Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS827
2006-02-08 17:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
FRENCH ON TURKISH PLAN FOR CYPRUS
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000827
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU FR EUN
SUBJECT: FRENCH ON TURKISH PLAN FOR CYPRUS
REF: STATE 16987
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000827
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU FR EUN
SUBJECT: FRENCH ON TURKISH PLAN FOR CYPRUS
REF: STATE 16987
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: France not only sees nothing new in the
January 24 "Gul proposal," but considers it essentially as a
step backward, according to MFA DAS-equivalents responsible
for Cyprus in the EU and UN. In their view, Turkey is
already obliged to fulfill its Ankara protocol commitments on
opening ports/airports to Cypriot vessels, and is thus not in
a position to demand concessions from Cyprus in return for
doing so. They saw few prospects for progress until after
the upcoming Greek Cypriot elections, at which time they
hoped the EU would be able to unblock funds for Turkish
Cypriots and the UN would re-engaged on the Cyprus issue.
They claimed that all sides were more or less at a loss as to
how to move things forward. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche to MFA DAS-equivalent
for Southern Europe Marine de Carne on February 3. Deputy
Polcouns and poloff met February 8 with de Carne and
Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel, DAS-equivalent for UN political
affairs, for an informed discussion of France's views.
3. (C) De Carne noted at the outset that the French found
nothing new in the January 24 "Gul proposal;" it was the same
as the plan that had been rejected by the May 30, 2004
referendum, with the difference that Turkey had subsequently
signed the EU's Customs Union protocol, and now had an
obligation to open its ports and airports to Cypriot ships
and aircraft. To the extent that the Turks were now seeking
Cypriot concessions in return for fulfilling their own
obligations, the Gul proposal "seems like a step backwards.
We had trouble considering it and explaining it to the
Cypriots." France had thus made clear to Turkey that it was
up to Turkey to take the first step, initially by
implementing its Ankara Protocol obligations. Only then
would France be willing to encourage Cyprus to do more.
4. (C) De Carne pointed to the remarks of FM Douste-Blazy,
who during a press availability with FM Gul in Ankara on
February 1, said that the UN remained the best framework
within which to solve the Cyprus question, but that it was
also necessary that Turkey progress "as rapidly as possible"
on the path of normalizing its relations with Cyprus. De
Carne echoed the FM in reminding us that the EU would
evaluate Turkey's progress on implementation of the customs
protocol later in the year. She repeated that Turkey must
make a gesture, no matter how limited.
5. (C) DAS-equivalent for UN political affairs Simon-Michel
underlined de Carne's points, noting that UNSYG Annan
appeared to believe that the time was not yet ripe for a new
round of negotiations. He also said it would be difficult to
envision any real engagement until after the Cypriot
elections, although he held out some hope that some progress
might still be made by the end of the year. At the same
time, he lamented that no one -- neither the UN, the UK, nor
France -- had any good ideas for moving forward.
6. (C) Asked how willing Cyprus might be to play its "veto"
card in the opening and/or closing of chapters in the early
part of Turkey's EU accession negotiations, de Carne said she
believed Cyprus would show patience and would not scupper
talks on particular chapters for the present. She made
clear, however, that the EU will scrutinize Turkey's
performance on the customs union question.
7. (C) Comment: Given public skepticism in France with
respect to eventual Turkish EU accession -- as manifested in
the constitutional amendment requiring a popular referendum
on Turkish membership, legislation on the Armenian genocide,
and the pre-presidential election posturing of PM de Villepin
and FM Douste-Blazy on the need for Turkish recognition of
Cyprus -- it seems unlikely at this time that France will
make any positive contributions to finding a solution on
Turkey-Cyprus issues.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU FR EUN
SUBJECT: FRENCH ON TURKISH PLAN FOR CYPRUS
REF: STATE 16987
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: France not only sees nothing new in the
January 24 "Gul proposal," but considers it essentially as a
step backward, according to MFA DAS-equivalents responsible
for Cyprus in the EU and UN. In their view, Turkey is
already obliged to fulfill its Ankara protocol commitments on
opening ports/airports to Cypriot vessels, and is thus not in
a position to demand concessions from Cyprus in return for
doing so. They saw few prospects for progress until after
the upcoming Greek Cypriot elections, at which time they
hoped the EU would be able to unblock funds for Turkish
Cypriots and the UN would re-engaged on the Cyprus issue.
They claimed that all sides were more or less at a loss as to
how to move things forward. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche to MFA DAS-equivalent
for Southern Europe Marine de Carne on February 3. Deputy
Polcouns and poloff met February 8 with de Carne and
Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel, DAS-equivalent for UN political
affairs, for an informed discussion of France's views.
3. (C) De Carne noted at the outset that the French found
nothing new in the January 24 "Gul proposal;" it was the same
as the plan that had been rejected by the May 30, 2004
referendum, with the difference that Turkey had subsequently
signed the EU's Customs Union protocol, and now had an
obligation to open its ports and airports to Cypriot ships
and aircraft. To the extent that the Turks were now seeking
Cypriot concessions in return for fulfilling their own
obligations, the Gul proposal "seems like a step backwards.
We had trouble considering it and explaining it to the
Cypriots." France had thus made clear to Turkey that it was
up to Turkey to take the first step, initially by
implementing its Ankara Protocol obligations. Only then
would France be willing to encourage Cyprus to do more.
4. (C) De Carne pointed to the remarks of FM Douste-Blazy,
who during a press availability with FM Gul in Ankara on
February 1, said that the UN remained the best framework
within which to solve the Cyprus question, but that it was
also necessary that Turkey progress "as rapidly as possible"
on the path of normalizing its relations with Cyprus. De
Carne echoed the FM in reminding us that the EU would
evaluate Turkey's progress on implementation of the customs
protocol later in the year. She repeated that Turkey must
make a gesture, no matter how limited.
5. (C) DAS-equivalent for UN political affairs Simon-Michel
underlined de Carne's points, noting that UNSYG Annan
appeared to believe that the time was not yet ripe for a new
round of negotiations. He also said it would be difficult to
envision any real engagement until after the Cypriot
elections, although he held out some hope that some progress
might still be made by the end of the year. At the same
time, he lamented that no one -- neither the UN, the UK, nor
France -- had any good ideas for moving forward.
6. (C) Asked how willing Cyprus might be to play its "veto"
card in the opening and/or closing of chapters in the early
part of Turkey's EU accession negotiations, de Carne said she
believed Cyprus would show patience and would not scupper
talks on particular chapters for the present. She made
clear, however, that the EU will scrutinize Turkey's
performance on the customs union question.
7. (C) Comment: Given public skepticism in France with
respect to eventual Turkish EU accession -- as manifested in
the constitutional amendment requiring a popular referendum
on Turkish membership, legislation on the Armenian genocide,
and the pre-presidential election posturing of PM de Villepin
and FM Douste-Blazy on the need for Turkish recognition of
Cyprus -- it seems unlikely at this time that France will
make any positive contributions to finding a solution on
Turkey-Cyprus issues.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton