Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS792
2006-02-08 08:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

WHA A/S SHANNON'S 2/2 MEETINGS WITH FRENCH

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON FR AR VE BL BR CO CA IR HA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000792 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA AND NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON FR AR VE BL BR CO CA IR HA
SUBJECT: WHA A/S SHANNON'S 2/2 MEETINGS WITH FRENCH
OFFICIALS

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
ONS 1.4 B/D

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000792

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA AND NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON FR AR VE BL BR CO CA IR HA
SUBJECT: WHA A/S SHANNON'S 2/2 MEETINGS WITH FRENCH
OFFICIALS

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
ONS 1.4 B/D


1. (C) SUMMARY: A/S Shannon visited Paris on February 2 to
discuss the full range of WHA issues with officials from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency. On Haiti,
Shannon encouraged France to consider symbolic gestures
during the election period to demonstrate GOF engagement, an
action the GOF said it would consider. He reviewed the
evolution of U.S relations with Venezuela, and was told that
in the GOF,s opinion, Venezuela "would not agree" to a
nuclear Iran. Shannon praised President Chirac,s message to
Bolivian President Morales urging cooperation with the U.S.
French officials said they would use GOF influence to work
with Morales and encourage him not to be overly influenced by
Venezuelan President Chavez. French interlocutors also
briefed Shannon on FM Douste-Blazy's recent trip to Colombia,
reviewed the recent elections in Canada, and discussed French
relations with Brazil and Argentina. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) A/S Shannon met with A/S-equivalent for the Americas
Daniel Parfait, President Chirac,s advisor on the Americas
Dominique Boche, PDAS-equivalent for the Americas Jean-Marc
Laforet and DAS-equivalents Yves Oudin, Pierre-Alain
Coffinier and Michel Pinard. He was accompanied by DCM Karl
Hofmann, POL M/C Josiah Rosenblatt, ECON/C Ken Merten,
D/POL/C Bruce Turner and Poloff Peter Kujawinski (notetaker).

--------------
GENERAL
--------------


3. (C) Shannon explained U.S. attempts to link democratic
institutions with economic development in Central and South
America. Parfait and Boche both agreed that development was
needed to sustain democracy. Shannon expressed the hope that
the U.S. and France would find ways to deepen and broaden
their cooperation to address the challenges of the region,

given common purposes in many areas. His interlocutors
agreed, noting that French and U.S. efforts were often
complementary, since each tended to have more influence in
different countries.

--------------
HAITI AND THE CARIBBEAN
--------------


4. (C) Shannon explained that, as technical conditions for
holding elections improved, violence became the only means to
stop the elections. It was for this reason that the U.S.
planned a Coast Guard ship visit as a symbolic gesture to
boost security. Furthermore, the U.S. would push MINUSTAH to
be active in the interim period between the first round and
likely second round of the elections. Shannon encouraged
France to also consider a symbolic gesture. Parfait said
that time might be too short for sending gendarmes or
helicopters, but he was open to considering all
possibilities, and would pass on this request immediately to
the Prime Minister,s office.


5. (C) Shannon said the U.S. was prepared to live with
whoever won the elections. Boche expressed concern, in the
event of Preval's election, that Aristide might return.
Shannon said the U.S. would speak to South Africa to try to
prevent Aristide from leaving there and speculated that
Preval would see that it was not in his own interest that
Aristide return. He argued that Aristide's only claim to
legitimacy would be in the event of no elections. Parfait
said the GOF had already demarched South Africa on this
subject, and had encouraged them to keep Aristide there.
Shannon said that in a post-election scenario, MINUSTAH
should begin to transition from static security to
peace-building operations such as disarmament. Parfait
agreed and said a post-election Core Group meeting would be
important to discuss steps forward.


6. (C) Parfait said that Haiti was at the top of the list of
discussions France had with all countries in South America,
but especially in the Caribbean. In French overseas
territories there, the presence of illegal Haitian immigrants
was contributing to a rise in tensions. He said Spain, the

Netherlands, France and representatives from the European
Commission had recently met to discuss the Caribbean, in
particular the rise in violence and drug smuggling. Parfait
suggested that the U.S. join the next meeting of these
interested parties. Shannon agreed that this would be
worthwhile.

--------------
VENEZUELA
--------------


7. (C) During his meeting with Parfait, Shannon reviewed the
evolutions in the U.S.-Venezuela relationship, and explained
in particular why the U.S. had decided not to sell lethal
military equipment to Venezuela. Shannon added that the U.S.
was increasingly concerned that Chavez's anti-American
rhetoric was his core message, and furthermore, Chavez was
seeking to disrupt good relations between the U.S. and other
South American countries. Parfait thanked Shannon for his
explanation, remarking that it helped him better understand
U.S. policy. He added that during a recent conversation with
President Chirac, Chavez claimed the U.S. was trying to kill
him. Boche cautioned against provoking Chavez, given his
paranoid tendencies; there was a risk of escalation.
Moreover, Chavez was genuinely popular in the region, he
noted.


8. (C) Shannon enumerated Chavez's attempts to destroy the
historically good relationship between the U.S. and
Venezuelan armed forces and posit the U.S. as the theoretical
invading force during Venezuelan exercises. Asked about
Venezuelan interest in purchasing submarines from France,
Boche insisted that discussions were at a preliminary stage
and that no decisions had been taken, a statement echoed by
Parfait. Boche acknowledged that there were currently some
bilateral tensions between France and Venezuela and that U.S.
concerns were also a factor to be taken into consideration.
But he challenged the U.S. to explain why such sales would
constitute a threat to U.S. interests. (Comment: Boche's
insistence that no decision had been made on selling
submarines to Venezuela contrasted with recent statements
made by Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Maurice
Gordault-Montagne (Boche's superior) to the Ambassador
suggesting that France ultimately would not agree to sell the
submarines. End comment.) Parfait promised transparency
with the U.S. on the matter.


9. (C) Parfait briefed Shannon on his recent trip to
Venezuela, in which he and MFA Secretary General Stanislas de
Laboulaye discussed Iran with Venezuelan officials. The
GOF,s conclusion, said Parfait, was that Venezuela would not
agree to a nuclear Iran, although it needed to be convinced
that Iran had crossed the line in attempting to gain a
nuclear weapon capacity. A key to convincing Venezuela would
be a strong statement from IAEA Director General el-Baradei,
said Parfait. Although the GOF understands it would be hard
for Chavez to vote against Iran, it believes he will do so if
the IAEA statements are strong enough, said Parfait. (Note:
Venezuela was one of three countries that voted against
referring Iran to the UNSC. End comment)

--------------
BOLIVIA
--------------


10. (C) Shannon expressed appreciation for the messages on
the importance of governing responsibly that President Chirac
passed to President Morales during the latter's visit to
Paris. Boche responded that Morales was aware that he lacked
international experience and needed international support and
good relations with Europe and the U.S. Morales was also
willing to listen to advice, he added, and recently had
called Chirac to thank him for receiving him in Paris and
solicit his advice on traveling to an unnamed country.
(Comment: Iran. End comment.) Boche said Chirac had argued
against such a visit, leading to Morales' agreement to
postpone the trip. Boche said France wanted to help Morales,
which explained Cooperation Minister Girardin's attendance at
his inauguration. Parfait said the relationship between
Presidents Chirac and Morales seemed to be very good, due in
part to Morales, "admiration" for Chirac,s long-standing

interest in indigenous peoples.


11. (C) Shannon confirmed, based on his own meeting with
Morales in La Paz, that Morales appeared to have understood
the French message on governance, noting that he had
discerned a new openness to relations with the U.S. Boche
said Morales' only complaint about the U.S. had been that
U.S. assistance was conditional; otherwise he had assured
France that any rules affecting foreign companies would be
transparent and designed to last. Shannon cautioned that
Morales would come under pressure from his own constituency's
expectations for more radical change, adding that the U.S.
and others could use this to their advantage. He said
President Bush had called Morales on February 1 to
congratulate him on his election. The U.S., said Shannon,
was not looking for a fight; it was looking for a
relationship. Parfait welcomed this, and said France (and
the EU) was prepared "to do a lot" in Bolivia.

--------------
COLOMBIA
--------------


12. (C) A/S Shannon asked Parfait for a read-out on French FM
Douste-Blazy,s January trip to Colombia. Parfait said that
it was a good trip even though there has heretofore been no
movement on release of FARC-held hostages, especially Ingrid
Betancourt. Before continuing, Parfait said he felt obliged
to note that French relations with Colombia are "excellent,"
that there is between $300 and $400 million of French
investment in Colombia, and that Colombia vies with Brazil as
one of the largest sources of Latin American students in
France.


