. An interagency delegation met in Paris with
French officials on January 16 to discuss the pending export
to China of a vibration/centrifuge testing system (vibrafuge)
by the U.S. company Data Physics and the French Company
Actidyn Systemes. French technical experts disagreed with
the U.S. expert assessment that the only proven use of the
vibrafuge to date has been to test the effects of stress on
nuclear warheads and missile components upon re-entry into
the earth,s atmosphere and that the USG has credible
evidence that the vibrafuge under development by Actidyn is
destined for a nuclear weapons end-use/end-user. The GOF
maintained their claim that the vibrafuge appeared to fall
below the MTCR threshold for export of this type of equipment
and implied that it would allow the export to proceed. U.S.
delegation members countered by maintaining that the
diversion to a WMD/missile end-use cannot be ruled out and
that preventing the vibrafuge,s export is consistent with
the objectives of the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI). End summary.

Background
--------------


2. (C) The USG first approached the Government of France in
April 2005 under the PSI to request that French authorities
stop the export to China of a vibration/centrifuge testing
system (vibrafuge) by the U.S. company Data Physics and the
French Company Actidyn Systemes (ref A). The USG had reason
to believe that the equipment was destined for a nuclear
weapons development end-user in China. Since then, the U.S.
had engaged the GOF in several exchanges on the technical
aspects of the equipment and had requested specific French
assistance into the USG,s efforts to pursue charges against
Data Physics for violating U.S. export control laws (refs

B-D). At the invitation of the GOF, an interagency
delegation of policy, enforcement and technical experts
(Department of State, together with Embassy liaison,
Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security and
Sandia National Laboratories) met in Paris with French
officials on January 16 to discuss the U.S. investigation
into the transfer and the technical characteristics of the
vibrafuge. National Defense General Secretariat (SGDN)
Director Jean-Luc Vo Van Qui conveyed at the outset of the
meeting that the U.S. delegation would be permitted to meet
privately with Actidyn representatives the following day,
without official French presence (reported ref E).

U.S.: Vibrafuge Export is a Proliferation Concern
-------------- --------------


3. (C) At the January 16 bilateral meeting, Department of
Commerce Export Enforcement Special Agent Joe Whitehead
presented the status of the USG,s investigation into Data
Physics, violation of U.S. export control laws. The U.S.
believes that Data Physics negotiated the sale of an Actidyn
Systemes vibrafuge to a Chinese university knowing that the
intended end-use would be nuclear weapons research and
development at the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics
(CAEP),which is included on the Department of Commerce
Entities List. Evidence collected by USG investigation to
date implies that on several occasions, Data Physics and
Actidyn discussed how to complete a request for French export
authorization, knowing that the information they were
providing would not accurately identify the end-user and
end-use. The U.S. investigation also revealed that Data
Physics had made multiple unauthorized shipments to other
listed Chinese entities involved in the development of
missile systems and nuclear weapons, in violation of U.S.
law.


4. (C) In presenting the technical characteristics of the
vibrafuge, Sandia National Laboratories technical expert
Steve Heffelfinger stated that the only documented use of
vibrafuge technology has been for testing of missile inertial
guidance systems and components, re-entry vehicles, weapon
components (i.e., switches, circuit boards),and weapon safe
and arm devices. Heffelfinger assessed that the technical
capability of the system was excessive for the Chinese
university,s claimed end-use of fundamental research on
metal fatigue. He further stated that he was unaware of any
documented research demonstrating a vibrafuge could be used
successfully in material fatigue research. (Note: the
system alone costs over 1.2 million Euros, plus the cost of
the constructing the facility to house it.) According to
Heffelfinger, there were less expensive, already proven
methods, for conducting this type of research. Although the
vibrafuge as prepared for export by Actidyn falls just below
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) export control
thresholds, it would not be difficult for the end-user to
upgrade the system for WMD/missile testing applications, he
assessed.


5. (C) Whitehead further highlighted that no universities
possess a vibrafuge and that Sandia National Laboratories
possesses the only vibrafuge in the world and it was designed
for the sole purpose of testing the effects of stress on
nuclear warheads and missile components upon re-entry in the
atmosphere. Therefore, the USG believes that the unique
nature of the French export warrants further scrutiny.

France: Vibrafuge Export is Legitimate
--------------


6. (C) According to French technical experts, the vibrafuge
posed no proliferation risk. Using vibrafuge technology for
WMD/missile testing applications in general is difficult if
not obsolete, asserted French Ministry of Defense technical
expert Graver. No other country besides the United States
employs vibrafuge technology in their weapons programs
because there are far easier and less expensive ways to
achieve the same results, Graver claimed. He stated that
furthermore, the specifications of the Actidyn vibrafuge are
inferior in performance to Sandia,s vibrafuge. It is
reasonable that a Chinese university would use a vibrafuge to
perform accelerated fatigue on materials, structures or
equipment, Graver said.


7. (C) SGDN Director Vo Van Qui stated that after careful
investigation, the GOF has been unable to conclude that the
vibrafuge is destined to a nuclear weapons end-user or
end-use. The stated end-user and the personnel associated
with the Chinese university &are real,8 he said. He
continued that the export is permissible under French and EU
regulations because the vibrafuge is neither Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) nor MTCR-controlled. Actidyn has not
violated any French or European laws, Vo Van Qui added. He
chose not to respond when U.S. delegation members sought
clarification on whether the GOF has issued a license for the
export or whether the GOF had determined that no license was
necessary. He left U.S. delegation members with the sense
that that the GOF did not plan to prohibit the export and
likely would not exercise its &catch-all8 authority to
require an export license.

U.S.: Preventing Vibrafuge Export Consistent with PSI
-------------- --------------


8. (C) U.S. delegation members countered that the
possibility of diversion to a WMD/missile end-use cannot and
should not be ruled out. The U.S. company Data Physics has
exported in the past to China,s nuclear weapons and missile
programs and the Chinese university that is the claimed
end-user has a publicly acknowledged cooperative relationship
with the CAEP. The risk of proliferation is real, regardless
of whether the vibrafuge is technically, export controlled
within specific MTCR and NSG criteria, U.S. delegation
members maintained. The U.S. delegation further stated that
MTCR controls were not as relevant as the actual end-use of
this item. (U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
Part 744, prohibits the export and re-export of all items
subject to the EAR to defined end-users, including nuclear
and missile programs. Regardless of its performance
characteristics, an item requires a U.S. export license if
the end-user or end-use is associated with nuclear weapon or
ballistic missile research.) It is certainly within the
objective and spirit of the PSI to prevent the export of
goods that have a potential to make a material contribution
to a program of proliferation concern, said one U.S.
delegation member at the conclusion of the bilateral session.

Participants
--------------


9. (U) United States:

Renee Pan, Foreign Affairs Officer, Department of State,
ISN/CPI
Robert Dry, EST Counselor, Embassy Paris
Julie Salcido, Special Agent in Charge, San Jose Field
Office, Department of Commerce, BIS/OEE
Joe Whitehead, Special Agent, San Jose Field Office,
Department of Commerce, BIS/OEE
Craig Spelce, Special Agent, San Jose Field Office,
Department of Homeland Security, ICE
Richard Jolles, ICE Representative, Embassy Paris
France:

Jean-Luc Vo Van Qui, Director of Technology and Sensitive
Transfers, National Defense General Secretariat (SGDN)
Commander Patrick Beau, Deputy for Proliferation, Science and
Technology, SGDN
Colonel Bruno Chable, SGDN
Commander Herve Auffret, SGDN
Sebastien Jaunet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Guy Lusetti, Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry

M. Ballarin, French Customs

M. Graver, Ministry of Defense

M. Guy, Ministry of Defense

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton