DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH SENIOR GOF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 000846

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PREF IV CD SU FR
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH SENIOR GOF
OFFICIALS ON SUDAN, CHAD, AND COTE D'IVOIRE


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Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton. Reasons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: The Deputy Secretary met separately on
February 3 with Presidential Counselor for African Affairs
Michel de Bonnecorse and Chief of Defense General Henri
Bentegeat for exchanges on Sudan and Chad. French
interlocutors concurred AMIS should transition into a UN
mission, while emphasizing an Abuja peace settlement was
indispensable to UN engagement. Bonnecorse and Bentegeat
said the Darfur crisis had left Chad's President Deby
isolated and vulnerable. France recognizes Deby's failings
but warns that Deby has no successor and his demise or
departure could lead to civil war. Bentegeat said France had
emergency evacuation plans for the international community.
He stressed that French troops would not fight in support of
Deby. Bonnecorse said France had engaged to encourage an
AU-chaired 8 February meeting in Tripoli between Deby and
Bashir which could result in a border-monitoring agreement
involving some role for French forces. Bentegeat said France
was already engaged in aerial monitoring. Bonnecorse asked
about the possibility of postponing elections in Chad on the
condition that Deby step down from power within one or two
years. He suggested Chad may break relations with Taipei,
with implications for PRC positions on Darfur. On Cote
d'Ivoire, Bonnecorse feared the onset of civil war.
Concerted international pressure -- sanctions and a robust
UNOCI -- were needed to force the "fascist" Gbagbo to hold
elections. Bentegeat appealed for UNMIL reinforcement of
UNOCI. End Summary.


2. (C) The Deputy Secretary explained the U.S. approach on
Sudan as building on the 2005 North-South Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) as the cornerstone for a broader Sudan-wide
peace that would encompass Darfur and the Beja region. The
Darfur crisis required efforts to ameliorate the humanitarian
situation, to reinforce security through deepening AMIS
capacity and readying the transition to a UN mission, and to
bolster the difficult peace process in Abuja. Despite an
overall reduction in Darfur mortality rates, the situation in
West Darfur continued to deteriorate with violence washing
across the border with Chad and shaking up the regime of
President Deby.

Presidency Views: CPA stagnating, Darfur weakening Chad
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Michel de Bonnecorse, Presidency Counselor for
African Affairs, observed with regret that the original
dynamic was gone from the CPA since the death of John Garang.
Salva Kir, Garang's successor, was less engaged, and the
position of Vice President Taha, the SPLM's principal
interlocutor, appeared to have weakened. The impact of the
Darfur crisis on Chad was France's immediate concern and
Bonnecorse worried about the regional implications. The
effects of Darfur instability could radiate further into
Central African Republic and also incite Libyan activity.


4. (C) Bonnecorse favored AMIS transition to a UN mission.
To cover an interim AMIS funding gap of 160 million USD, he
expected the EU to provide for a third of the needs, he hoped
the USG would provide another third, and that other parties
-- Canada and Arab states -- would cover the remainder. In
terms of AMIS and UN assistance, France preferred an
EU-driven solution, though a NATO logistical and planning
role was admissible. Advancing the Abuja peace talks was
indispensable to a UN transition, he asserted. He understood
the AU summit in Khartoum seemed to have energized the
negotiations. While only an observer at the Abuja talks,
Bonnecorse said France would be available to help if the USG
wanted.


5. (C) Bonnecorse asked whether Darfur parties may demand a
reworking of the CPA in order to introduce a tripartite
redistribution of wealth and power in lieu of the present

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North-South accord. Was the CPA at risk of unraveling?
There was no serious risk in the view of the Deputy
Secretary, who noted that the framework of the Abuja talks

SIPDIS
was closely mirroring the CPA structure of power-sharing,
wealth-sharing, and security reform. The security sector was
especially thorny, since there could be no peace without
dismantlement of the Janjaweed.

Presidency Views: Defusing Chad-Sudan Friction
-------------- -


6. (C) France, for instance, could play an active role in
addressing friction between Deby and Bashir, and Bonnecorse
admitted there had been much French engagement in recent
days. He informed the Deputy Secretary that Deby and Bashir
had now agreed to attend an 8 February meeting in Tripoli
under the auspices of AU Chairman Sassou-Nguessou, and
facilitated by Qhadaffi. CAR President General Bozize and
Chairperson Konare would also attend. There were hopes to
reach an accord to interdict proxy assistance by either party
to either Darfur rebels or breakaway Chadian military
elements, Bonnecorse said. The fact that the AU would
technically host, instead of Libya, was pivotal in Deby's
decision to attend the meeting, according to Bonnecorse.


7. (C) In Tripoli Deby and Bashir would also broach
monitoring of the border with Darfur. France, he suggested,
could make available aerial photography. Probed by the
Deputy Secretary about the French project to monitor the
border, Bonnecorse underscored the surveillance would
necessarily be incomplete, and would also involve Sudanese
and Chadian parties. Deby would only agree to the monitoring
on condition that Bashir engaged regular Sudanese troops.
Bashir however wanted to use Sudanese militias.

Presidency Views: Deby at Risk, Chad could fracture
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8. (C) Deby faced serious problems in Chad which Darfur had
exacerbated. His position was extremely fragile and he had
lost the support of at least half of the Zarghawa clan. His
clash with Sudan and his sparring with the World Bank left
Deby deeply isolated, and France worried that it remained his
last support. Justifying French support, Bonnecorse warned
Deby's departure would leave a vacuum that could lead to
violent civil war, with three to four different ethnic groups
ready to divide the territory, and Qhadaffi on the margins
prone to a misstep. Nonetheless, Deby would not collapse due
to a military attack, Bonnecorse thought. France meanwhile
continued to advise Deby to renew dialogue with the World
Bank and to go forward with the organization of fair and
transparent elections in May, inviting international
observers.


9. (C) Bonnecorse asked the Deputy Secretary about a recent
report that the USG may be amenable to a prolongation of
Deby's presidential mandate and the postponement of the
elections on the condition that Deby agree to step down
within 1-2 years. The options, according to Bonnecorse, were
either to force Deby to hold fair elections this spring -- in
which Deby will handily triumph, Bonnecorse predicted --- or
to support Deby for an agreed interim period. France would
not object to the latter scenario, Bonnecorse declared. The
Deputy Secretary said he was unaware of any USG discussion of
that nature. He said the USG was still trying to get a
better sense of Deby's current viability. Bonnecorse offered
that France did not yet have much of a reading about possible
successors, though a Zarghawa seemed likely. He noted that
this would be a bad sign considering their increasing
radicalization. Bonnecorse's deputy, Labriolle, dismissed as
Zarghawa fantasizing the rumor that Mini Minawi wants to
exploit the Darfur rebellion to take power in Chad.

Presidency Views: Chad may break with Taipei

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10. (C) Continued USG and EU pressure on Khartoum was
imperative, the Deputy Secretary said, especially on behalf
of CPA implementation. He acknowledged French ability to
contribute, particularly with Chad, and thanked Bonnecorse
for efforts in support of the February 8 Tripoli meeting and
the potential agreement on border monitoring. Chad, Libya
and Eritrea all exercised influence on Darfur rebels. He
suggested France and the USG could work together on Libya and
noted that the PRC has some leverage with Eritrea.
Bonnecorse commented, without elaborating, that Chad may look
into the option of breaking its relationship with Taiwan.
(Comment: The unstated implication was that the decision
could alter PRC positions on Darfur.)

Presidency Views: Cote d'Ivoire and Civil War
--------------


11. (C) Bonnecorse stated France believed Cote d'Ivoire was
on the brink of civil war. Divisions were profound and
hatred ran deep between extremists in the camps of Gbagbo and
the Force Nouvelles. It was a miracle, he said, that civil
war had been averted, thanks in large part to the strong
engagement of the UN and the AU. Presidential elections
appeared the only viable exit strategy and the only hope for
reconciliation. However, the international community -- the
AU, the Security Council, and the P-5 -- would have to deepen
its engagement in order to meet the 31 October target.
Sanctions, coupled with a more robust UNOCI, were the chief
counter to slippage on the election calendar. Otherwise,
Cote d'Ivoire would degenerate further and become like
Liberia in the 90's. Bonnecorse branded Gbagbo a fascist,
who commanded only a minority of the population and would
lose in elections. Gbagbo, like all fascists, employed
street agitators, armed thugs, and targeted propaganda. The
international community must never give the impression of
vacillation.

MOD: Yes on AMIS Transition, but a Hard Chore
--------------


12. (C) Concurring with the Deputy Secretary's analysis,
General Bentegeat, Chief of Defense, declared that France
shared the USG view on the need for AMIS transition into a UN
mission, noting the continuing financing challenges for AMIS,
whose budget will run out end March. The Deputy Secretary
observed that the USG budgetary processes, like those of the
EU, were geared toward UN peacekeeping. General Bentegeat
observed that AMIS had patent weaknesses, namely in terms of
intelligence, logistical planning, and transportation; the
chain of command was especially poor. Perhaps a NATO role
would be effective but to only a limited degree, he
suggested, adding that AMIS also needed technical advisers
"in the right places" to establish order.


13. (C) The General judged the transition to a UN mission
would be challenging. The General averred, speaking from
personal experience, that UN peacekeepers, when operating in
the absence of a peace accord and without a clearly defined
mission, were "absolutely ineffective." Hence, achieving
success at the Abuja talks should be the top priority. Given
notional projections of a 20,000-large force for Darfur, the
General added that the UN would also be hard put to find
adequate peacekeepers to deploy, even if current AMIS troops
took part. Sudanese President Bashir's rejection of
non-African peacekeepers was a further complicating factor,
he observed. The Deputy Secretary said he had urged Sudanese
VP Taha to look at a UN deployment as less problematic for
Khartoum than a continued worsening of the Darfur crisis and
consequent international opprobrium. There could also be
benefits, he suggested, from joint-integrated units comprised
of government, SPLA and potentially SLA troops operating
under UN oversight. Such units would have better chances to

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reintegrate Darfur rebels than standard Sudanese military.
At the same time, their deployment would enable the
government somewhat to reestablish sovereignty over Darfur.