13. (C) In explaining the recent Douste-Blazy hostage release
initiative, Parfait said that President Uribe had surprised
the GOF by almost immediately announcing "contrary to the
agreed plan" the French initiative publicly. "Does the FARC
agree with our proposal?" Parfait asked; "unfortunately we
still don,t know; we don,t have an answer from them."
Parfait said the GOF realized that it was very likely being
manipulated by the FARC. He said the GOF had been talking
with Spain and Switzerland about obtaining a stronger
communique. Parfait added that the GOF was still talking
with FM Barco about the initiative and that those discussions
had been "very good." The GOF has also been in touch with
the Catholic Church as well as a representative of the
communist party to seek their input. Parfait noted that this
hostage return proposal is the "most serious proposal on the
table" and that it seems like "a good moment to get
something." A/S Shannon replied that the U.S. sees the
hostage issue as a Colombian issue and one that the GOC needs
to determine how to resolve. He opined that the FARC would
use any hostage release to try and create a problem for
President Uribe.


14. (C) Parfait said he wanted to reassure A/S Shannon that
the GOF and "the Europeans" harbor no "romantic" illusions
about the FARC. He said that France supports the fight
against the FARC, has "nothing against" President Uribe, and
has "nothing against your aggressive policy" in Colombia.
Boche added that the Betancourt case was a delicate issue for
France and assured Shannon that France would act in a
transparent manner and that it had no interest in weakening
Colombian president Aribe.

--------------
CANADA
--------------


15. (C) Boche expressed concern that new Canadian PM Harper
had no connection to France. He said GOF leaders were
interested in developing a personal relationship with him as
soon as possible, in order to reestablish the close ties of
the past. Boche said Canada was an important country for
France, given the convergence of French and Canadian
approaches to such issues as peacekeeping, assistance and
development, and multilateralism. Shannon responded that
good French-Canadian relations were good for Canada and the
Western Hemisphere, noting that the conservative party had
performed surprisingly well in traditional liberal bastions

in Quebec. He praised the political symbolism of an
Anglophone from western Canada who spoke French during the
election campaign. Boche responded that Harper's apparent
receptivity to Quebec's specific situation and a favorable
economic situation bode well for keeping separatist
tendencies under control.

--------------
BRAZIL
--------------


16. (C) Parfait said Brazil is France,s "main partner" in
Latin America and the GOF believes Brazil plays an important
stabilizing role in the region. He noted that French
companies consider a presence in Brazil to be an essential
component to any global strategy. Shannon agreed and said
that Brazil was an emerging democratic power. Parfait
mentioned a February 28 conference on the financing of
development, which would include consideration of President
Chirac,s pet project: an international tax on airline
tickets. Brazil would be making a decision, said Parfait, on
whether it would support Chirac,s project. Parfait added
that France had asked Brazilian President Lula da Silva to
exercise a "moderating influence" on Venezuelan President
Chavez.

--------------
ARGENTINA
--------------

17.(C) Parfait said France is worried that Argentina remains
confronted with "lots of problems," particularly economic
ones. He noted that French firms in Argentina had lost
considerable amounts of money in 2001-2002 and that French
economic interests in the country remain significant.
Parfait said that France was concerned about the lack of
fiscal reforms and the quick resurgence of inflation. Given
President Kirchner,s weak and unpredictable economic policy,
there was little incentive for foreigners to invest in
Argentina. More broadly, Parfait reported, the GOF was
"unsure" of Kirchner,s long-term political and economic
intentions. Parfait explained that in his most recent trip
to Buenos Aires his primary goal was to "maintain the
relationship" and to "express disappointment about their
economic policies." He noted that, for their part, the
Argentines were very interested in a visit from President
Chirac and strongly encouraged Parfait to press for one after
returning to Paris. Parfait explained that no such trip is
planned for President Chirac at this time and that "to go
that far, you have to be going to other places in the region
too." Despite the economic and political worries, French
interests there are significant.


19. (C) Parfait asked whether the USG still had special
concerns about the Tri-Border Region between Argentina,
Brazil and Paraguay. A/S Shannon said that the USG has good
cooperation with all three governments and that those
governments were also concerned about the money laundering
and other international criminal activity in the region. He
reported that Argentina, as the only country in the region to
have experienced international terrorism on its soil, worked
closely with relevant USG agencies in monitoring activities
in the region. A/S Shannon noted that Brazil in particular
had a problem in that it hosts a large ethnic Syrian
population which has some small radicalized Islamic elements
in its midst.


20. (U) A/S Shannon cleared this cable.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton