DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH MINISTER-DELEGATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000854

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DEPT FOR EUR, NEA, AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL FR EUN NATO KNNP IR SU CD CG
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH MINISTER-DELEGATE
FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS CATHERINE COLONNA


Classified By: AMB Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) Summary: At a February 3 meeting with the Deputy
Secretary, Minister Delegate for European Affairs Catherine

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Colonna affirmed a vision of an ever-deepening European Union
despite recent turmoil, stated that the next enlargement
should be limited to the Balkan states, and sketched a French
vision for NATO that would limit it primarily to classic
military operations. She expressed satisfaction with P-5
unity on Iran to date but saw a narrowing path with few
prospects for ultimate success. She stressed the importance
of U.S. success in Iraq but offered neither optimism nor new
French assistance. She expressed satisfaction with U.S.-EU
solidarity in the wake of the Palestinian elections and
viewed Putin's recent unhelpful statements as deliberate.
Finally, while welcoming U.S.-French cooperation on Chad and
Sudan, Colonna noted that there is no alternative to Chadian
President Deby and implicitly warned against further NATO
involvement, while informing the Deputy Secretary of a likely
EU role in the DRC. End summary.

Europe
--------------


2. (C) Colonna said the European Union was characterized by
fluidity and continuity, but the European integration process
would continue. The EU's current difficulties were not of
historical significance; if French voters rejected the
constitutional treaty, they were not rejecting the idea of
Europe. The rejection could be seen positively, as a wake-up
call about the need to address the average citizen's
concerns. What was needed over the short term, she
continued, were concrete projects in specific areas designed
to illustrate to European electorates the true utility of the
EU. Institutional reform, she indicated, would have to be
tackled later.


3. (C) The Deputy Secretary shared Colonna's skepticism on
the prospects for pushing ahead with the constitutional
treaty notwithstanding the French and Dutch referenda, and
asked whether France was considering variable geometries for
advancing the EU. Colonna responded that integration needs
to continue to ensure that a Europe of 25 -- soon to be 27 --
remained more than a free trade area, although she also
asserted that the 25 are already more integrated than were
the original 6 or 9 or 12. Calling for flexibility and
diversity, she elaborated on the President Chirac's idea of
pioneer groups which other member states could join when they
wished -- there would be no directorate or two-speed Europe
-- to take the lead in specific areas. She asserted there
was no contradiction between such flexibility and deepening.


4. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked how the EU would tackle
the issue of increased institutional effectiveness in light
of enlargement. Colonna explained the constitutional
treaty's mechanisms for increasing the voting weight of the
larger member states and for augmenting the number of areas
subject to decision-making by qualified majority rather than
unanimity. The Deputy Secretary asked whether qualified
majority voting would eventually extend to matters of foreign
policy. Colonna responded that most member states viewed
foreign policy as the last preserve of sovereignty, but
explained that the constitutional treaty would have
permitted, following an initial consensus decision on an
overall policy, subsequent coordination on tactical
implementation on the basis of qualified majority voting.
She termed the absence of harmonized tax policies an obstacle
to competition, while admitting that achieving a common
policy would be difficult.


5. (C) Colonna noted the role EU enlargement has played in
stabilizing Europe and said that France considered the
Balkans as part of Europe. However, the EU played other
important roles for its member states and could not be seen
primarily as a tool for exporting stability. Enlargement
needed to proceed now at a slower pace, since the EU still
needed to digest its latest 10 (soon to be 12) members before
moving on to the next stage. It was for this reason that the
EU had developed its neighborhood policy and was interested
in a different relationship with countries such as Ukraine.
She suggested that the same considerations should also apply
to NATO. The Deputy Secretary said the U.S. agreed on the
importance of integrating the Balkan states and conceded that
the U.S. tended to view Europe more in terms of strategic
stability than internal EU cohesion.


6. (C) Colonna made a point of raising NATO just before the

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meeting concluded. She stated that France had confidence and
trust in NATO and was interested in deepening its
relationship with NATO. France did not want NATO-EU tensions
to interfere with U.S.-EU relations. She informed the Deputy
Secretary that France would soon present its "vision" for

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NATO at the February 4 security conference in Munich. She
noted France's preference that NATO remain a military
organization and engage in other missions only on an
exceptional basis. The Deputy Secretary responded that it is
important for the EU to develop defense capabilities,
including expeditionary capability, and emphasized the
importance of finding ways for the EU and NATO to work
together. Only then would the EU be able to intersect
effectively with NATO. He reminded Colonna of NATO's
importance to the U.S. as an organization where
political-military and security issues can be discussed more
generally; this was not function that the U.S. would want to
disappear.

Iran
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7. (C) The Deputy Secretary commented that the Iran issue
would be entering a more challenging phase following the IAEA
BOG vote that day and expressed appreciation for French
agreement to send their Ambassador in Tehran to Washington
for consultations on the situation in Iran. Recalling his
recent discussions in Beijing, the Deputy Secretary said he
had encouraged the Chinese to focus also on Ahmadi-Nejad's
potentially destabilizing impact on energy security and
regional security. It was also time to think about ways to
influence internal Iranian politics, where Russia and China
could perhaps play useful roles. He reminded Colonna of the
U.S. distinction between the regime and the Iranian people.


8. (C) Colonna agreed that the road was becoming narrower in
dealing with Iran, stressing the need to maintain dialogue
with Iran and unity among the international community. She
insisted on the importance not just of support, but active
support, from Russia and China. But she concluded that it
was not even clear that such unity, even if maintained in the
UNSC, would impress Iran. Political Director Laboulaye took
a more optimistic line, extolling the unity among the P-5 in
evaluating the Iranian threat and working together in New
York and Vienna. He said it was appropriate now to look at
economic measures, since Ahmadi-Nejad was elected on a social
platform and would need to deliver. He doubted that Russia
and China would agree on sanctions. Sanctions would be the
only real chance to move Iran in the right direction, he
said, but it would require heavy lobbying of others.


9. (C) The Deputy Secretary agreed with Laboulaye's focus on
the "shadow" areas of Iran's social and economic environment,
which offered prospects for influencing Russia and China to
play more active roles. Modulation would be important, he
said, and Russia was a key, since on some issues China would
tend to follow its lead. At the same time, he also
encouraged the EU to remain closely engaged with China, since
China could also help steer Iran in the right direction.
Colonna fretted again that, although unity was a precondition
for a solution, it was not a solution by itself. She feared
that the West would suffer first from economic sanctions, and
noted that political sanctions would have little effect on a
president who rarely went abroad. The Deputy Secretary noted
that some companies were already beginning to pull out of
Iran because based on their risk assessments. He expressed
the hope that it would be possible -- through P-5 and Indian
solidarity -- to exploit Iranian vulnerabilities, without
overplaying that hand.

Iraq
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10. (C) The Deputy Secretary outlined the U.S. political,
economic and security agendas, saying that 2006 would be a
critical year for Iraq. As the situation in Iraq improved,
he suggested that the GOF consider how it might help in
capacity building in Iraqi ministries, in addition to
opportunities for military training. Colonna expressed the
hope that the U.S. would succeed in Iraq and said France's
special relationship with Iraq had ended with the first Gulf
War. She recalled French assistance through debt relief but
made no new offers. She described progress in Iraq as slow
and filled with more disappointments than good surprises,
concluding that France was not very optimistic about the
future. The Deputy Secretary responded that that divisions
were beginning to develop between Sunni insurgents and Al

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Qaida. He said the U.S. would remain open to further
discussions with France.

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
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11. (C) The Deputy Secretary expressed satisfaction with EU
and U.S. agreement on key standards for Hamas following its
surprise victory in the Palestinian elections. He noted that
Olmert would probably follow Sharon's lead in using a mix of
unilateral and cooperative steps to move forward. He
believed Israel would seek opportunities to work together
with Abu Mazen. He pointed out that, for Israel,
Ahmadi-Nejad's statements are not taken as merely rhetorical.


12. (C) Colonna said France's and the EU's policy was
encapsulated in the Quartet declaration and expressed
satisfaction that the U.S. and EU were on the same page. She
expressed concern about Russian President Putin's recent
statements on the Palestinian situation, which she called
"different" and probably not improvised. More generally, she
expressed concern about overreaction in the Muslim world to
the publishing of anti-Islamic political cartoons. On the
Israeli elections, she saw good chances for Olmert to follow
in Sharon's footsteps, and agreed he would mix unilateralism
with cooperation.

Chad and Sudan
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13. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted the importance of
implementation of the North-South Accord in Sudan at a moment
when world attention was focused increasingly on Darfur. He
said the African Union (AU) AMIS force in Darfur had reached
its limits and that it was now time to involve the UN. He
assured Colonna of U.S. awareness of the need to support the
AU while encouraging it to work together with NATO and the EU
to build up the capability of AMIS, particularly in the areas
of logistics and planning, as well as funding. The situation
was complicated by splits among the various rebel groups. He
noted that the advent of insecurity in Chad is problematic
and emphasized the importance of staying in contact on this
issue. Noting that the UN Special Representative had
mentioned the possibility of French engagement through a
border force, the Deputy Secretary asked about the French
position on Chadian President Deby's strength and the French
role in Chad. He also assured Colonna that the U.S. was
prepared to discuss Cote d'Ivoire with France.


14. (C) Colonna welcomed U.S.-French cooperation to try to
address the ongoing situation and agreed on the difficulties
inherent in finding a solution. It was important to move
forward pragmatically. France agreed that the Africans and
the AU needed to take their future into their own hands and
underscored that France is participating in Africa as part of
international efforts, as in Cote d'Ivoire, and would not
allow itself to be in a showdown with any African country.
Noting that the Darfur situation cuts across the French
position vis-a-vis NATO and the EU, she cautioned against the
dangers of too many cooks in the kitchen. She then noted
that the EU might soon take on a greater role in the DRC.
Finally, she stressed the French view that there were no good
alternatives to Deby.


15. (U) Participants
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--France
Catherine Colonna, Minister Delegate for European Affairs
Stanislas de Laboulaye, MFA Political Director
Daniel Parfait, Americas Director
Gilles Dufeigneux, Cabinet Director
Yves Oudin, Americas Directorate Deputy Director
MFA Notetaker

-- U.S.
The Deputy Secretary
Ambassador Stapleton
EUR PDAS Volker
Michael Matera, D Executive Assistant
Taiya Smith, D Special Assistant
Christine Davies, D Special Assistant
Richard Mills, D Senior Advisor for Public Affairs
Embassy notetaker


16. (U) The Deputy Secretary's party cleared this message.


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