MOD: Chad at Risk
--------------


14. (C) General Bentegeat said France provided some
assistance to refugee camps in Chad and through support for
NGOs. He called the French military role minor, apart from
helping with transportation between N'djamena and Abeche. By
all reports, the humanitarian situation near the border was
"very bad." French forces remained vigilant, worried at the
potential for a surge in cross-border refugees that would
exceed Chadian capacity. However, the chief French concern
was the existence of an ongoing Chadian rebellion.


15. (C) The Chad-Sudanese relationship remained "conflicted
and confused," the General commented. The cross-border
population lacked any national identity apart from their
particular ethnic group. In his measured response to the
Darfur crisis, Deby, a Zarghawa, had cut himself off from his
own ethnic group, and now was threatened by 2,000 armed
Zarghawa rebels based in Darfur, equipped by disparate
Sudanese parties. (Note: Bentegeat described Deby as a true
citizen of Chad, unlike other Zarghawa; he was trained in
France and spoke French, unlike his clansmen.) The Darfur
risk was not the main threat however to Deby. France worried
more about a possible coup in Chad, given the endemic
corruption of Deby's Zarghawa entourage. France had decided
to reinforce its garrison in N'djamena (now 1 battalion),who
would be prepared to evacuate the approximately 3,000 foreign
citizens through Cameroon in the event of upheaval.


16. (C) Deby had strengthened his position along the border
in the last month and his troops were able to repulse any
attack to the north of Abeche, the General judged, but the
southern border with the Central African Republic would be
more difficult. French forces moreover were conducting
aerial patrols along the Darfur border. Deby's regime was
most vulnerable to a coup in N'djamena where his allies are
corrupt, and there is dissatisfaction over his recent
alliance with the Darfur rebels. Chadian troops were amassed
alongside Darfur, and would have difficulty responding to
threats to the oil fields in the south. The General did not
consider Libya a major threat and noted Qhadaffi's
willingness to serve as an intermediary between Deby and
Bashir. Qhadaffi of course was capable of destabilizing
Chad, however, Deby could easily retaliate in kind, the
General asserted, calling the relationship a "balanced game."
Although anti-Deby rebels were divided into four different
cells, they were nonetheless capable of a "decisive victory"
through a coup in N'djamena, he claimed.


17. (C) Deby had lived amid uncertainty for years. He could
be assassinated in N'djamena at any time, General Bentegeat
suggested, or he could survive through the full term of
another presidential mandate. His health was also poor and
the General found him to be visibly tiring toward the close
of a 90 minute meeting together in January. France, he
assured the Deputy Secretary, had no illusions concerning
Deby. "We know his weaknesses" and Deby "is not a good
President." However, France sees no other alternative to
Deby in the near future. France does not support the regime,
the General stressed, and French troops will not fight
alongside Chadian troops. France only has a military
cooperation agreement with Chad, not a defense accord.


18. (C) The Deputy Secretary cited SRSG Pronk's concern that
instability in Chad, including the possible overthrow of
Deby, could exacerbate violence in Darfur and incite attacks
against refugee camps. He asked how France would react in
such circumstances. General Bentegeat responded that French
assets in the region were not that strong, but that France

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would react, as appropriate, in support of refugees in Chad,
but he could not foresee French intervention within Sudan.

MOD: UNMIL should help UNOCI
--------------


19. (C) The Deputy Secretary expressed USG support for the
French role in efforts to stabilize Cote d'Ivoire. Bentegeat
said France wanted to be working along with the international
community there, rather than on the front line. The General
appealed for the USG to help by supporting temporary troop
transfers from UNMIL in Liberia to UNOCI. Such support would
be consistent with past USG leadership in encouraging the UN
to look to regional reinforcement and management of UN
missions. The French believed that great progress had been
made on Liberia and the situation was certainly better than
in Cote d'Ivoire.


Participants
--------------


20. (U) Meeting at Elysee Palace:

The Deputy Secretary
Ambassador Stapleton
Michael Matera, D Executive Assistant
Taiya Smith, D Special Assistant for Africa and European
Issues
Richard Mills, D Senior Advisor for Public Affairs
Greg D'Elia, Embassy Africa Watcher

Michel de Bonnecorse, Counselor for African Affairs
Jacques Champagne de Labriolle, Charge de Mission
Bernard Diguet, Conseiller Technique
Interpreter

Meeting at Ministry of Defense:

The Deputy Secretary
Ambassador Stapleton
EUR PDAS Kurt Volker
Michael Matera, D Executive Assistant
Taiya Smith, D Special Assistant for Africa and European
Issues
Richard Mills, D Senior Advisor for Public Affairs
Christine Davies, D Special Assistant for Economic and
Development Issues
Greg D'Elia, Embassy Africa Watcher

General Henri Bentegeat, Chief of Defense
MG Christian Falzone, Deputy Chief of Staff
Jean-Marie Magnien, Diplomatic Adviser
MG Patrick de Rousiers, Head of Euro-Atlantic Division
Col. Charles Deleris


21. (U) Message cleared by the Office of the Deputy
Secretary.

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22. (U) Minimize considered.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton